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Good morning, hackers.

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Welcome to the Lowdown presented by Maze, our code security partners for this podcast.

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Guys, I don't know if you can tell, but we are not in my basement.

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Matt is not in his studio, and we're not at PlanetSkale headquarters.

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Guys, we are at DEFCON.

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We are at Hacker Summer Camp having a great old time.

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Matt, how's your Vegas experience going for you so far?

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I got to say, your boy is not 19 anymore.

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Yeah, I did the thing I always do.

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I get to Thursday and I changed my flight to a day earlier.

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So I, as you can hear, my voice is maybe at about a 40 out of a hundred right now.

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So love you for sticking through this.

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I also just want to say thanks to the biohacking village for hosting us here, the WeHack Health crew, because we were having a hard time finding a good spot where we could film this because DEF CON makes it, you know, so that not everyone's just.

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in backgrounds of photos and all this kind of stuff, which is great.

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It makes sense.

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There's people here that don't want to be seen and on the internet and all this kind of stuff.

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We actually got to go to dinner last night with a bunch of creators.

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We took over a whole Korean barbecue restaurant.

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Shout out Sean from Miscreants for setting that up.

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But, like, case in point, Jack Recider from Darknet Diaries was there.

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Yeah.

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Not in photos.

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We took a big group photo, and he, like, scurries away.

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He's there.

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We have proof, sort of.

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Yeah, sure.

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Like, he gave me a little bracelet.

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Yeah, man.

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But, yeah, the homies are out, you know?

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So it's really cool to be here another year.

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I've been coming every year since, like, 2009.

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What was your first?

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Oh, first was DEFCON 21.

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What is that?

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2020 or 2013.

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Yeah.

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Yeah, yeah.

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That's only a few years after me.

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That was actually the first time that I did the Black Hat DEFCON double headers.

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If you're not aware, Black Hat is kind of like the more corporate, a little more sales heavy, rightfully so, different kind of organizations.

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Conference before DEFCON, and then DEFCON happens after.

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And so when I was 19 at the time in 2013, you know, I was a little more spry and I could do that.

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No issue.

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I did the back to back this year for the first time in 13 years.

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And I am I'm fried.

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Yeah, so my first year, I think I did Sunday to Sunday, something like that.

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But then pretty quickly, I actually spoke in 2011.

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So like 2009, my first ever thing.

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I got my talk accepted 2011.

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Black Hat, the second ever B-Sides LV, maybe third.

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And then DEFCON that Saturday.

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I had to give the same talk three times back then.

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I will say it is much easier to get through a full week in Vegas not drinking booze.

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here yeah like it's seven days like vegas while drinking is a three-day city yes i totally agree um it's nice i highly recommend if you're in the industry and you haven't gone out in here yet at least do one defcon man like everyone here is so nice and it's gotten so big where there are villages for literally every sector of cyber security if you're an embedded person if you're a red teamer if you're a physical pen tester you like to break down doors there's literally a spot for you not an ad just literally it's that it's that great so come hang out

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We're literally in, we said we're in the biohacking village.

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We're in the village hall.

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We've done a couple of laps already this morning.

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It's my favorite thing to do at DEFCON because these village organizers are so happy to be here and so passionate that you're at their village checking their hard workout.

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Right?

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So the maritime hacking village is like flagging people in and they're like, come on, hack our boat.

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Check out this drone ship that takes down drug mules.

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Right.

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You know, off of Florida.

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And, like, they're so excited you're there.

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They wanted to show you what was going on.

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We walked into the DDoS village.

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They're really excited to see low level because one of the routers that they have there, the only reason they have it is because they watched your video.

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Right.

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Yeah, yeah, yeah.

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Like, it's so, so, so cool.

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Well, A, because we're who we are that, like, you know, some people kind of have the parasocial, like, oh, cool.

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I'm excited.

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I've said hi to so many awesome people.

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It's not even halfway over.

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We're only, like, this is day one of DEFCON.

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So, yeah.

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Yeah, I'm going to give low levels some crap because they only recognize him, which means he's not promoting the podcast on his videos enough yet.

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Come on, man.

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Come on.

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No, I'm just messing with you.

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Yeah, we have very different audiences.

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Black Hat, I was getting pulled over left and right.

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People shoving stuff in my face.

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But that like...

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It's just so cool to get that.

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Because we're just screaming into the void.

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Even here, we're recording live.

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No one's watching us.

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We're chilling.

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I mean, biohacking homie who's running the audio is watching us.

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But we scream into the void a lot in our house.

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It's really cool to come here and talk to you guys who actually watch and listen to this.

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Get feedback, good and bad.

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And mostly good, honestly.

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People are just stoked that we're around.

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Yeah.

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Not just that, not just like stroke our ego stuff, but like they literally only had that router on that table because they watch your video.

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Yeah.

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Yeah.

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I was telling people that come up to me, it's like content is such kind of like a one way thing.

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Like you're like, oh no, surely we comment on your videos.

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But it's like for us, we put the video into the machine and like that's the end of it, right?

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So having people come up physically and be like, hey, I watched your video and like I got this job because I brought it up in an interview or like, oh, I found this bug is the way you mentioned this thing.

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Like it just, it's really, really nice to hear that.

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DEFCON is a very fun community event for us in that regard.

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And then this is the only place that the kind of stuff that happens.

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Like I was at a party last night for like an old like threat intel sharing malware email list that I've been in and out of and stuff.

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And they still run a party.

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And I had people coming up to me saying, hey, I run the SOC for this whole state.

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And we share your videos around the SOC.

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That's how we find out about some stuff.

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My boss wants to meet you.

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Can we hang out tomorrow?

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I had a CIA agent come up to me and be like, hey, man, love your stuff.

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And I'm like, what?

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That's crazy.

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That's crazy.

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okay cool CIA is on Instagram I guess you know whatever it is so anyway just shout thank you guys for doing that thank you for coming up and like we even said it just now walking back from lunch that there's probably only a small percentage that actually like take the time to even say that to us that you know might recognize us walking around it's just we're grateful for it so thank you appreciate that

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The other bit, right?

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So DEFCON and the villages are really where it's at, and it's super cool.

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But you also got to meet a general this morning because we have press badges.

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Yeah, so interesting.

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I have a press badge, and I'm like, oh, what's on the press agenda today?

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And it was like, oh, General Nakasone, former director of the NSA.

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I'm going to go to that press meeting and see what he has to say.

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It was a conversation about, like, what does AI mean for national security?

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We talked about, like, the whole open way conversations.

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It was interesting to hear, like,

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what he has to say with his perspective on it, right?

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So super interesting there, for sure.

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Again, just things that only happen at DEF CON.

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Yeah, only at DEF CON, baby.

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This kind of stuff.

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For me, it was earlier in the week, Black Hat.

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So DEF CON's really this, the community.

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It's really, really community-driven.

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You can tell.

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Even, like, 34 years in, it's very grassroots.

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All the villages are run by the village organizers.

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It's not like some corporate entity that's putting on these villages, right?

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Black Hat is very corporate entity, and it feels like it.

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This is like, whatever.

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I'm not even saying that's an awful thing.

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It just is what it is.

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Different, isn't it?

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But the events at Black Hat are all by our corporate partners, friends of ours that run businesses or sponsors of ours, or people that we know that work in the industry that invite us to these events.

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And so, yeah, I'd say earlier in the week, it was very corporate event heavy, and now we're like,

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in the community, all this kind of stuff.

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I will say it was pretty cool earlier in the week.

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A mutual friend of ours, Clint Gibbler, who runs TLDRSec Newsletter, now at OpenAI, got to invite us to the OpenAI party, and I got to meet the co-founder of OpenAI and talk to him about this kind of stuff.

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He asked me directly, he was like, what would happen if we released...

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The cyber model, no guardrails, most capable cyber thing we could produce.

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If we just released it tomorrow, what would happen?

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And we had like a long conversation about this.

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The co-founder of OpenAI.

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Again, this is only Black Hat and DefCon.

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Only Black Hat and DefCon, baby.

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And a little teaser, we are trying to get him to come talk to us.

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on camera about that.

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Like, I don't know if it'll happen.

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No promises.

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Future episode.

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Hit that subscribe button.

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Yeah.

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Yeah.

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Yeah.

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But like he did, he was like, I'm down.

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I want to keep talking about this.

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Cyber is super important.

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Right.

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You know?

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So Greg, thank you.

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If you're, if you're, you're not listening to this.

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Greg, thank you.

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I know you're the biggest fan.

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Thank you for taking the time to talk to me over there.

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But, yeah, that kind of stuff is just great.

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Did you have any highlights?

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You said you haven't been to Black Hat in quite a while.

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A long time.

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Did anything stand out to you?

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Obviously, it's way different.

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A lot of AI companies.

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A lot of companies getting real deep into AI.

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Which is like completely expected, right?

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Because that is where the industry is going.

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And I totally get it.

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It just makes me begin to ask, like, how many products are there left to build?

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You know what I mean?

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Like, what else are we going to make here, guys?

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The joke that I've been making, there's this word.

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I shouldn't.

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I've said this line so many times this week.

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I should look up the word.

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There's a word in science about how evolution keeps producing crabs.

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Like in the tree of life, crab-like things have evolved independently of one another so many times because it's like a very efficient body or whatever it is, right?

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I'm not whatever.

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Sure.

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Okay.

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Cool.

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I said, that's happening now.

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Like two years ago, AI was in the startup village, right?

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And like, maybe it was on a few like posters or whatever, but it wasn't like the headline in any of the big booths.

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Last year, it was like, okay, it's basically all the startups and some of the big booths are definitely, it's percolating, it's percolating, it's percolating.

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Some of the, some of the big AI companies caught some big VC checks and got booths and stuff like this.

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This year,

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I think it would be easier to count the booths that didn't have AI as a headline than it would possibly do it, whatever.

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And a couple years ago, it was like, this is how we're trying to be different.

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Like, oh, no, we're not just an AI sock because that already exists.

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We're doing this niche thing over here.

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And I'd say the vast majority now is like evolution has produced a lot of crabs over here.

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Like they've all kind of migrated towards the same company, probably due to like investor pressure is my gut.

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Right.

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Yeah.

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If they're all VC funded, the VCs are like looking at some of the big A.I.

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socks going, well, why aren't you doing that?

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You know, kind of thing.

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And no, no, no, no.

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We were trying to do this niche.

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Well, that niche isn't big enough.

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Like you got to do this.

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Right.

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So I could see that happening.

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Sprinkle some A.I.

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in there, please.

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Yeah, yeah.

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So a lot, I think I heard 75, 77 AI SOC companies.

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That's so crazy.

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Yeah, yeah, yeah.

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So obviously, I'm not saying it's universal.

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Some are standouts.

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Some do have differentiators.

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Some of the earlier players to the game are doing really cool stuff.

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It's just, it's hard being in the industry, looking at that and going, how do I make sense of this?

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Like, if I'm putting one of my old job hats on, how do I pick?

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00:10:38.305 --> 00:10:38.525
Right.

237
00:10:38.865 --> 00:10:39.706
It's like, oh, my God.

238
00:10:40.346 --> 00:10:49.712
So to kind of transition to the next part of the podcast, one of the highlights that I actually did have from Black Hat on the first of all, the two keynotes at Black Hat were very, very good.

239
00:10:49.732 --> 00:10:51.373
The first one was Dave Weston.

240
00:10:51.393 --> 00:10:52.173
He goes by Dwizzle.

241
00:10:53.174 --> 00:10:56.816
He is a AI VP at Microsoft.

242
00:10:57.136 --> 00:11:01.739
And he kind of gave this presentation on like what happens to vulnerabilities, what happens to.

243
00:11:02.359 --> 00:11:06.902
exploitation when AI makes vulnerabilities no longer a scarcity, right?

244
00:11:06.922 --> 00:11:08.143
Like what does that do to the market?

245
00:11:08.163 --> 00:11:14.007
It's a whole conversation about where the actual businesses are that matter in like the five to 10 year span.

246
00:11:14.307 --> 00:11:26.556
And what's kind of cool about the conversation is like what it does lead to is like a market that truly incentivizes the money being in formal verification and memory safety software, as opposed to right now where it's just like reactionary defense type stuff.

247
00:11:26.616 --> 00:11:26.796
Right.

248
00:11:27.836 --> 00:11:29.598
And then the second keynote, which really interesting,

249
00:11:30.378 --> 00:11:34.702
Jan, I don't know his last name, it's like a Russian name, it's very hard to pronounce.

250
00:11:34.982 --> 00:11:37.504
Assistant professor at ASU, the author of Anger.

251
00:11:37.584 --> 00:11:42.289
So Anger is a symbolic execution engine for doing vulnerable research in reverse engineering.

252
00:11:42.849 --> 00:11:50.256
He gave a really good talk on what is left for the human to do when you're doing vulnerable research now that AI is a thing.

253
00:11:50.616 --> 00:11:55.560
And he gave this really cool graph that basically showed what they did at ASU on accident because they actually had

254
00:11:56.601 --> 00:12:00.986
unlimited codex spend that ASC was paying for that ASC was not aware of that they were paying for.

255
00:12:01.026 --> 00:12:03.249
So like a million or two dollars later, they fixed it.

256
00:12:03.329 --> 00:12:13.521
But they actually proved that a single Mythos instance based on the numbers that Mythos reported they found bugs in the Linux kernel is less performant

257
00:12:14.001 --> 00:12:17.344
than a bunch of separate codex agents.

258
00:12:17.625 --> 00:12:32.077
So the actual hard problem is still left to the human to do the orchestration and writing the harnesses and to use the Cloudflare harness that we talk about all the time as the magnum opus for the security harness that makes AI's actually good.

259
00:12:32.097 --> 00:12:40.585
So there still are products to build, research to do, and problems to solve for humans in the world of orchestration for VR, which is really interesting.

260
00:12:40.825 --> 00:12:51.181
In doing that, by the way, they said they found over a thousand non-root-to-root LPEs in the Linux kernel using a tool they came up with.

261
00:12:51.201 --> 00:12:53.925
They're currently in Disclosure trying to figure out, like, what do we do?

262
00:12:53.945 --> 00:12:55.968
Because there aren't enough people on the Linux security team.

263
00:12:56.248 --> 00:12:58.789
to patch by hand 1,000 LPEs.

264
00:12:58.849 --> 00:13:00.349
Do we now Vibecode patches?

265
00:13:00.409 --> 00:13:04.010
What does that do for the actual state of the Linux kernel software quality, right?

266
00:13:04.351 --> 00:13:19.215
But it was a very interesting opener to an otherwise— not that Black Hat's a non-technical conference, but it's a little more marketing and salesy— to have him be there and kind of anchor it in the reality of, like, this is where the vulns occur, this is where the breaches start, was really, really nice, for more I said.

267
00:13:19.679 --> 00:13:22.360
I've got two follow-ups on that exact story.

268
00:13:22.760 --> 00:13:27.181
So I feel like we're actually in a sine wave pattern of this.

269
00:13:28.181 --> 00:13:31.582
This was my mantra back two years ago.

270
00:13:31.742 --> 00:13:33.803
AI is starting to become ubiquitous.

271
00:13:33.883 --> 00:13:35.543
Coding agents are starting to come out.

272
00:13:36.704 --> 00:13:43.346
I was saying, hey, our next couple of years, I was calling it scaffolding at the time, because harness wasn't really a phrase that we were using yet.

273
00:13:43.666 --> 00:13:45.226
I was like, it's really going to be in the scaffolding.

274
00:13:45.246 --> 00:13:47.447
I was using a tool called Klein for a while.

275
00:13:49.087 --> 00:13:54.912
a Claude code, like precursor type agent automation engine that was using the models.

276
00:13:55.392 --> 00:14:01.937
And so I was saying, oh, it's all going to be scaffolding and context management was like my sound bite.

277
00:14:01.978 --> 00:14:04.800
You can go back and like I said it a million times a couple years ago, right?

278
00:14:05.360 --> 00:14:07.142
And then Opus 4.6 dropped.

279
00:14:07.722 --> 00:14:11.084
And I was like, oh, the models still have a lot of room to get better.

280
00:14:11.324 --> 00:14:12.545
I didn't know.

281
00:14:12.665 --> 00:14:13.145
No one knew that.

282
00:14:13.245 --> 00:14:16.587
No one realized that the models could still get that much better, right?

283
00:14:16.747 --> 00:14:27.373
An Opus 4.6 out of the box, no harnesses, no scaffolding, no context management could do things that the best of the best of the best tools, like award-winning tools.

284
00:14:27.913 --> 00:14:30.174
like couldn't do a few months before that, right?

285
00:14:30.194 --> 00:14:30.995
A few weeks before that.

286
00:14:31.415 --> 00:14:32.435
And so this is the sine wave.

287
00:14:32.475 --> 00:14:34.236
It's like, oh, harnesses, harnesses, harnesses.

288
00:14:34.396 --> 00:14:37.158
Oh crap, the models are actually way, way, way better.

289
00:14:37.558 --> 00:14:39.919
And now I feel like we're in another part of the sine wave.

290
00:14:41.120 --> 00:14:43.681
The harnesses have been the topic of the week for me again, right?

291
00:14:44.141 --> 00:14:50.384
Because we're all now realizing the new reality of model capabilities, open weight model capabilities.

292
00:14:50.764 --> 00:14:51.205
And again,

293
00:14:52.085 --> 00:14:56.707
The real, real juice from the squeeze is, oh, how good is your harness?

294
00:14:56.727 --> 00:14:57.327
Right.

295
00:14:57.628 --> 00:14:58.308
What can you do?

296
00:14:58.728 --> 00:15:02.730
What can you point it at specifically, like, when it comes to vulnerability research?

297
00:15:03.110 --> 00:15:06.031
Or I'm hearing a lot about auto-remediation, right?

298
00:15:06.071 --> 00:15:07.252
Like, oh, can I fix things?

299
00:15:07.412 --> 00:15:09.673
Not just find them, but fix them at the same time, stuff like this.

300
00:15:10.353 --> 00:15:10.994
The second...

301
00:15:11.634 --> 00:15:15.997
like story that I heard this week, some research that dropped out of 1Password.

302
00:15:16.198 --> 00:15:23.123
My friend Keith started their security research department there just recently, and they just dropped their first research paper.

303
00:15:23.503 --> 00:15:38.534
They went and studied a lot of these AI companies that are like partnering and doing a lot of these find and fix vulnerabilities in open source software type stuff, like Patch the Planet, that we're hopefully going to talk to Dan Guido soon about.

304
00:15:40.716 --> 00:15:45.658
Well, 1Password did some research on a bunch of the public PRs for these things.

305
00:15:46.318 --> 00:15:55.461
And yeah, they fixed the vulns, but in significant percentage of the time, they actually introduced new problems or broke new code.

306
00:15:55.781 --> 00:16:00.063
So it says only 26% of the patches generated were actually usable.

307
00:16:00.503 --> 00:16:08.346
And again, the title of the paper is very much targeted towards humans in the loop are still very much necessary in this.

308
00:16:08.986 --> 00:16:20.089
This was good news for anyone in this industry that's kind of nervous about all of this, is that even the best of the best, I think Trail of Bits is doing fantastic work, partnering with OpenAI's best models.

309
00:16:20.189 --> 00:16:22.670
These are very, very capable things.

310
00:16:22.690 --> 00:16:24.750
There's still cracks, it seems.

311
00:16:24.770 --> 00:16:26.371
I'm excited to ask Dan about this.

312
00:16:26.431 --> 00:16:28.871
I haven't seen their reaction to the 1Password research.

313
00:16:28.891 --> 00:16:32.953
We're seeing that even in the effort with Ubuntu to rewrite all the core utils in Rust.

314
00:16:33.113 --> 00:16:33.953
Even if you write...

315
00:16:34.733 --> 00:16:43.780
code in a memory-safe language, A, you're still vulnerable to traditional logic errors, cryptographic misimplementation, DOSes through a vector misindexing.

316
00:16:44.080 --> 00:16:49.084
But on top of that, I think it was Casey Moratori that said this on the Stand Up, the Primogens podcast.

317
00:16:49.484 --> 00:16:57.610
When you have tools that have certain failures in their behavior, they don't do exactly what they're supposed to do,

318
00:16:58.310 --> 00:16:59.451
that is the feature.

319
00:16:59.551 --> 00:17:00.992
Like, that is what people get used to.

320
00:17:01.312 --> 00:17:08.877
And if you have infrastructure built around those edge cases and then you completely change them, that in and of itself is also a vulnerability.

321
00:17:08.897 --> 00:17:11.939
So, yeah, the code is safer, but it's also different.

322
00:17:12.179 --> 00:17:12.699
You know what I mean?

323
00:17:12.719 --> 00:17:18.363
So it's rewriting or even fixing bugs does not necessarily make everything better net zero.

324
00:17:18.483 --> 00:17:25.550
Yeah, this brought me right back to the Cloudflare blog post that I keep bringing up from the CISO during the Mythos Glasswing stuff.

325
00:17:25.610 --> 00:17:32.737
And he said this line, he said, the speed at which you fix a flaw does not change the shape of the pipeline that produced the bug.

326
00:17:32.777 --> 00:17:32.897
Right.

327
00:17:32.917 --> 00:17:34.959
And this is just yet another piece of evidence to that.

328
00:17:35.019 --> 00:17:35.199
Right.

329
00:17:35.519 --> 00:17:43.747
We're throwing all of this horsepower at finding and fixing vulnerabilities because we now have like a super coder machine that we didn't have before.

330
00:17:44.067 --> 00:17:45.087
a couple months ago, right?

331
00:17:45.107 --> 00:17:47.388
So it makes sense, like find and fix all the vulnerabilities.

332
00:17:47.448 --> 00:17:52.889
And it turns out we're still not changing the shape of the pipeline that's creating the code by doing this, right?

333
00:17:53.289 --> 00:17:55.990
And so again, what is the answer?

334
00:17:56.010 --> 00:17:58.731
When I talk to Keith from Unpass about this, guess what?

335
00:17:58.831 --> 00:18:03.112
It's harnesses, it's humans, it's all this kind of stuff that I think we're in this sine wave right now.

336
00:18:04.272 --> 00:18:04.912
Super interesting.

337
00:18:04.932 --> 00:18:08.533
I had a few other highlights from Black Hat that I was talking to.

338
00:18:08.553 --> 00:18:10.194
Some homies, Casey Ellis.

339
00:18:10.354 --> 00:18:11.094
Do you know Casey?

340
00:18:11.894 --> 00:18:13.795
Founder of Bug Crowd, if you guys don't know Casey.

341
00:18:15.015 --> 00:18:18.376
Very passionate about the vulnerability reporting space.

342
00:18:18.436 --> 00:18:20.857
Obviously, founder of Bug Crowd, right?

343
00:18:21.017 --> 00:18:26.719
Literally tried to solve bug bounty reporting and triage as a career and as a company successfully.

344
00:18:27.159 --> 00:18:27.879
Tried, yeah.

345
00:18:28.479 --> 00:18:28.619
Yeah.

346
00:18:28.639 --> 00:18:29.700
I think Bunker is doing just fine, right?

347
00:18:29.720 --> 00:18:30.440
Right, right.

348
00:18:30.720 --> 00:18:37.202
Well, Casey just released a new project that he was getting to show me on the side, Disclose.io.

349
00:18:37.222 --> 00:18:38.182
Did you see this?

350
00:18:38.462 --> 00:18:39.043
No, no, no.

351
00:18:39.663 --> 00:18:49.846
So he did this in reaction to a topic that we've talked about on the show a few times, the security researcher community kind of being a little punks again, right?

352
00:18:49.866 --> 00:18:50.166
Right, right.

353
00:18:50.426 --> 00:18:53.707
Which I say punk with love, you know?

354
00:18:53.927 --> 00:18:54.548
Oh, I did see this.

355
00:18:54.568 --> 00:18:54.748
Yep.

356
00:18:55.868 --> 00:19:01.532
So he did it in the reaction of like, hey, the security community dropping full disclosure bugs is kind of in vogue right now.

357
00:19:01.713 --> 00:19:01.893
Right.

358
00:19:01.913 --> 00:19:02.713
We're seeing it a lot.

359
00:19:03.294 --> 00:19:10.960
People are frustrated with bug reporting going on at Microsoft or Apple or Google or any of the big shops.

360
00:19:11.000 --> 00:19:12.141
And so they're going full disclosure.

361
00:19:12.401 --> 00:19:13.662
Well, that's had ripple effects.

362
00:19:13.762 --> 00:19:19.586
And we've actually we haven't really talked about every one of these, but a lot of smaller vendors are getting hit with full disclosure stuff.

363
00:19:20.107 --> 00:19:22.789
Just drops on Twitter and GitHub and things like that, because.

364
00:19:23.349 --> 00:19:25.831
People are just like, I don't know, getting street cred or whatever they're doing.

365
00:19:26.231 --> 00:19:30.674
But they say publicly it was because they couldn't find who to like.

366
00:19:30.694 --> 00:19:34.116
Oh, the reporting mechanism of this company was too convoluted.

367
00:19:34.136 --> 00:19:35.156
I couldn't figure it out.

368
00:19:35.476 --> 00:19:36.817
And Casey's like, I call BS.

369
00:19:36.997 --> 00:19:37.438
Yeah, sure.

370
00:19:37.978 --> 00:19:38.558
You didn't try.

371
00:19:38.578 --> 00:19:42.241
And so Disclose.io is his attempt to catalog.

372
00:19:42.541 --> 00:19:49.285
If you type in a company or a website or something, it will give you how to report a security issue to them.

373
00:19:49.565 --> 00:19:49.865
Period.

374
00:19:50.085 --> 00:19:53.288
And so the other cool thing is he's a bit AI-pilled.

375
00:19:53.648 --> 00:20:05.097
And he's got it, like he showed me a little bit behind the curtain so that every time you type something in and it fails, like if he doesn't have it in his database, that goes in the logs.

376
00:20:05.137 --> 00:20:13.484
And every night he's got an AI agent that looks at all the failed queries and then figures out why they failed and tries to self-heal those things.

377
00:20:13.524 --> 00:20:14.765
They're not really bugs.

378
00:20:14.785 --> 00:20:16.767
They're just like holes in the data.

379
00:20:17.167 --> 00:20:18.367
And so every night he's got an agent.

380
00:20:18.387 --> 00:20:19.567
That's a great use for AI, in my opinion.

381
00:20:19.587 --> 00:20:20.668
That's what you should be using it for.

382
00:20:20.768 --> 00:20:22.068
It's very specific tasks.

383
00:20:22.148 --> 00:20:22.468
Right.

384
00:20:22.508 --> 00:20:22.948
That's awesome.

385
00:20:22.968 --> 00:20:24.188
So kudos to Casey.

386
00:20:24.228 --> 00:20:25.228
Super cool.

387
00:20:25.269 --> 00:20:26.089
Check out the project.

388
00:20:26.149 --> 00:20:26.709
It's open.

389
00:20:27.289 --> 00:20:28.909
So I'm sure he would be open for help.

390
00:20:28.969 --> 00:20:30.169
It's open source and everything.

391
00:20:31.050 --> 00:20:32.270
The other one was Jason Haddix.

392
00:20:32.330 --> 00:20:32.890
You know Jason.

393
00:20:32.910 --> 00:20:33.010
Yeah.

394
00:20:33.030 --> 00:20:34.390
Jadix, a homie.

395
00:20:34.650 --> 00:20:35.830
Always great to see him in Vegas.

396
00:20:36.211 --> 00:20:38.351
He's the busiest man of the week ever.

397
00:20:38.411 --> 00:20:40.931
I think he's speaking at four villages over the next two days.

398
00:20:41.271 --> 00:20:43.052
Definitely, he's already given talks earlier in the week.

399
00:20:44.833 --> 00:20:48.017
Jason and his wife gave me this cool bracelet.

400
00:20:48.037 --> 00:20:48.698
So thank you guys.

401
00:20:48.718 --> 00:20:49.699
It says, hack me, daddy.

402
00:20:50.360 --> 00:20:52.242
Let's go.

403
00:20:52.622 --> 00:20:59.972
So Jason actually just released via his company Arcanum, which is a red team shop, security consulting shop.

404
00:20:59.992 --> 00:21:00.973
They do a lot of cool work.

405
00:21:01.013 --> 00:21:01.954
Check them out.

406
00:21:02.154 --> 00:21:03.396
Not sponsored, just homies.

407
00:21:05.456 --> 00:21:08.637
He actually recreated an open-sourced beef.

408
00:21:08.977 --> 00:21:09.497
Do you remember beef?

409
00:21:09.517 --> 00:21:10.198
Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah.

410
00:21:10.638 --> 00:21:12.278
So I'm really excited to check it out.

411
00:21:12.378 --> 00:21:15.939
I was a big beef user way back early in my career.

412
00:21:15.959 --> 00:21:16.419
Yeah.

413
00:21:16.499 --> 00:21:18.219
And beef is kind of like an abandoned project.

414
00:21:18.259 --> 00:21:22.420
If you guys don't know, browser exploitation framework, browser something.

415
00:21:22.660 --> 00:21:22.800
Yeah.

416
00:21:22.861 --> 00:21:24.401
I'm missing an E. What's beef?

417
00:21:24.601 --> 00:21:24.881
I don't know.

418
00:21:25.041 --> 00:21:26.781
I thought it was that too.

419
00:21:26.841 --> 00:21:27.442
Yeah, yeah, yeah.

420
00:21:27.502 --> 00:21:37.444
So the whole point of the project was you create these moment-in-time use exploits based on browser fingerprints and all this kind of stuff.

421
00:21:37.464 --> 00:21:41.785
It was a pen testing helper tool to exploit people's browsers.

422
00:21:41.925 --> 00:21:42.785
Really cool tool.

423
00:21:43.245 --> 00:21:45.846
Kind of went away or wasn't maintained.

424
00:21:46.126 --> 00:21:51.827
And so Jason stepped up and was like, all right, we're going to maintain it and open source it and all this kind of stuff.

425
00:21:51.867 --> 00:21:53.608
So shout out to the two homies there.

426
00:21:53.628 --> 00:21:53.988
Hell yeah.

427
00:21:54.008 --> 00:21:54.408
Cool stuff.

428
00:21:54.428 --> 00:21:54.908
That's awesome.

429
00:21:55.408 --> 00:22:00.893
My other shout-out, our home on Tuesday for a bit, at least mine, was Decibel.

430
00:22:01.053 --> 00:22:05.316
I mean, they're a VC group doing cool things, invested in a lot of cool companies.

431
00:22:05.736 --> 00:22:10.220
They took over Libertine Social in the hallway at Black Hat, and it was just a really good—they invited us in.

432
00:22:10.840 --> 00:22:12.201
Endor Labs invited us in.

433
00:22:12.281 --> 00:22:14.063
They had, like, an influencer set up for us.

434
00:22:14.883 --> 00:22:15.784
Again, not sponsors.

435
00:22:15.804 --> 00:22:18.526
They were just really nice to us all week, so have to give them a shout.

436
00:22:19.707 --> 00:22:20.608
And they brought—

437
00:22:21.749 --> 00:22:28.313
Honestly, some of the best and brightest that were at Black Hat spent a lot of time at that place that facilitated some really cool conversations for us.

438
00:22:28.554 --> 00:22:29.795
We ripped some Pokemon cards.

439
00:22:29.855 --> 00:22:30.635
We did, yeah.

440
00:22:30.775 --> 00:22:31.956
Endor, randomly.

441
00:22:32.196 --> 00:22:33.938
Again, a sponsor for me, but not for this podcast.

442
00:22:33.978 --> 00:22:35.879
They had Pokemon packs.

443
00:22:35.899 --> 00:22:37.160
They were just giving out people to rip.

444
00:22:37.200 --> 00:22:38.141
And so we ripped a couple.

445
00:22:38.161 --> 00:22:41.743
They were one Chaos Black and one Prismatic Evolution each.

446
00:22:42.444 --> 00:22:42.964
Garbage.

447
00:22:43.004 --> 00:22:44.666
Didn't get anything, but it was a good time.

448
00:22:44.686 --> 00:22:46.247
You get the dopamine rush of the pull.

449
00:22:46.947 --> 00:22:47.967
I have an Eevee that I got.

450
00:22:48.087 --> 00:22:49.588
They gave you an Eevee, but it was already pulled.

451
00:22:49.608 --> 00:22:50.848
It was a pre-pulled Eevee.

452
00:22:51.048 --> 00:22:51.748
Yeah, not a rare one.

453
00:22:51.768 --> 00:22:53.389
I think it was like a mid-rare.

454
00:22:53.429 --> 00:22:54.849
I got nothing.

455
00:22:55.069 --> 00:22:57.910
I got bulk.

456
00:22:58.010 --> 00:23:03.251
One more shout-out we have is, before we get into the bugs of the podcast, the sponsor of this podcast, Maze.

457
00:23:03.511 --> 00:23:04.031
Good friend.

458
00:23:04.072 --> 00:23:04.832
Give him a shout-out.

459
00:23:04.872 --> 00:23:05.732
Maze, take it away.

460
00:23:07.358 --> 00:23:10.900
Hey hackers, before we keep going, I wanna take a quick break and say a quick thank you to our sponsors.

461
00:23:11.160 --> 00:23:14.663
Today's Lowdown episode is sponsored by our friends over at Maze.

462
00:23:15.163 --> 00:23:20.447
Maze has spent the last couple of years using AI to find and remediate vulnerabilities in the cloud.

463
00:23:20.547 --> 00:23:27.311
And now they've released Maze Code, AI agents that find and deeply investigate vulnerabilities in your code.

464
00:23:27.551 --> 00:23:28.352
Now we all know the deal.

465
00:23:28.732 --> 00:23:34.994
Software composition analysis tools and SaaS toolings are all historically really bad at just making more noise.

466
00:23:35.034 --> 00:23:41.897
They find issues that may not actually be real and just create a lot of problems for your engineers to deal with that don't solve real security vulnerabilities.

467
00:23:41.977 --> 00:23:42.397
I get it.

468
00:23:42.437 --> 00:23:43.017
We've been there.

469
00:23:43.657 --> 00:23:49.059
Maze code is a really cool tool because Maze code actually knows how your code works.

470
00:23:49.379 --> 00:23:54.421
Maze code investigates every finding with the context of how your code is actually deployed.

471
00:23:54.841 --> 00:24:02.405
Sure, you're using a version of libxml2 that's vulnerable, but the actual code path to hit that vulnerability is not exposed in your Docker image.

472
00:24:02.686 --> 00:24:06.228
Maze code can find that and won't show you that that vulnerability is a big deal.

473
00:24:06.368 --> 00:24:10.930
Every vulnerability that Maze code reports comes with evidence that it's real and a way to fix it.

474
00:24:11.270 --> 00:24:15.353
Check out Maze at go.lowdownpod.com slash Maze.

475
00:24:15.473 --> 00:24:18.935
That's go.lowdownpod.com slash Maze.

476
00:24:19.115 --> 00:24:19.715
Thanks again, Maze.

477
00:24:19.835 --> 00:24:20.676
Let's keep going.

478
00:24:21.176 --> 00:24:23.081
You're such a pro podcaster.

479
00:24:23.121 --> 00:24:24.064
And we're back.

480
00:24:24.084 --> 00:24:25.247
Welcome back, everybody, to the lowdown.

481
00:24:25.267 --> 00:24:27.173
Yeah, man, so cool.

482
00:24:27.193 --> 00:24:29.018
So what's going on in the cyber world, dude?

483
00:24:29.138 --> 00:24:29.700
What's happening here?

484
00:24:30.126 --> 00:24:33.127
I mean, that 1Password thing was the thing that I was really sticking on this week.

485
00:24:33.247 --> 00:24:36.128
The other bit is, I think, really cool.

486
00:24:36.408 --> 00:24:45.090
OpenAI felt the need to show up last minute at Black Hat unscheduled and explain the hugging face incident from their side, right?

487
00:24:45.690 --> 00:24:47.291
Obviously, we're working off of our phones this week.

488
00:24:47.311 --> 00:24:49.291
We can probably go into it a little bit on the next episode.

489
00:24:50.552 --> 00:24:51.772
This talk just happened yesterday.

490
00:24:52.172 --> 00:24:55.473
But they were pretty transparent on stage with what they need.

491
00:24:55.813 --> 00:24:56.994
I've heard some criticisms.

492
00:24:57.034 --> 00:24:58.074
I've heard some kudos.

493
00:24:58.574 --> 00:25:03.200
So I'm excited for us to form our own opinion about it, but it's good to mention that they showed up.

494
00:25:03.760 --> 00:25:04.501
I think kudos.

495
00:25:04.541 --> 00:25:05.022
They showed up.

496
00:25:05.142 --> 00:25:05.943
Yeah, 100%.

497
00:25:05.983 --> 00:25:06.964
Stood on stage, did it.

498
00:25:07.024 --> 00:25:08.266
This is kind of like last year.

499
00:25:09.247 --> 00:25:13.172
I was in the Innovators Summit on Tuesday at Black Hat, and...

500
00:25:14.373 --> 00:25:19.494
The leadership at CrowdStrike showed up, and it was right after they took down, like, all of the internet.

501
00:25:19.514 --> 00:25:20.595
It's a world for a minute, yeah.

502
00:25:20.615 --> 00:25:22.935
Yeah, and they showed up, and they got on stage, and they explained themselves.

503
00:25:22.955 --> 00:25:27.336
And I feel like OpenAI did very similar this week, so I say kudos for showing up and explaining it.

504
00:25:28.036 --> 00:25:33.758
Some people out there are, like, hoping for more transparency, like, especially actionable transparency.

505
00:25:34.978 --> 00:25:44.106
what happened so that we can not let it happen while we're using your products or your tools, I think is what people are asking for.

506
00:25:44.226 --> 00:25:48.270
As someone who's led incident response, you're not going to get the audit logs.

507
00:25:49.170 --> 00:25:51.272
I'm never publishing logs.

508
00:25:51.352 --> 00:25:51.993
You never know.

509
00:25:52.353 --> 00:25:54.815
It's impossible to sanitize that stuff to that degree.

510
00:25:54.935 --> 00:25:56.376
I've seen people ask for that.

511
00:25:56.396 --> 00:25:57.237
I'm like, that's too much.

512
00:25:57.257 --> 00:25:57.778
Yeah, not going to happen.

513
00:25:57.798 --> 00:25:58.218
You know what I mean?

514
00:25:58.298 --> 00:26:01.099
I think the one reason that we'll ask is the prompt.

515
00:26:01.299 --> 00:26:03.900
Like, what did they say to the model to make it do the thing?

516
00:26:04.140 --> 00:26:11.762
Because maybe that kind of at least contextualizes what it thought it was supposed to do, like what kind of sandboxing it thought it had.

517
00:26:11.782 --> 00:26:15.283
Like, just to set the stage for why it may have taken the actions that it did.

518
00:26:15.383 --> 00:26:17.004
Well, yeah, I mean, we were at dinner with Clint last night.

519
00:26:17.024 --> 00:26:17.784
He's at OpenAI.

520
00:26:18.045 --> 00:26:19.325
I mean, I don't think this is super secret.

521
00:26:19.505 --> 00:26:27.090
Like, one of their, like, as they test new models, they use very basic prompting to test the full capabilities, cyber capabilities.

522
00:26:27.130 --> 00:26:29.511
I think this is not super, super secret.

523
00:26:29.631 --> 00:26:32.613
But he's like, you know, it's a few lines, right?

524
00:26:32.653 --> 00:26:37.216
Just, like, literally hack this, don't make no mistakes is, like, one of their tests.

525
00:26:37.376 --> 00:26:41.098
I think he said, yeah, as, like, their benchmark of, like, danger, right?

526
00:26:41.118 --> 00:26:44.260
Like, if a 14-year-old got this model and said, like, find me a zero-day in Google Chrome,

527
00:26:44.580 --> 00:26:44.981
Could it?

528
00:26:45.061 --> 00:26:46.582
And if the answer is yes, that's a problem.

529
00:26:46.923 --> 00:26:50.787
They acknowledge that a good model with a good harness will find the bugs.

530
00:26:50.807 --> 00:26:54.631
The question is, what is the barrier to entry to that process?

531
00:26:54.651 --> 00:26:55.452
That's the danger.

532
00:26:55.472 --> 00:26:56.513
I think it makes sense, right?

533
00:26:56.533 --> 00:27:04.821
Because if you look at some of the most successful zero-day finding things that we've seen post-Mythos era level stuff, it's not.

534
00:27:05.602 --> 00:27:08.123
go find this, make no mistakes.

535
00:27:08.383 --> 00:27:14.405
It is a well-oiled vulnerability research machine that just got steroids injected into it.

536
00:27:14.845 --> 00:27:15.946
Those are not the same thing.

537
00:27:15.966 --> 00:27:17.206
Yeah, Yannet Blackhat said that.

538
00:27:17.226 --> 00:27:21.647
He said the new meta for VR is like, it's not that you tell the AI, find the bug, no mistakes.

539
00:27:21.687 --> 00:27:22.388
That does not work.

540
00:27:22.448 --> 00:27:23.308
It'll hallucinate bugs.

541
00:27:23.348 --> 00:27:24.889
It'll find some bugs, but not all of them.

542
00:27:25.169 --> 00:27:28.530
What you do is tell the AI, here are the tools at your disposal.

543
00:27:28.930 --> 00:27:30.190
Here is the unique problem.

544
00:27:30.250 --> 00:27:33.331
It's either you have the source code, you want to do white box fuzzing.

545
00:27:33.371 --> 00:27:35.152
You don't have the source code, closed source binary.

546
00:27:35.452 --> 00:27:42.074
here's the target, here are the tools, build me a system that uses the available tools for the problem, right?

547
00:27:42.294 --> 00:27:46.276
That is a much more difficult research question than find me zero to no mistakes.

548
00:27:46.876 --> 00:27:58.380
And maybe the models will get there, maybe we'll improve, because we are seeing that kind of like a little bit of a hockey stick in the number of found, disclosed vulnerabilities, but I mean, hopefully we don't get to the true like, we found them all and we just have to deal with the consequences, you know?

549
00:27:58.580 --> 00:27:59.461
Yeah, absolutely.

550
00:27:59.961 --> 00:28:07.246
I'd say some of the other talks that I saw that I'm excited to, like, dig in a little bit deeper post this, like maybe reach out to some of the speakers.

551
00:28:07.306 --> 00:28:13.671
Maybe that's probably a good future content idea is, like, follow up with some people that dropped some cool stuff this week and get them on our channels.

552
00:28:14.211 --> 00:28:18.675
But Jamie over at Huntress gave a talk at Black Hat about, do you remember the story?

553
00:28:18.695 --> 00:28:22.618
We probably covered it, about how one of the Black Hats, like—

554
00:28:23.438 --> 00:28:27.500
had their software on the machine and they did this whole investigation.

555
00:28:27.520 --> 00:28:31.221
There's a whole like Twitter outcry about like, oh my God, like Huntress is spying on us.

556
00:28:31.261 --> 00:28:33.462
And it's like, brother, do you know what EDR is like?

557
00:28:33.502 --> 00:28:33.762
Yeah.

558
00:28:33.802 --> 00:28:33.942
Yeah.

559
00:28:33.962 --> 00:28:34.263
Yeah.

560
00:28:34.363 --> 00:28:41.646
So like that as a talk, they kind of went through the whole investigation with that, like, and went behind the scenes and all this.

561
00:28:41.666 --> 00:28:43.066
I'm really excited to dig into that one.

562
00:28:43.646 --> 00:28:43.866
Yeah.

563
00:28:43.886 --> 00:28:45.167
This kind of stuff happens a lot.

564
00:28:45.647 --> 00:28:49.449
What was the, what was the recent one where I was like, oh, is this really something to worry about?

565
00:28:49.809 --> 00:28:51.870
Or is this like when normies figure out what EDR is?

566
00:28:51.990 --> 00:28:52.550
Oh, it was, uh,

567
00:28:52.610 --> 00:29:17.782
the windows gd yeah yeah yeah they're like oh my god windows has telemetry yes i was like uh is this like when normies realized what edr is basically corporate spyware and of course it is yeah i mean we used to make the joke like uh when i was running blue team it's like oh i want to be the nsa for right like my thing your your feelings aside about government like patriot act level stuff right at your company you want that that is like you're on your team

568
00:29:17.802 --> 00:29:18.382
That's your job.

569
00:29:18.402 --> 00:29:19.643
That's your objective is to have a level.

570
00:29:19.663 --> 00:29:20.643
You need everything.

571
00:29:20.703 --> 00:29:21.944
You need every command run.

572
00:29:21.964 --> 00:29:23.324
You need every website visited.

573
00:29:23.344 --> 00:29:25.765
You need to know everything that goes on on your corporate network.

574
00:29:25.785 --> 00:29:28.106
So, yeah, sometimes people are shocked that that happens.

575
00:29:28.387 --> 00:29:29.127
How about you?

576
00:29:29.187 --> 00:29:32.108
What kind of a bunch of research job that you've been focusing on?

577
00:29:32.128 --> 00:29:32.388
Yeah.

578
00:29:32.408 --> 00:29:36.250
So, I mean, on the topic of bugs just keep coming out, right, we keep seeing...

579
00:29:36.670 --> 00:29:47.116
This trend where new styles of bugs are being discovered through LLMs by one researcher, and then either that researcher or fallen researchers discover new variants of that bug.

580
00:29:47.136 --> 00:29:51.439
So in a previous podcast episode, we talked about Jan Escape, right?

581
00:29:51.839 --> 00:29:55.922
This was a guest to host Virtual Machine Escape.

582
00:29:56.642 --> 00:29:58.024
in a nested VM, right?

583
00:29:58.044 --> 00:30:09.835
So in the world of nested hypervisors and nested virtualization, you are the VM host on what's called bare metal, and then you host another hypervisor that maybe you're renting out, and then someone hosts their VM inside of that.

584
00:30:09.875 --> 00:30:17.443
So what you have is a structure, which is an L0, the native host, the L1, which is the virtual hypervisor, and then the L2, the second layered guest.

585
00:30:17.963 --> 00:30:28.613
The vulnerability was a use after free in the way that the shadow MMU, which is basically a structure for tracking memory pages of the guest, got handled in the kernel in KVM, right?

586
00:30:28.633 --> 00:30:30.114
This is a Linux hypervisor.

587
00:30:30.514 --> 00:30:32.896
And so this researcher in finding Januscape...

588
00:30:34.517 --> 00:30:44.081
got paid out 250 grand by KVM CTF, because that is a CTF put on by Google, where if you can escape from a KVM VM on Intel hardware, they will pay you 250 grand.

589
00:30:44.101 --> 00:30:48.102
So if you're interested in paying off part of your mortgage in the next couple of months, go please participate.

590
00:30:48.883 --> 00:31:00.347
And so that same guy, the same god mode of one researcher, Hi-On-Woo Kim, if I fucked your name, man, I'm really sorry, found literally,

591
00:31:00.947 --> 00:31:06.431
Same class of bug, use after free and shadow memory pages in an L1 virtual machine.

592
00:31:06.471 --> 00:31:12.096
So just not even nested, just like you're in a VM on KVM using that same structure of code.

593
00:31:12.156 --> 00:31:12.296
Right.

594
00:31:12.316 --> 00:31:16.059
We're on AMD hardware, which is called SVM for virtual machines.

595
00:31:16.439 --> 00:31:23.585
The shadow MMU bookkeeping that can lead to use after free causing a guest triggered page fault and potentially use after free enabling remote code execution.

596
00:31:23.705 --> 00:31:23.865
Right.

597
00:31:24.205 --> 00:31:27.406
So it's just interesting to see these really unique classes of bugs.

598
00:31:27.726 --> 00:31:46.432
Also, on Twitter, I saw someone leaking that in the future they're going to drop another bad pipe, a pipe failed site vulnerability, which is basically like, you know, in the kernel when you pipe two files together, you have the pages that they live on in page cache.

599
00:31:46.812 --> 00:31:51.394
And if you do operations on them temporarily, it might overwrite pages that should not be overwritten.

600
00:31:51.434 --> 00:31:58.857
And if you use that page cache later, you can do things like overwrite the current page cache entry for like a set UID binary.

601
00:31:58.877 --> 00:32:00.438
So like run that code as root, right?

602
00:32:00.458 --> 00:32:09.061
Really interesting new styles of bugs that once they come out through some kind of LLM research, there are a hundred different implementations of that bug in the kernel that get popped.

603
00:32:09.081 --> 00:32:10.262
So a lot of those popping out right now.

604
00:32:10.402 --> 00:32:13.183
I feel like it's going to take us three weeks to cover all the research that dropped.

605
00:32:13.203 --> 00:32:17.305
Dude, I've been at DEF CON for four or five days, and I feel like I missed like 15 bugs to talk about.

606
00:32:18.025 --> 00:32:18.766
I'll bring up one.

607
00:32:19.126 --> 00:32:19.946
I made a video about it.

608
00:32:20.286 --> 00:32:22.988
We can probably link that goes deeper into it, but we can talk briefly.

609
00:32:23.028 --> 00:32:26.029
Another Shai Haloud supply chain attack hit.

610
00:32:26.089 --> 00:32:31.772
Literally, the threat actor said, Shai Haloud, here we go again is one of the IOCs.

611
00:32:31.792 --> 00:32:34.093
It's like in the GitHub repo, all this kind of stuff.

612
00:32:35.373 --> 00:32:38.898
massive, massive packages that actually got compromised.

613
00:32:38.938 --> 00:32:49.871
This Kivi was the main one, but all of the packages, flat cache, file entry cache, we're talking 2 billion downloads a month on these packages.

614
00:32:49.971 --> 00:32:51.132
So like crazy thing.

615
00:32:51.132 --> 00:32:55.095
And for context, I think Key V on its own was like $174 million.

616
00:32:55.115 --> 00:32:56.256
$604 million a month.

617
00:32:56.276 --> 00:32:58.078
Flat cash, $580 million a month.

618
00:32:58.178 --> 00:32:59.820
I mean, just crazy, crazy, crazy.

619
00:32:59.860 --> 00:33:09.028
So just if you guys don't remember Shai Halued and why this is so crazy, what happens is this malicious code gets into these JavaScript packages.

620
00:33:09.768 --> 00:33:09.928
And...

621
00:33:10.729 --> 00:33:15.912
Hacks the actual developer who has NPM credentials to publish the packages.

622
00:33:16.072 --> 00:33:19.333
And generally these people don't just publish one package.

623
00:33:19.574 --> 00:33:21.234
They're prolific JavaScript developers.

624
00:33:21.555 --> 00:33:25.296
And so they can, they have access to repos for more packages.

625
00:33:25.717 --> 00:33:27.958
And then it just becomes a self replicating worm.

626
00:33:27.998 --> 00:33:31.800
It just gets the maintainers of that package and that package and that package.

627
00:33:32.300 --> 00:33:35.902
The thing that like really stands out to me, we've talked about Shia Lude.

628
00:33:35.942 --> 00:33:37.162
I know I've talked about it on my channel.

629
00:33:38.583 --> 00:33:46.885
The thing that stands out is the threat actors are stealing lots of other information as part of these attacks, not just NPM tokens and GitHub tokens.

630
00:33:47.126 --> 00:33:54.868
It seems like most of what we see in terms of impact is just self-replication, which is just NPM and GitHub token usage, but they're stealing...

631
00:33:55.428 --> 00:33:59.531
your HashiCorp vault, your AWS creds, your Kubernetes creds.

632
00:33:59.551 --> 00:34:00.352
I'm looking at the list.

633
00:34:00.392 --> 00:34:05.556
I mean, Stripe stuff, generic environment variables, private keys, SSH keys.

634
00:34:05.616 --> 00:34:07.137
A lot of AI credentials too.

635
00:34:07.157 --> 00:34:10.500
Terraform stuff, AI stuff, VPN stuff, key pass stuff.

636
00:34:10.980 --> 00:34:12.702
Where is the ripple effects on all this?

637
00:34:12.782 --> 00:34:13.022
Right.

638
00:34:13.322 --> 00:34:18.046
It almost makes you wonder if they're just purely profit incentives, and they're like, they're selling them in the black market, right?

639
00:34:18.106 --> 00:34:19.567
Like, just, let's get some cash and get out.

640
00:34:19.587 --> 00:34:20.147
I haven't even heard that.

641
00:34:20.167 --> 00:34:21.669
Because there are rumors that they're, like, teenagers, right?

642
00:34:21.689 --> 00:34:23.030
They're, like, young people, isn't that?

643
00:34:23.370 --> 00:34:24.891
Well, Team PCP.

644
00:34:25.071 --> 00:34:28.094
I don't know if Team PCP is behind every iteration of Shia Haleed.

645
00:34:28.294 --> 00:34:29.194
Yes, they were part of it.

646
00:34:29.274 --> 00:34:32.977
Yes, I think they're kind of YOLOing, very YOLO threat actors.

647
00:34:34.078 --> 00:34:34.819
But still...

648
00:34:35.299 --> 00:34:49.630
If you've taken the time to code all of this other secret stealing code into your malware, it keeps me up at night going, what else got stolen that hasn't been used yet that we haven't seen a second order effect of one of these NPM works?

649
00:34:49.670 --> 00:34:50.311
I do understand.

650
00:34:50.371 --> 00:34:51.572
Yeah, that is kind of terrifying.

651
00:34:51.852 --> 00:34:53.533
Yeah, that's one of the keep me up at night things.

652
00:34:54.093 --> 00:35:04.060
The other thing, kind of a follow up from one of our main stories last week was the water supply hacks that we obviously talked about were attributed to Iran.

653
00:35:04.540 --> 00:35:15.407
The government is like at this point screaming about this because those PLCs that you talked about in the last episode are still on the Internet and still confirmed vulnerable to CVEs from 2013.

654
00:35:16.067 --> 00:35:20.370
And like, what else do we need to do to like get these things off the Internet?

655
00:35:20.390 --> 00:35:21.030
I don't understand.

656
00:35:21.070 --> 00:35:26.911
Yeah, so when I went to the General Nakasone press briefing earlier, that was one of the conversations too.

657
00:35:26.931 --> 00:35:30.952
It was like, what does the government have to do to get these things off the Internet?

658
00:35:30.972 --> 00:35:40.615
And it's like, guys, that is just like, there should be a program, your company that does the awareness training that's like, hey, maybe we should figure out if our PLCs are on the Internet, at least for the defense industrial base.

659
00:35:41.055 --> 00:35:45.476
He said that the DOD offers a service that they will just scan your stuff.

660
00:35:45.616 --> 00:35:50.397
They'll be like, okay, let's go look at your website, your IP address range, and see what ports are open to the Internet.

661
00:35:50.817 --> 00:35:51.638
is it a PLC?

662
00:35:51.778 --> 00:35:52.578
Maybe it shouldn't be.

663
00:35:52.998 --> 00:35:53.899
I don't know.

664
00:35:53.959 --> 00:35:58.481
I would hope or imagine that at least the DHS for, like, private U.S. companies would do something similar.

665
00:35:59.422 --> 00:36:09.988
But, yeah, that's a whole other conversation about, like, the defunding of CISA and, like, the irony of, like, Colonial Pipeline, new administration, CISA defunded, Iran hacks Minnesota, right?

666
00:36:10.028 --> 00:36:11.789
So it's a very depressing story.

667
00:36:11.809 --> 00:36:12.489
Yeah, it's wild.

668
00:36:12.529 --> 00:36:17.612
We did get to meet briefly that one of the old heads of CISA, something or other, that we met in the hallway.

669
00:36:17.632 --> 00:36:19.233
It was a CIO, I think, or the CISA.

670
00:36:19.273 --> 00:36:19.513
Yeah.

671
00:36:20.654 --> 00:36:23.919
that might want to come talk to us about this kind of thing, because I would love the insight, right?

672
00:36:24.039 --> 00:36:34.572
To me, it seems like people with these remits should be able to pick up a bat phone and say, hey, that's vulnerable to a 20-plus-year-old CVE.

673
00:36:34.713 --> 00:36:35.414
It's on the internet.

674
00:36:35.434 --> 00:36:37.837
Where's the bat phone that says, like, pull that off the internet?

675
00:36:38.477 --> 00:36:45.959
In the press briefing, he said, I didn't realize this, in the U.S., there are 50,000 water municipalities that all have to get maintained.

676
00:36:46.219 --> 00:36:47.959
And it's like there's multiple problems there.

677
00:36:48.099 --> 00:36:53.100
One, every one of them is subject to some form of state funding that they don't get for security.

678
00:36:53.360 --> 00:36:58.282
And then on the federal side, A, the federal government doesn't really have the authority to regulate that.

679
00:36:58.302 --> 00:37:03.363
And even if they did, how are they going to regulate 50,000 water plants, water municipalities?

680
00:37:03.423 --> 00:37:04.263
It's this very...

681
00:37:04.603 --> 00:37:05.924
As anything is with security, right?

682
00:37:05.964 --> 00:37:08.786
It's a very complex scaling problem that no one has the answer to.

683
00:37:08.886 --> 00:37:16.090
Yeah, I guess I'm probably oversimplifying it in my head because I've worked in big megacorps where I had that bat phone, so I'm kind of expecting that, right?

684
00:37:16.190 --> 00:37:25.996
If I found a vuln at, you know, large bank, insert large bank that I worked at, like, I had the power to, like, call and give that person a really hard time until that thing disappeared, right?

685
00:37:26.216 --> 00:37:26.716
Sure, sure.

686
00:37:27.276 --> 00:37:32.560
I just feel like even though they are 50,000 different water municipalities, their critical infrastructure...

687
00:37:33.500 --> 00:37:43.668
they're beholden to federal funding and regulation, there should be someone that has the, I agree, like political clout to call someone at these places.

688
00:37:43.728 --> 00:37:44.709
And it's like, what are you doing?

689
00:37:44.909 --> 00:37:47.812
Like the water supply is like what we're talking about here.

690
00:37:49.020 --> 00:37:51.862
in that scenario, people know that it's internet connected.

691
00:37:51.982 --> 00:37:52.963
I don't think anybody knows.

692
00:37:53.003 --> 00:37:59.087
I think it's one of those scenarios where there's just literally a lack of knowledge on where the borders start and stop.

693
00:37:59.207 --> 00:37:59.788
You know what I mean?

694
00:38:00.028 --> 00:38:08.734
Which again, for a mom and pop, five person company or whatever that's maintaining the pump in rural Kentucky, I don't know.

695
00:38:09.074 --> 00:38:13.157
I just don't know if they have the funding to maintain a team that actually has that knowledge.

696
00:38:13.177 --> 00:38:14.678
We know this from other incidents.

697
00:38:15.299 --> 00:38:17.040
So much of security is just like

698
00:38:17.420 --> 00:38:18.801
a knowledge management failure.

699
00:38:18.861 --> 00:38:24.543
Like, oh, Jim was implementing that firewall rule, and then Jim went on vacation, and then Jim quit.

700
00:38:24.783 --> 00:38:29.665
And no one wrote down what Jim was doing, so it never got finished, and then we got popped because that hole was still there.

701
00:38:29.705 --> 00:38:31.286
You know what it is?

702
00:38:31.586 --> 00:38:43.371
One of the hardest parts of getting vulns fixed in large organizations, and this isn't even a large organization because there isn't like an umbrella thing unless you talk about the US government as a whole, is figuring out who to call.

703
00:38:43.771 --> 00:38:44.151
Sure, yes.

704
00:38:44.411 --> 00:38:48.554
A lot of times you see this phone, you see this thing, you're like, who the hell owns this?

705
00:38:48.634 --> 00:39:00.082
I had an entire working group on my team that had people throughout the org, through devs, through engineering organizations that was called the code owners working group.

706
00:39:00.142 --> 00:39:01.763
And it was just like, figure out...

707
00:39:02.223 --> 00:39:13.520
who's the code owner for all these repos, for all these things, because if I found a vuln and a repo, it wasn't a given that I would know exactly who to call to get that thing fixed, or open a PR and get the PR merged, or whatever it was.

708
00:39:13.980 --> 00:39:15.803
So I can imagine this is that problem on

709
00:39:17.425 --> 00:39:33.998
dial turn to 11 right when you're talking about all these different municipalities yeah organizations involved for sure makes it complicated all right man what what what else at vegas are you super stoked about before we wrap up hmm what else at vegas i'm going to a party with some of the flair homies later this one tonight that'll be good

710
00:39:34.638 --> 00:39:39.302
I'm going to spend some time tomorrow at one of the CTFs and try to hack a robot.

711
00:39:39.402 --> 00:39:40.903
Maybe win some cash monies on that.

712
00:39:40.923 --> 00:39:41.503
It'll be kind of fun.

713
00:39:41.523 --> 00:39:46.607
And it's going to bop around the DDoS village, the IoT village, and just see what fun firmware I can rip apart.

714
00:39:47.068 --> 00:39:47.428
What about you?

715
00:39:47.808 --> 00:39:48.949
Yeah, same.

716
00:39:48.969 --> 00:39:50.390
We've done a few laps around here.

717
00:39:50.690 --> 00:39:54.453
I really like going deep into these little corners in the villages here.

718
00:39:56.074 --> 00:40:01.158
We've got some homies to go say hi to at some of the booths, the Hack5 family over there, the Miscreants family.

719
00:40:01.518 --> 00:40:04.659
They were kind of swamped when we went over there earlier, so I'm excited to go see them.

720
00:40:05.620 --> 00:40:06.000
Yeah, man.

721
00:40:07.720 --> 00:40:10.021
Just, like, feeling the passion.

722
00:40:10.081 --> 00:40:14.863
I think you said this a few weeks ago, that you come out of Vegas a lot of times energized, but, like, full of ideas.

723
00:40:15.043 --> 00:40:19.885
We've been bouncing ideas off of each other about how we can kind of continue to level this up.

724
00:40:20.565 --> 00:40:22.125
I gotta go get some of that.

725
00:40:22.306 --> 00:40:28.588
I gotta go find some of that passion from some of these village organizers and just mainline it, and be like, yeah, gimme, gimme.

726
00:40:28.608 --> 00:40:29.208
Yeah.

727
00:40:29.408 --> 00:40:35.655
I always walk away from DEF CON Black Hat physically exhausted, but like spiritually rejuvenated.

728
00:40:35.675 --> 00:40:36.356
Yeah, yeah, yeah.

729
00:40:36.376 --> 00:40:37.277
You know what I mean?

730
00:40:37.297 --> 00:40:37.417
Yeah.

731
00:40:37.457 --> 00:40:43.964
I think I'm glad we did this because otherwise we were going to have to record a podcast when we got home real quick, and I do not want to do anything when I get home.

732
00:40:45.255 --> 00:40:45.615
All right, y'all.

733
00:40:45.635 --> 00:40:47.297
Well, thank you for watching as usual.

734
00:40:47.357 --> 00:40:48.578
If you're new here, hit that sub button.

735
00:40:48.598 --> 00:40:49.919
If you're on Spotify, give us a rating.

736
00:40:49.959 --> 00:40:50.880
Five stars preferred.

737
00:40:50.900 --> 00:40:53.182
But if that's not how you feel, then it is what it is.

738
00:40:53.543 --> 00:40:56.946
And yeah, man, again, we recommend DEFCON and Black Hat very highly.

739
00:40:57.286 --> 00:40:59.007
If you haven't done it, you should do it.

740
00:40:59.548 --> 00:41:02.551
And Mays, thank you again for partnering with us and keeping the world safe.

741
00:41:03.271 --> 00:41:04.172
Yeah, that's it.

742
00:41:04.252 --> 00:41:04.813
Thanks so much.

743
00:41:05.073 --> 00:41:05.433
Wrap it up.

744
00:41:05.814 --> 00:41:06.094
See you guys.
