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If someone approaches you on Discord and says, hello, would you like to download gta6installer.msi.exe.mp4.exe, please don't install it.

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We don't know anything about this leak.

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And then you look into it, and it's like, oh, wait, insider threat, ransomware, shitcoin, malware.

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I was like, oh, damn, okay, yeah.

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Like, we should actually make a video about this.

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What is the meme where it's like the giant dominoes, and it's like, me installing GTA 6?

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North Koreans have my Facebook password.

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Like that's, that's what this turns into, right?

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Good morning, hackers.

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Welcome to the lowdown, a podcast sponsored by partners over at Maze.

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Matt, how we doing, man?

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I don't know if you can see on the camera here.

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Maybe you're a Spotify listener and you can't see me.

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I'm a little disheveled right now.

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My, my wife is out of town for work.

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And between all these Marchi vulnerabilities and some new ones we're going to talk about here in the podcast, your boy is, your boy is tired, man.

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How are you doing?

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Yeah, we got on to record the podcast today and we both just shared the things that we've been like hallucinating through vibe coding because we had a random idea.

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And I think the phrase that I said was, oh, to have talent and attention deficit disorder, right?

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It's just like, oh, every random idea that we come up with, we also now have the capability to like materialize, you know, combination of skill and the tools that are at our disposal now that we could just like speak things into existence.

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Yeah.

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Yeah, I have a very bad problem where, like, I can't turn my brain off.

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I'm constantly thinking about either, like, you know, doing video stuff, like, trying new projects or, like, hanging out with, like, doing family stuff.

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I'm always in something, making something happen.

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And the ability for AI to now just, like, exacerbate that problem where, like, you can make anything instantly is, like, not super healthy for me.

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But, you know, it is what it is.

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Yeah, but we're here.

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We're here.

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We're doing it.

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I got myself a new car this week.

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Ooh.

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And from the 1900s, it has no computers.

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Wow.

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The way I like my cars.

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Buttons, like physical turn knobs.

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Oh, yeah.

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This is how I get my window down.

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A crank for the windows.

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Wow.

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I don't know if you youngins even know what that is.

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That's crazy.

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I know.

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I'm like, I literally was like, I'm excited to toughen my kid up a little bit.

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I was like, we have one CD player in it.

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I get to teach you what a CD is.

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And we get these 15 songs on this drive.

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And that is it.

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I was thinking about that earlier.

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It's like my son is he's three.

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And whenever we're in the car, he's like, Daddy, can I have row your boat or like, Daddy, can I have twinkle twinkle or whatever?

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And like, I'm like, why is he so asking all the time?

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It's because he knows he can get music on demand.

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Whereas like when I was a kid, bro, it was the radio that played whatever with no consent.

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It would just play whatever.

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Or it was a CD, you know, that was like start to start to stop.

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The reason this came up, the reason like it just came up really just before I bought the car, I was actually kind of it was a few days before that, that I was explaining what a CD was to my daughter.

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Right.

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It's crazy.

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I was like, oh, right.

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I have to explain this.

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Like, you know, you don't just have these as part of your life.

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And yes, we just have Spotify in the car.

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And like you can just yell, you know, Alexa, play poop song.

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And like I become the number one listener of the poop song on Spotify at the end of the year, whatever it is.

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Right.

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But so I was explaining because we were listening to an album that I like associate with my first car because it was like a CD that just like never left my car.

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And, you know, like you just didn't bring your whole, like some people had those big binders in their car, but like for me, I, you kind of got stuck with a few CDs that were just in your car for many, many, many weeks or months.

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Right.

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At least I did.

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And so I was listening to one of those CDs.

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It was cartel chroma, if you know cartel chroma.

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And it was like in my first car,

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And so it was just kind of like flashback.

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And I was explaining this to her.

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And she was like, I know what CDs are.

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I picked them up in Pacopia.

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They only have one song on them, right?

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And it's like, there's an item in Pacopia that looks like a CD.

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And so there we are.

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So I was like, oh, this is great.

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I got a Jeep from the 90s.

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Take the doors off.

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She gets in it.

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She goes, this looks like this has been driven a million times.

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It's kind of rusty.

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I was like, yeah, that's kind of the point.

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But I was like, ooh, I'm very excited.

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No touchscreens.

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No...

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No buttons, no nothing.

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You just get, like, a car.

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And, yeah, so I'm happy.

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That's funny.

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You know what else is old today?

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You know what else is super old there, Matt?

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I think today is the 35th birthday of Linux, potentially.

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I think I read that somewhere.

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Either Linux or Ubuntu.

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It's probably not Ubuntu because Ubuntu is, like, the year is, like, the numbers.

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I think Linux is 35 years old today.

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How does it make you feel?

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That feels both young and old to me at the same time.

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Like, no, operating systems have always existed.

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Pre me, of course.

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Right.

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Like, and Linux being, you know, the father, the grandmother of all operating systems, the mother root.

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Yeah.

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1991, according to Linus.

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There we go.

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Okay.

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Well, it has not stopped changing since then as we all have.

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And what's the hitchhiker's guideline was largely a mistake and made a lot of people really angry.

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We've created an operating system, which we now realize was a mistake.

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Yeah.

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What the heck?

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You mentioned it in our intro.

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What is an Omaki, Omaki, Omarchi?

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What is it?

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Yeah, so guys, talking about today, okay, so it's spelled Omarchi Linux.

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I believe it is correctly pronounced Omaki.

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I did use Omaki exclusively for one of the Terminal Tower events, so I probably should know how to pronounce it, but alas, here we are.

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You know, people love...

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to rice their Linux setups, right?

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People have to make them look and feel a certain way that they want.

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The reason being, I think out of the box, a lot of the primarily used Linux distros, like Ubuntu and Arch, like don't come out super useful.

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You know, you have to install your editors and then rice your editors, and then, oh, you wanna have like a tiling window manager, and now you have to like configure i3 to be the way that you want.

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So DHH made Omaki, which like the tagline is Omaki, a beautiful, modern, and opinionated Linux by DHH.

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It is built on top of Arch Linux.

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So it's, you know, the word Arch is inside Omaki.

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The whole point being like it is a distro of Linux that comes out of the box looking pretty.

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It uses Hyperlan.

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So you have kind of that window manager that's really kind of fluid and tiled.

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And it has, you know, Vim, if you're one of those people.

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It has a bunch of other tools.

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Like, I think GIMP by default.

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It makes it really easy to, like, you put the... His whole shtick is...

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You want to be able to deploy this ISO to a new box in like under 10 minutes and then just get right to work.

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It should just work instantly for you.

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And again, I have used it.

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It is really fluid and nice.

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So big fan personally.

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As you all may know, I actually – I like daily drive Windows.

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I know heresy in the cybersecurity world, but I also just like all my hardware and networking stacks to work by default.

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But, yeah, so the problem with Omaki right now, I think, is, like, they are a very popular, a very fast-moving operating system, or operating system in air quotes, distro of Linux.

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And so with that come a certain set of vulnerabilities, you know.

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So we did have a recent CVE.

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Actually, I'm not even sure if a CVE number got assigned to it by MITRE or otherwise.

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But basically, it was a two-click RCE in Omaki, specifically because of the setup of how its Chrome is configured.

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So again, the issue with a lot of these distros like this, where you have custom Foo installed, is there's kind of this opacity, this lack of transparency to what exactly is inside of it, what is running by default.

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And as you kind of build...

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these systems out.

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If you don't have like clear agreements on what does what you can have maybe conflicting security boundaries.

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And so this vulnerability in particular is actually what got the Omaki security team created.

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It was a vulnerability in the Omaki Chromium extension.

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that basically if you were tricked into doing a keystroke and then clicked on a notification, so it's a two-click RCE, they would get RCE on your computer, right?

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The underlying vulnerability is pretty interesting.

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It actually has to do with, like, the Omarki Chromio extension by default comes with a program called YouTube DLP for downloading and, like, basically ripping videos off YouTube.

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Very common piece of software.

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Like, nothing wrong with that being on the computer.

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But the issue is, within YouTube DLP...

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You know, when you download the piece of software, or you download the video rather, it may open the video in a video editor, right?

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Or a video player.

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The video player that comes with Omaki is MPV.

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And MPV is fine, it's fine that it comes with that.

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But under the hood, MPV takes a configuration file.

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And inside the configuration file, you are able to run commands before MPV starts.

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So the full chain is basically, if you can get the browser to think it is downloading a video and then the video gets supplied a basically malicious configuration file in this hex string that comes from the website, if the user tries to download the video,

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clicking the notification will trigger RCE ultimately, which is really like, you know, it's not like zero click RCE, auto magic, like get a shell for free type thing.

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But it is an interesting issue where the security boundaries of the application kind of missed that, oh yeah, this internet data gets pumped to this other application and oh, that other application can use that data to trigger what command gets run ultimately, which is a really neat bug.

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Yeah, the POC is kind of crazy, right?

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And I saw some reactions to it basically saying like Omaki just like straight puts browser notification interactions into Bash as like part of the reason, right?

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Yeah.

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I was just kind of like clicking around on this, even just four hours ago from the time that we're recording this, there was a new issue opened up on their GitHub that's like an SSH security issue.

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We didn't talk about it while we were making the show notes because I just found it.

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I mean, it's not like a major bone, but basically SSH, when you're setting it up, will like leave password SSH access on kind of no matter what.

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So even if you're trying to move to like key only and get rid of password, password stays on.

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And then also.

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During setup, the SSH port opens before the key exists.

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And so the person who wrote this is like the servers enabled, the firewall is open first, and then a bunch of steps after that where the key creation can like fail happen.

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And then at that point, you're like sitting with an open port with password off and no key.

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I don't know.

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So that issue just opened four hours ago.

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I haven't like looked too much into it.

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But this leads me to kind of the broader conversation here, right?

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Is like we have a viral OS.

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I feel like an influencer.

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Come with me to try the viral Linux operating system.

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Come with me.

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Based on Arch Linux.

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Oh, my God, you guys.

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I've never heard of this.

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You have to try it.

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People are lining up around the corner to try this Linux distro.

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And that's exactly like what's going on.

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And what comes with that is just so many eyeballs, right?

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So many eyeballs.

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And what comes with a ton of eyeballs?

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Obviously, vulnerabilities.

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The other bit is they're very much touting that this is the Vibe Coders operating system.

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At least what I read about this, it's very much this is built for developers.

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It's built with agentic workflows in mind.

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So at least in the branding that I see in my sphere of the internet is the Venn diagram

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you know, vibe coding and Linux nerds that are trying this is a circle, right?

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Sure.

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You know, it seems like that's exactly where they're going.

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So not to just, you know, be the AI hater creators that we could be and like just print views all day if we wanted to, like some people are doing.

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I don't just think like, oh, vibe coding, you know, this on this Linux distro equals bad.

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This is LOL.

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This thing is going to be Swiss cheese.

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No, but like that all being said,

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Operating systems are hard, man.

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Like this, this, uh, the, the, the analogy that I think of the, the comparison that I think of to this is the AI browsers, right?

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Like we saw this big boom and kind of virality movement around the agentic browsers.

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And I think we, we might've even talked about it on some of our early episodes.

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If not, I definitely talked about it on some of my own content.

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It's like, yeah,

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Browsers are very hard to get right and get secure.

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That's why everyone bases their thing off of Chromium is because Google throws a gazillion dollars at the development team to make Chrome Chrome.

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Chrome has its problems.

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Chrome has major, major privacy concerns because it's run by an advertising company.

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But you cannot say that they don't throw some serious security talent and budget at.

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Some of the best in the world at browser stuff are working on the Chrome project, right?

223
00:13:19.843 --> 00:13:24.987
That cannot be said about random OS that you downloaded today.

224
00:13:25.987 --> 00:13:38.095
And the risk profiles are very similar in that this is, not to use your name, this is as low level as you get with stuff that you interact with daily.

225
00:13:38.455 --> 00:13:42.958
In your browser, you are giving remote code execution as a service to another person.

226
00:13:44.779 --> 00:13:46.240
Like that's what your web browser is doing.

227
00:13:46.500 --> 00:13:50.281
You just need to do it with such guardrails that it can't like completely ruin your life.

228
00:13:50.801 --> 00:13:51.962
Same thing with this operating system.

229
00:13:52.122 --> 00:13:58.004
And like, I think some of the other bits about this OS that are interesting is like, I've never been an arch user.

230
00:13:58.584 --> 00:14:00.105
Take my nerd badge, I know, right?

231
00:14:00.925 --> 00:14:01.925
I do drive Linux.

232
00:14:02.825 --> 00:14:03.926
You said you daily drive windows.

233
00:14:04.066 --> 00:14:05.546
I kind of daily drive all three.

234
00:14:05.767 --> 00:14:12.029
Like, at some point I'm touching a Linux box, a Mac box and a Windows box throughout my week, right?

235
00:14:13.069 --> 00:14:18.492
I kind of touch everything, but I've never like really enjoyed the Linux on the desktop experience.

236
00:14:18.512 --> 00:14:19.413
I've done it.

237
00:14:19.513 --> 00:14:23.075
I've done Ubuntu forever, but I SSH into servers all the time, right?

238
00:14:23.155 --> 00:14:25.976
Like Debian stuff and whatnot.

239
00:14:26.356 --> 00:14:29.358
But Arch, have you been an Arch user before?

240
00:14:29.858 --> 00:14:33.584
No, I used Arch when I was doing Omaki back at the Tower event.

241
00:14:33.684 --> 00:14:38.090
In college, I tried to set up a laptop on Arch, and I just found it very clunky and hard to use.

242
00:14:38.110 --> 00:14:45.600
And then when it was finally installed and working, you're the one who's beholden to make it look pretty, and I just don't have time for that type of shit, so no.

243
00:14:46.280 --> 00:14:52.126
But I feel like culturally or like part of the ethos of this whole ecosystem is it's like an ecosystem, right?

244
00:14:52.146 --> 00:14:54.968
There's like tons of different like packages and stuff to bring in.

245
00:14:55.008 --> 00:14:56.169
Yeah, sure.

246
00:14:56.590 --> 00:15:02.615
And so this starts to smell a little JavaScript-y, like NPME to me, right, also.

247
00:15:02.675 --> 00:15:03.816
So like you're now trusting...

248
00:15:04.726 --> 00:15:10.411
almost supply chain level packages as like key parts of your operating system.

249
00:15:10.691 --> 00:15:13.293
Well, this is the whole argument about, about like the AUR, right?

250
00:15:13.313 --> 00:15:13.693
So what is it?

251
00:15:13.713 --> 00:15:15.855
The Arch user repository?

252
00:15:15.875 --> 00:15:19.638
Basically it is like a crowd sourced package manager.

253
00:15:19.698 --> 00:15:20.619
It's not yum, right?

254
00:15:20.639 --> 00:15:21.619
It's or Pac-Man rather.

255
00:15:22.760 --> 00:15:28.445
But it's like the second in command to Pac-Man, and anyone can push anything there.

256
00:15:28.485 --> 00:15:31.968
And literally, you're kind of beholden to read it before you install it.

257
00:15:32.208 --> 00:15:34.190
I know, a crazy, crazy idea.

258
00:15:34.971 --> 00:15:38.994
But yeah, security vulnerabilities, beware when you're talking about Arch.

259
00:15:39.054 --> 00:15:41.976
Ultimately, man, I think Omarki is a cool OS.

260
00:15:41.996 --> 00:15:42.597
It looks pretty.

261
00:15:42.937 --> 00:15:46.860
And the issue is just like, anytime you're going to have...

262
00:15:47.501 --> 00:15:54.087
you know, convenience where user data is parsed somewhere with these programs that are going to, like, things are going to go wrong.

263
00:15:54.167 --> 00:15:57.931
It is just inevitable it's going to go wrong, especially if your whole shtick is that you're moving fast, right?

264
00:15:57.991 --> 00:16:01.835
Then, you know, security tends to be, like, the last thing that you're worried about, unfortunately.

265
00:16:02.267 --> 00:16:04.308
Yeah, I guess, I mean, that's my key point, right?

266
00:16:04.328 --> 00:16:06.448
Especially with the browsers, right?

267
00:16:06.768 --> 00:16:22.612
When you're taking like a much, much, much smaller development team and pointing them at a tool that is so critical to your security posture and your workflow, like your web browser or your operating system, like we're going to stub our toe.

268
00:16:22.912 --> 00:16:24.253
Like these couple of volumes that were like...

269
00:16:24.953 --> 00:16:29.015
pointing at today are just because it's like getting so much attention right now.

270
00:16:29.455 --> 00:16:31.677
These aren't the only volumes that exist in this code.

271
00:16:31.697 --> 00:16:32.317
I guarantee it.

272
00:16:32.517 --> 00:16:32.717
Right.

273
00:16:32.797 --> 00:16:35.879
Like, you know, we're just getting eyeballs on it.

274
00:16:35.979 --> 00:16:37.640
And they're not the only volumes that are going to exist.

275
00:16:37.840 --> 00:16:37.980
Right.

276
00:16:38.000 --> 00:16:39.501
They're going to continue to stub their toe.

277
00:16:39.941 --> 00:16:41.622
And so I think that's just my takeaway from this.

278
00:16:41.702 --> 00:16:41.922
Right.

279
00:16:42.022 --> 00:16:49.466
Is like as you try these new browsers, new viral browsers, new viral operating system type things, just know what you're getting into.

280
00:16:49.806 --> 00:16:49.986
Right.

281
00:16:50.147 --> 00:16:52.608
Not saying like no one should use this, but just like

282
00:16:52.988 --> 00:16:53.749
Oh, no, use it for sure.

283
00:16:53.769 --> 00:16:57.371
It's just like understand that like it's called the bleeding edge for a reason, right?

284
00:16:57.431 --> 00:16:58.371
Like there's blood.

285
00:16:58.632 --> 00:16:59.052
It happens.

286
00:16:59.072 --> 00:16:59.392
Yeah.

287
00:16:59.792 --> 00:17:00.012
Yeah.

288
00:17:00.193 --> 00:17:00.373
Yeah.

289
00:17:00.533 --> 00:17:11.560
Just like, I mean, we talked about our last episode, even for like stuff in our home, you just kind of make a decision about your threat model and like what you're willing to do and like what, like what kind of risks you're willing to take on.

290
00:17:11.640 --> 00:17:16.523
And I think this is, uh, this is one of those things, new browsers are one of those things like that kind of stuff.

291
00:17:16.703 --> 00:17:16.823
So.

292
00:17:17.003 --> 00:17:19.424
Yeah, honorable mentions, right, there are two vulnerabilities on top of that.

293
00:17:19.444 --> 00:17:27.346
So the whole vulnerability with, like, the two-click to RCE thing kind of kicked off the, hey, RCE should have a security team effort.

294
00:17:27.426 --> 00:17:31.567
Since then, the distro has gotten a lot of attention, right, from a security perspective.

295
00:17:31.967 --> 00:17:38.669
So in the last, literally, I think, like, 24 hours, someone dropped a local LPE where, like, the Docker daemon runs as root.

296
00:17:38.689 --> 00:17:42.430
So you as a non-root user can kick off a privileged server.

297
00:17:42.870 --> 00:17:47.712
Docker image and then mount root to your image and then like overwrite a set UID binary, right?

298
00:17:47.732 --> 00:17:48.292
So like not great.

299
00:17:48.932 --> 00:17:56.995
And the second one was basically based on, I think the way that Omaki potentially parses and handles one of its USB device descriptors.

300
00:17:57.015 --> 00:17:59.396
It runs a binary based on like the name that you plug it in.

301
00:17:59.976 --> 00:18:02.617
And so you can exploit that trust boundary, right?

302
00:18:02.657 --> 00:18:09.299
Basically the issue is that you're trusting that a USB device is who it says it is and that is like the core flaw with USB.

303
00:18:10.340 --> 00:18:19.247
If you plug in a Raspberry Pi to your Omaki over USB, you can get the Raspberry Pi to advertise that it is this vulnerable USB device.

304
00:18:19.567 --> 00:18:21.509
And then from there, pop effectively a root shell.

305
00:18:21.569 --> 00:18:21.729
Right.

306
00:18:21.769 --> 00:18:22.790
So not great.

307
00:18:22.810 --> 00:18:24.751
And again, this is not like anybody in particular's fault.

308
00:18:24.791 --> 00:18:26.733
It's just the nature of of code.

309
00:18:26.853 --> 00:18:28.094
New code will have vulns.

310
00:18:28.154 --> 00:18:31.117
And that's something you got to consider when you're working on a new distro.

311
00:18:31.257 --> 00:18:32.398
So, you know, happens, man.

312
00:18:33.557 --> 00:18:33.937
It does.

313
00:18:33.997 --> 00:18:34.378
It does.

314
00:18:35.819 --> 00:18:38.881
And speaking of risks that you might unnecessarily take.

315
00:18:38.941 --> 00:18:39.502
And now I don't know.

316
00:18:39.642 --> 00:18:41.283
I literally cannot transition to this one.

317
00:18:41.523 --> 00:18:43.925
I might talk about the sponsor transition.

318
00:18:44.305 --> 00:18:50.390
No, I was I wasn't going to I was I was going to go to GTA six and I was like trying to think of a GTA.

319
00:18:50.470 --> 00:18:50.690
Right.

320
00:18:51.011 --> 00:18:57.676
From taking unnecessary risks to like stealing a car and punching the person in the face and multiple cop stars.

321
00:18:58.316 --> 00:19:01.679
We're calling out sick on November 26th because the game's coming out.

322
00:19:02.119 --> 00:19:03.020
Is that the drop day?

323
00:19:03.280 --> 00:19:03.941
It's coming out, man.

324
00:19:03.961 --> 00:19:04.281
It's soon.

325
00:19:04.301 --> 00:19:05.762
It's like in two months, three months.

326
00:19:06.243 --> 00:19:07.724
Is it a PC thing for you?

327
00:19:07.804 --> 00:19:09.385
Is it a console thing for you?

328
00:19:09.405 --> 00:19:10.847
I don't know, man.

329
00:19:11.187 --> 00:19:15.050
I'm more of a PC gamer now because I like my PC.

330
00:19:15.130 --> 00:19:17.132
It's more comfortable in my office chair.

331
00:19:17.533 --> 00:19:24.138
But I feel like GTA is one of those games that it's almost culturally required that you're on a PS5 or you're on an Xbox.

332
00:19:24.258 --> 00:19:27.041
That's where I played Vice City when I was 12, right?

333
00:19:27.141 --> 00:19:28.022
I was on a PS2.

334
00:19:28.042 --> 00:19:29.403
Yeah, man.

335
00:19:29.903 --> 00:19:31.946
Yeah, I didn't have the date memorized.

336
00:19:31.966 --> 00:19:34.068
I also do not have a PS5.

337
00:19:34.088 --> 00:19:37.291
I don't know if this is going to be the reason I buy one.

338
00:19:37.311 --> 00:19:42.137
It's probably going to be the reason I like actually get my gaming rig set up at my house.

339
00:19:42.457 --> 00:19:44.019
It's been in disarray for a while.

340
00:19:44.880 --> 00:19:45.580
Who has time?

341
00:19:45.640 --> 00:19:46.081
Who has time?

342
00:19:46.181 --> 00:19:58.045
Okay, so I think I've gotten more outreach about this GTA 6 leak than I have anything in the second half of the year of people just like in my DMs being like, are you going to make a video about the GTA 6 leak?

343
00:19:58.065 --> 00:20:03.006
And I'm like, we know nothing about the hack or whatever.

344
00:20:03.046 --> 00:20:03.527
We don't know.

345
00:20:03.587 --> 00:20:06.528
We have no information about what's actually gone on here.

346
00:20:06.568 --> 00:20:08.368
So maybe I should make that video, right?

347
00:20:08.428 --> 00:20:09.228
It's just like whatever.

348
00:20:09.809 --> 00:20:11.269
But we figured we should talk about it.

349
00:20:12.770 --> 00:20:13.470
The quick and dirty.

350
00:20:13.890 --> 00:20:24.733
There's someone online that is putting gameplay footage of GTA 6 on a Cyber Leaks website.

351
00:20:24.753 --> 00:20:26.153
And they spell it leak like the onion.

352
00:20:26.693 --> 00:20:27.733
Cyber Leak.

353
00:20:28.513 --> 00:20:30.474
And the gameplay footage come out.

354
00:20:30.574 --> 00:20:32.014
Rockstar has been pretty quiet about it.

355
00:20:32.054 --> 00:20:35.255
But just this morning, this is why we decided to talk about it.

356
00:20:35.275 --> 00:20:38.816
Because Rockstar kind of confirmed that it's real and that they're heartbroken.

357
00:20:38.856 --> 00:20:43.537
And all the work that this is not how they wanted us to see gameplay.

358
00:20:44.057 --> 00:20:47.299
So first, after all of this, I can definitely heart goes out to them.

359
00:20:47.359 --> 00:20:48.680
I mean, that just sucks, right?

360
00:20:50.161 --> 00:20:56.805
But we have no information about how the game was actually stolen or the footage was actually stolen or whatever it is, right?

361
00:20:56.865 --> 00:20:59.007
We have like, is this an insider?

362
00:20:59.947 --> 00:21:01.628
Is this like some sort of third party?

363
00:21:02.169 --> 00:21:05.891
Is this a contractor or was it some sort of cybersecurity incident?

364
00:21:05.991 --> 00:21:07.032
We know nothing.

365
00:21:07.772 --> 00:21:18.634
My heart goes out to the Rockstar team because you have to consider, like, from just a pure intellectual property management perspective, this is one of the world's hardest problems, right?

366
00:21:18.934 --> 00:21:27.596
You have a game that has likely been in development for a decade or more, and your goal has been, okay, let's make this game, and literally no one can know about it.

367
00:21:27.636 --> 00:21:28.876
No one can talk about it ever.

368
00:21:37.178 --> 00:21:38.098
You know what I mean?

369
00:21:38.138 --> 00:21:44.280
Like people can make millions of dollars off of just extortion if they could do effectively this, right?

370
00:21:44.500 --> 00:21:44.740
Yeah.

371
00:21:44.980 --> 00:21:48.141
So I think that that's the last word you use there, right?

372
00:21:48.181 --> 00:21:51.762
Extortion being kind of the key thing, because otherwise it's like, well, why?

373
00:21:51.822 --> 00:21:52.002
Right.

374
00:21:52.022 --> 00:22:02.806
I mean, it's almost it's almost like you're a big target because your particular audience is also the audience that is filled with actual cyber threat actors and talent.

375
00:22:04.346 --> 00:22:11.848
I've given a talk the last couple of years at PAX, the video game conference, about kind of the intersection between the video game industry and the cybersecurity industry.

376
00:22:12.288 --> 00:22:20.350
Because if you get into like threat actor identification and tracking and all of this, they are in gaming discords, period.

377
00:22:20.490 --> 00:22:30.132
Like that is where like every big name hacking group you've read about or read an incident about, they have met each other and organized in gaming communities.

378
00:22:31.053 --> 00:22:38.377
like 100% of the time, like there isn't another example, especially in the Western world.

379
00:22:38.417 --> 00:22:38.598
Right.

380
00:22:39.038 --> 00:22:47.503
Obviously we know a little bit less about like non-government, like hacking out of like the Eastern world, especially like named groups and all this kind of stuff.

381
00:22:48.923 --> 00:22:53.524
But like Western world where like people are getting arrested and we know about them.

382
00:22:53.704 --> 00:22:59.706
It's like Roblox, Xbox chats, like Fortnite groups, like Discord stuff, whatever it is.

383
00:23:00.846 --> 00:23:06.348
So that I could see, okay, hey, you're highly targeted because you're rock star working on GTA 6.

384
00:23:06.408 --> 00:23:10.609
And it turns out that the threat actor groups are gamers like through and through.

385
00:23:11.209 --> 00:23:14.970
But financially, I was like, well, why would they have such a big target on their...

386
00:23:15.770 --> 00:23:16.030
Back.

387
00:23:16.090 --> 00:23:16.991
And that's what I started.

388
00:23:17.011 --> 00:23:34.501
Like we're starting to see this week right now with the GTA six leaks is they under the guise of this is a political protest against rock stars decision to not release physical copies of the game, right?

389
00:23:34.541 --> 00:23:36.141
This is going to be a download only game.

390
00:23:36.161 --> 00:23:37.582
They're not printing it on discs.

391
00:23:38.123 --> 00:23:42.345
And the manifesto from the threat actor is basically saying, you know,

392
00:23:42.485 --> 00:23:43.366
This is BS.

393
00:23:43.467 --> 00:23:48.935
Like there's a, there's a big movement around like, Oh, we're now all just like renting everything.

394
00:23:48.975 --> 00:23:50.777
We don't, none of us own anything anymore.

395
00:23:51.478 --> 00:23:54.102
You know, you don't just like have the game and I get it.

396
00:23:54.222 --> 00:23:54.403
Right.

397
00:23:54.563 --> 00:23:55.544
I like, I hate it too.

398
00:23:55.624 --> 00:23:56.045
I agree.

399
00:23:56.105 --> 00:23:56.606
It's terrible.

400
00:23:56.926 --> 00:23:57.127
Yeah.

401
00:23:57.287 --> 00:23:57.427
Yeah.

402
00:23:57.427 --> 00:23:57.827
Yeah.

403
00:23:57.887 --> 00:23:59.689
And the constant expansions.

404
00:24:00.009 --> 00:24:05.534
And then the real, the real kicker is like their ability to just like turn off your access to something that like you thought you bought.

405
00:24:05.634 --> 00:24:05.874
Right.

406
00:24:05.954 --> 00:24:07.716
Or like it, it goes away eventually.

407
00:24:07.736 --> 00:24:08.716
And that's just kind of weird.

408
00:24:08.756 --> 00:24:08.937
Right.

409
00:24:08.977 --> 00:24:11.919
Like I could fire up golden eye on my N64 right now.

410
00:24:12.119 --> 00:24:12.319
Right.

411
00:24:12.399 --> 00:24:17.384
Like you can't like shut the servers down and take, like take access away of this anyway.

412
00:24:17.904 --> 00:24:20.987
So that all being said, that's the manifesto, but yeah,

413
00:24:21.707 --> 00:24:27.709
All of the videos that are coming out from this leaker are watermarked with their like crypto wallets addresses.

414
00:24:28.709 --> 00:24:31.110
So there's like this financial motive.

415
00:24:31.130 --> 00:24:36.131
That's what you can you kind of said extortion that we haven't seen a ton of that like in this world.

416
00:24:36.211 --> 00:24:37.232
Obviously, there are examples.

417
00:24:37.272 --> 00:24:40.533
The Sony hacks a while ago, you know, whatever.

418
00:24:40.633 --> 00:24:41.573
But there.

419
00:24:42.413 --> 00:24:51.822
This isn't like your very common ransomware target, a la healthcare providers or legal providers or stuff like this, right?

420
00:24:51.842 --> 00:24:54.865
That have the money and have like the reason to kind of shut it down.

421
00:24:55.746 --> 00:25:03.274
But this is like a Katie Masuris, a friend of mine who's just like a legend in the vulnerability research space.

422
00:25:04.214 --> 00:25:04.335
Uh,

423
00:25:05.095 --> 00:25:07.657
is quoted in this article about the GTA 6 stuff.

424
00:25:07.757 --> 00:25:10.038
And she's saying, I'm just going to read her quote directly.

425
00:25:10.078 --> 00:25:13.540
This is what the alternative vulnerability economy looks like.

426
00:25:14.721 --> 00:25:17.202
She said the leader launched a cryptocurrency token.

427
00:25:17.542 --> 00:25:20.104
Oh, so it's like a, it's a shit coin too, by the way, right?

428
00:25:20.604 --> 00:25:30.210
Launched a cryptocurrency token, watermarked stolen footage with a buy link, offered to sell ad space on future leaks because they're going to go viral.

429
00:25:30.970 --> 00:25:34.613
Each of those pays out in proportion to how many people are watching.

430
00:25:34.993 --> 00:25:36.894
The manifesto is what keeps them watching.

431
00:25:37.074 --> 00:25:47.421
This is genuinely a new monetization model for stolen pre-release content, and it means the usual playbook of negotiating a ransom payment quietly or paying to make it stop won't work.

432
00:25:47.901 --> 00:25:55.346
I think this is kind of, okay, now it's worth talking about from a cybersecurity context, no matter how they actually got the leak to begin with.

433
00:25:56.887 --> 00:25:58.268
Can I put on my Sinflow hat for a minute?

434
00:25:58.609 --> 00:25:58.809
Yes.

435
00:25:58.829 --> 00:25:58.909
Yes.

436
00:26:01.062 --> 00:26:05.543
I find the timing of all of this very suspicious.

437
00:26:06.523 --> 00:26:13.785
What if, hear me out, what if Rockstar is playing seven-dimensional chess and they are the leaguers?

438
00:26:15.125 --> 00:26:16.666
What's the benefit?

439
00:26:17.186 --> 00:26:17.846
Hype about the game.

440
00:26:18.106 --> 00:26:19.206
You think the GTA 6 was lacking hype?

441
00:26:22.232 --> 00:26:25.233
Um, potentially, maybe there's just too much noise in like the games market.

442
00:26:25.253 --> 00:26:29.314
Maybe people are mad about the, the Sony no physical disc thing.

443
00:26:29.834 --> 00:26:32.454
Maybe this is just them like, you know, 10.

444
00:26:32.495 --> 00:26:36.235
I mean, why would a company say no to 10% more profit, right?

445
00:26:36.315 --> 00:26:38.336
Like, okay, we make a little noise.

446
00:26:38.696 --> 00:26:39.796
We make a fake shit coin.

447
00:26:39.816 --> 00:26:42.397
Maybe we have a persona running around that we call the leaker.

448
00:26:43.017 --> 00:26:45.018
You think they made the coin too.

449
00:26:45.078 --> 00:26:46.258
I think they made it all.

450
00:26:46.338 --> 00:26:47.859
Okay, I'm not saying that I think that.

451
00:26:48.199 --> 00:26:58.663
I'm saying just like there is a timeline that could exist where the moon landing was fake, this could also be a thing.

452
00:26:59.063 --> 00:26:59.703
You know what I mean?

453
00:26:59.723 --> 00:27:00.884
All right, Tucker.

454
00:27:01.324 --> 00:27:02.104
Just ask a question.

455
00:27:02.124 --> 00:27:02.924
Hey, relax.

456
00:27:02.984 --> 00:27:04.085
Just ask a question.

457
00:27:06.286 --> 00:27:11.070
I'm not saying that I think they did it, but you got to ask the question.

458
00:27:11.470 --> 00:27:15.334
Did Rockstar make their own shit coin and fabricate their own leak?

459
00:27:15.954 --> 00:27:19.777
Yeah, I don't think so, but I, okay.

460
00:27:20.017 --> 00:27:21.719
I don't think that this is some grand hack.

461
00:27:21.759 --> 00:27:22.439
I'll tell you that.

462
00:27:22.620 --> 00:27:22.840
Sure.

463
00:27:24.061 --> 00:27:30.466
I think that this is going to be some sort of Occam's razor situation of like a contractor, right?

464
00:27:30.486 --> 00:27:30.926
That like,

465
00:27:31.807 --> 00:27:33.888
did some crap that they weren't supposed to.

466
00:27:34.669 --> 00:27:45.994
Um, that, that all being said, I know some people that have been like high up at like security at these gaming organizations, it's a tight ship because they understand the sensitivity of this, right?

467
00:27:46.095 --> 00:27:48.196
I've been in like, I've done some like government stuff.

468
00:27:48.236 --> 00:27:53.879
Like I've done some banking stuff, like where you go into a room with multiple badges and eye scans and all this kind of stuff.

469
00:27:53.899 --> 00:27:55.379
And they make sure that stuff can't get out.

470
00:27:55.439 --> 00:27:55.599
Right.

471
00:27:55.619 --> 00:27:56.560
I've experienced this.

472
00:27:57.721 --> 00:28:02.563
So I don't think that Rockstar exactly has zero controls on their contractors.

473
00:28:02.603 --> 00:28:06.585
So I'm actually really, really interested in the details because I think they're probably fascinating.

474
00:28:06.605 --> 00:28:10.307
I don't think it's like someone walked out with a USB stick or something like that.

475
00:28:10.528 --> 00:28:18.052
Can you imagine like, yeah, you know, billion dollar or whatever a year, like, you know, security budget to make sure that like the like their whole.

476
00:28:18.752 --> 00:28:25.036
company, all of their profit is derived from a single source of IP that's maybe a terabyte long or a terabyte in size, right?

477
00:28:25.056 --> 00:28:26.317
So protect that at all costs.

478
00:28:26.337 --> 00:28:32.901
And then imagine it just gets compromised by a guy walks in, DLP doesn't work, puts in the USB stick, downloads the game, and walks out.

479
00:28:32.921 --> 00:28:33.622
Can you imagine, dude?

480
00:28:34.002 --> 00:28:34.302
Yeah.

481
00:28:34.422 --> 00:28:39.906
I mean, I don't want it to be that because I feel like it has to be more interesting.

482
00:28:39.986 --> 00:28:40.146
Right.

483
00:28:40.186 --> 00:28:40.506
I agree.

484
00:28:40.606 --> 00:28:40.947
I hope.

485
00:28:41.207 --> 00:28:41.487
I hope.

486
00:28:41.547 --> 00:28:41.847
Yeah.

487
00:28:41.907 --> 00:28:43.308
I mean, to your point, right?

488
00:28:43.588 --> 00:28:45.309
Like, it comes out in November.

489
00:28:45.329 --> 00:28:45.650
Yes.

490
00:28:45.870 --> 00:28:46.050
Yes.

491
00:28:46.953 --> 00:28:48.494
We're recording this August 26th.

492
00:28:48.814 --> 00:28:51.495
To the day it comes out in a few months.

493
00:28:51.515 --> 00:28:55.757
Why haven't we seen more marketing or gameplay or footage?

494
00:28:55.817 --> 00:28:57.338
Why does it have to be leaked?

495
00:28:57.358 --> 00:29:00.279
I'm shocked that we haven't seen gameplay at this point.

496
00:29:00.399 --> 00:29:07.983
The only thing we've seen is there was a gameplay tangential trailer that came out I think a year ago or a year and a half.

497
00:29:08.023 --> 00:29:09.504
That's when they dropped the release date.

498
00:29:09.924 --> 00:29:11.665
Other than that, we've seen literally nothing.

499
00:29:12.205 --> 00:29:13.986
Now, why would you do...

500
00:29:16.826 --> 00:29:23.418
Why would you not do this kind of campaign, a PSYOP, if you will, and release gameplay footage?

501
00:29:23.499 --> 00:29:24.260
Why would you not do that?

502
00:29:24.420 --> 00:29:25.001
If that's the case...

503
00:29:27.416 --> 00:29:29.398
why would you do one exclusively and not both?

504
00:29:29.698 --> 00:29:29.858
Right.

505
00:29:29.878 --> 00:29:30.098
Yeah.

506
00:29:30.499 --> 00:29:32.080
I don't know.

507
00:29:32.120 --> 00:29:34.001
Their silence for a few days is a little weird.

508
00:29:34.122 --> 00:29:36.203
Like, you know, if this, I don't know.

509
00:29:36.383 --> 00:29:37.384
I don't know.

510
00:29:37.404 --> 00:29:37.544
Okay.

511
00:29:37.684 --> 00:29:43.769
The, the, the other bit worth talking about for us, because it hits on a story that we just talked about a few weeks ago.

512
00:29:43.869 --> 00:29:46.572
Did you read about the investigation that they're kicking off the forensics?

513
00:29:47.132 --> 00:29:48.713
Like Rockstar into GTA 6?

514
00:29:48.753 --> 00:29:51.854
Yeah, so Take-Two is Rockstar's parent company.

515
00:29:51.914 --> 00:29:52.074
Right.

516
00:29:52.094 --> 00:29:55.675
Okay, I'm not as familiar with that name, but I've heard it, right?

517
00:29:56.416 --> 00:29:59.897
They are trying to track this down.

518
00:29:59.917 --> 00:30:06.339
They're like way, I wouldn't even say over, I was about to say overreacting, but they're like, they're having a very strong reaction to this.

519
00:30:06.500 --> 00:30:06.940
How about this?

520
00:30:07.000 --> 00:30:08.640
Might be an appropriately sized reaction.

521
00:30:09.201 --> 00:30:14.663
But Take-Two has now asked for Windows device identifiers

522
00:30:15.658 --> 00:30:24.646
login records, and cloud storage contents for every person who spoke in three Discord servers going back to June, is what this says.

523
00:30:25.186 --> 00:30:30.251
So the people with the, yeah, there's some other quotes in here about, like, the people doing the investigations of forensics.

524
00:30:30.291 --> 00:30:32.112
But we just talked about this Windows identifier.

525
00:30:32.472 --> 00:30:32.693
Yeah.

526
00:30:32.713 --> 00:30:39.899
Because it's been, like, all of a sudden it's now, like, this is now the second very public use of this forensic token.

527
00:30:40.880 --> 00:30:42.901
Discord has not commented whether or not they are...

528
00:30:43.722 --> 00:30:45.123
like responding to this.

529
00:30:46.583 --> 00:30:58.308
Well, in this article, so this kind of steps back my it's a conspiracy conversation because federal judges granted the subpoenas against Discord, Microsoft and X, but the petition against Google remains unapproved as of Monday.

530
00:30:58.368 --> 00:31:00.829
So they're getting federal courts involved.

531
00:31:00.849 --> 00:31:03.550
So very unlikely that it's a PSYOP now.

532
00:31:03.890 --> 00:31:05.612
Okay, tinfoil.

533
00:31:06.473 --> 00:31:07.595
Tinfoil.

534
00:31:08.015 --> 00:31:09.117
Yeah.

535
00:31:09.397 --> 00:31:13.702
So, yeah, Discord hasn't confirmed it, but that they've been served.

536
00:31:13.723 --> 00:31:16.065
They just said, we do comply with valid subpoena.

537
00:31:16.085 --> 00:31:17.908
So if they got a subpoena, they're complying, right?

538
00:31:17.928 --> 00:31:18.929
Yeah.

539
00:31:19.850 --> 00:31:40.076
Yeah, the article kind of finishes with my take right is playing out like a classic insider threat exploitation scheme Which is probably most likely right this doesn't this doesn't scream hack that went Unidentified for months, you know to let them exfiltrate all this stuff This screams insider that had access that is trying to cash in on on the situation but

540
00:31:42.252 --> 00:31:44.274
There's some other messery going on.

541
00:31:44.754 --> 00:31:46.456
It's part of the reason I wore this T-shirt today.

542
00:31:47.317 --> 00:31:47.917
Yeah.

543
00:31:48.438 --> 00:31:49.038
Be jealous.

544
00:31:49.098 --> 00:31:51.260
This T-shirt sold out very quickly at DEF CON.

545
00:31:51.700 --> 00:31:54.143
The homies over at Miscreants, Sean, what up?

546
00:31:54.403 --> 00:31:58.567
And they collabed with VX Underground.

547
00:31:59.127 --> 00:32:01.269
VX Underground put a thread about this.

548
00:32:01.349 --> 00:32:04.232
Apparently, they're getting hit up about the GTA 6 leak a bunch, too.

549
00:32:04.252 --> 00:32:05.212
So they looked into it.

550
00:32:06.653 --> 00:32:07.654
And there's a ton of malware going on.

551
00:32:07.694 --> 00:32:12.555
VX Underground, if you guys don't know, is a malware research group and repository.

552
00:32:13.616 --> 00:32:17.577
They hold a lot of malware samples and they distribute them for researchers and stuff like this.

553
00:32:17.857 --> 00:32:20.919
They have analyzed some malware that's going around with the leaks.

554
00:32:21.079 --> 00:32:22.619
I mean, obviously this happened, right?

555
00:32:22.679 --> 00:32:24.360
So like what are you seeing on that side?

556
00:32:25.280 --> 00:32:35.655
Well, before we go underground on this malware, perhaps we go underground on the sponsor of today's podcast, helping you make the world a safer place by checking out to see if your code in your production environment has vulnerabilities.

557
00:32:35.695 --> 00:32:36.657
Maze, take it away.

558
00:32:37.365 --> 00:32:40.908
Hey hackers, before we keep going, I wanna take a quick break and say a quick thank you to our sponsors.

559
00:32:41.148 --> 00:32:44.671
Today's Lowdown episode is sponsored by our friends over at Maze.

560
00:32:45.171 --> 00:32:50.455
Maze has spent the last couple of years using AI to find and remediate vulnerabilities in the cloud.

561
00:32:50.556 --> 00:32:57.321
And now they've released Maze Code, AI agents that find and deeply investigate vulnerabilities in your code.

562
00:32:57.541 --> 00:32:58.342
Now we all know the deal.

563
00:32:58.742 --> 00:33:04.991
Software composition analysis tools and SaaS toolings are all historically really bad at just making more noise.

564
00:33:05.031 --> 00:33:11.901
They find issues that may not actually be real and just create a lot of problems for your engineers to deal with that don't solve real security vulnerabilities.

565
00:33:12.001 --> 00:33:12.421
I get it.

566
00:33:12.461 --> 00:33:13.022
We've been there.

567
00:33:13.663 --> 00:33:19.045
Maze code is a really cool tool because Maze code actually knows how your code works.

568
00:33:19.385 --> 00:33:24.448
Maze code investigates every finding with the context of how your code is actually deployed.

569
00:33:24.848 --> 00:33:32.391
Sure, you're using a version of libxml2 that's vulnerable, the actual code path to hit that vulnerability is not exposed in your Docker image.

570
00:33:32.691 --> 00:33:36.234
MazeCode can find that and won't show you that that vulnerability is a big deal.

571
00:33:36.354 --> 00:33:40.918
Every vulnerability that MazeCode reports comes with evidence that it's real and a way to fix it.

572
00:33:41.258 --> 00:33:45.361
Check out Maze at go.lowdownpod.com slash Maze.

573
00:33:45.481 --> 00:33:48.924
That's go.lowdownpod.com slash Maze.

574
00:33:49.104 --> 00:33:49.725
Thanks again, Maze.

575
00:33:49.845 --> 00:33:50.686
Let's keep going.

576
00:33:50.866 --> 00:33:54.549
Yeah, so VX Underground doing great work, doing the Lord's work on Twitter.

577
00:33:54.629 --> 00:33:54.789
What?

578
00:33:54.989 --> 00:33:55.369
What, Matt?

579
00:33:55.630 --> 00:33:55.770
What?

580
00:33:55.790 --> 00:33:55.930
What?

581
00:33:56.250 --> 00:34:06.695
We're just, oh, God, the level of podcast professional we've hit by episode 10 and our ability to throw to the money segment is unparalleled.

582
00:34:06.775 --> 00:34:07.376
True.

583
00:34:07.456 --> 00:34:08.156
Come at us.

584
00:34:08.256 --> 00:34:08.816
Come at us.

585
00:34:08.916 --> 00:34:09.457
Anyone else.

586
00:34:09.477 --> 00:34:10.097
Yeah.

587
00:34:10.297 --> 00:34:12.198
So VX Underground, great guy, does great work.

588
00:34:12.218 --> 00:34:18.401
He, quote, unquote, in his own words, likes to bonk goop with a stick, meaning malware, Ari.

589
00:34:18.521 --> 00:34:20.122
So, guys, obviously, let me be very clear here.

590
00:34:20.262 --> 00:34:23.864
If someone approaches you on Discord and says, hello,

591
00:34:24.264 --> 00:34:30.047
Would you like to download GTA6installer.msi.exe.mp4.exe?

592
00:34:30.748 --> 00:34:35.070
Please don't install it, because it is likely one of these goops that are to be bonked with a stick.

593
00:34:35.610 --> 00:34:37.171
So, yeah, super interesting stuff, right?

594
00:34:37.531 --> 00:34:43.575
So someone on Twitter approached VX Underground and said, Hey, I have the leak supposedly...

595
00:34:44.375 --> 00:34:45.236
Would you check it out for me?

596
00:34:45.256 --> 00:34:47.640
Because this is getting really popular on like torrenting sites, right?

597
00:34:47.660 --> 00:34:52.146
People are peering this file all over the place trying to like push out the leak as far as it will go.

598
00:34:52.186 --> 00:35:00.297
And obviously, bad actors are going to capitalize on that and use kind of the name collision of the real leak and malware to distribute the malware, right?

599
00:35:01.038 --> 00:35:10.749
So inside of the GTA 4 setup file, or GTA 6 setup file, rather, which is only 1.05 gigabytes, so just, like, very suspicious to begin with.

600
00:35:10.809 --> 00:35:16.696
Like, this game is likely going to be hundreds of gigabytes, just from a pure, like, shaders and texture perspective.

601
00:35:17.477 --> 00:35:17.677
Um...

602
00:35:18.418 --> 00:35:19.499
Something, something, something.

603
00:35:19.739 --> 00:35:28.924
It's a variety of self-packing, self-decompressing, de-encapsulating DLLs that run through multiple layers of de-encapsulation.

604
00:35:29.805 --> 00:35:41.072
Ultimately, at the bottom of the stack is a binary that tries to kill a lot of antiviruses, tries to disable them, like looking for Kaspersky, looking for, you know, ClamAV, looking for a bunch of others.

605
00:35:42.433 --> 00:35:46.219
It disables AI, which I guess maybe if you're into that, it's maybe worth running this.

606
00:35:46.239 --> 00:35:48.021
It turns off Copilot for you, so that's pretty cool.

607
00:35:48.482 --> 00:35:49.683
It turns off phishing filters.

608
00:35:49.703 --> 00:35:51.426
It turns off suggestions from Windows.

609
00:35:52.367 --> 00:35:55.091
It gets down to a six-stage payload.

610
00:35:55.131 --> 00:35:56.873
Stage six uses a...

611
00:35:59.148 --> 00:36:12.831
encrypted RAR file so that AV can't scan it, but then has the password, obviously, for the decryption in the payload, unencrypts and then uncompresses the RAR file, and ultimately runs a Quasar RAT, right?

612
00:36:12.851 --> 00:36:20.393
So, like, very common piece of malware that people use for, like, password exfiltration and a bunch of other malicious and various activity, right?

613
00:36:20.433 --> 00:36:26.294
So, you know, what is the meme where it's, like, the giant dominoes, and it's, like, me installing GTA VI

614
00:36:27.154 --> 00:36:28.715
North Koreans have my Facebook password.

615
00:36:28.735 --> 00:36:30.235
Like, that's what this turns into, right?

616
00:36:30.295 --> 00:36:36.558
So if you feel like you may have found the crown jewel, like I found the GTA 6 installer, you didn't.

617
00:36:36.738 --> 00:36:37.838
I'm pretty confident you didn't.

618
00:36:37.878 --> 00:36:39.059
Please, please don't run this.

619
00:36:39.479 --> 00:36:41.320
But, yeah, props out to VX Underground.

620
00:36:41.340 --> 00:36:44.001
You can follow him on Twitter if you're not, which if you're listening to this, you probably already are.

621
00:36:44.041 --> 00:36:45.221
But, you know, shout out to him.

622
00:36:46.202 --> 00:36:46.482
Yeah, man.

623
00:36:46.582 --> 00:36:47.582
It's a super weird world out there.

624
00:36:49.183 --> 00:36:50.383
Yeah, that, man.

625
00:36:51.064 --> 00:36:51.944
Like, yeah.

626
00:36:52.302 --> 00:36:55.485
It turns out there's more to talk about than I was giving credit there.

627
00:36:55.505 --> 00:36:56.906
I was like, we don't know anything about this leak.

628
00:36:56.946 --> 00:36:59.268
And then, like, you look into it, and it's like, oh, wait.

629
00:36:59.609 --> 00:37:02.751
Like, insider threat, ransomware, shitcoin, malware.

630
00:37:02.852 --> 00:37:03.432
I was like, oh, damn.

631
00:37:03.472 --> 00:37:03.953
Okay, yeah.

632
00:37:04.093 --> 00:37:05.934
Like, we should actually make a video about this.

633
00:37:06.795 --> 00:37:07.115
All right.

634
00:37:07.195 --> 00:37:08.337
So this next topic, I...

635
00:37:10.098 --> 00:37:12.119
I have my crystal ball for this next topic.

636
00:37:12.179 --> 00:37:12.479
Okay.

637
00:37:12.499 --> 00:37:12.740
Send it.

638
00:37:12.760 --> 00:37:22.105
You have two headlines that are completely unrelated and I'm going to relate them somehow through the power of friendship and magic for everyone.

639
00:37:23.046 --> 00:37:38.015
So this really cool bit of code that someone found on legitimate Ali Express that's using your browser to send out inaudible sounds to actually more accurately fingerprint you, even if you're like,

640
00:37:38.815 --> 00:37:41.699
one of these people that tries to avoid being accurately fingerprinted.

641
00:37:42.240 --> 00:37:50.831
And then two, and we'll go deeper into each of these two Comcast wifi routers are now motion sensing you through your home for various reasons.

642
00:37:51.492 --> 00:37:51.612
Uh,

643
00:37:52.678 --> 00:38:09.002
The friendship and magic for everyone unity of these two stories is I feel like we're starting to see some financial incentives behind abusing radio signals that we haven't really seen this before.

644
00:38:09.082 --> 00:38:14.103
We haven't seen a ton of this, like using Wi-Fi signals for motion detecting, using radio signals.

645
00:38:14.763 --> 00:38:17.206
your browser to send out audio stuff to fingerprint you.

646
00:38:18.287 --> 00:38:22.872
These are quote-unquote legitimate ways to use these pieces of technology.

647
00:38:23.874 --> 00:38:24.374
Crystal ball.

648
00:38:25.335 --> 00:38:25.776
Crystal ball.

649
00:38:26.597 --> 00:38:28.899
If we had a bigger budget, I'd have an animator.

650
00:38:30.201 --> 00:38:30.561
Maze?

651
00:38:30.601 --> 00:38:31.022
No, I'm kidding.

652
00:38:31.142 --> 00:38:31.282
F***.

653
00:38:36.248 --> 00:38:37.828
this is going to get abused, right?

654
00:38:37.888 --> 00:38:43.330
Like there's no way that these two quote unquote legitimate things, which are kind of BS anyway, right?

655
00:38:43.350 --> 00:38:46.931
Like stop, stop finding new innovative ways to track me, bro.

656
00:38:47.211 --> 00:38:53.213
But, but yeah, can you, you, you didn't hear about this AliExpress thing until I told you about it, but you dug in and you said it's super cool.

657
00:38:53.253 --> 00:38:54.653
What are they, what are they doing under the hood here?

658
00:38:55.003 --> 00:39:03.774
Yeah, so to be very clear, this is AliExpress getting caught using a technique that is now outdated, right?

659
00:39:03.794 --> 00:39:10.183
So what this means is they probably left this technique in, but this has been going on for a long time, and we're just now hearing about it, okay?

660
00:39:10.663 --> 00:39:12.986
So what's going on here is AliExpress got caught...

661
00:39:13.913 --> 00:39:19.358
fingerprinting visitors using a very particular metric that I knew nothing about.

662
00:39:19.658 --> 00:39:32.269
This is a method to fingerprint browsers and ideally to fingerprint not only the browser, but the operating system and the specific CPU that you're on, be it like ARM versus Intel versus AMD versus whatever.

663
00:39:32.409 --> 00:39:32.629
Okay.

664
00:39:33.350 --> 00:39:44.920
So the way this works is the AliExpress homepage was loading and playing an audio file at zero gain, so you couldn't hear it.

665
00:39:45.661 --> 00:39:49.044
What they were doing was pumping the audio file...

666
00:39:49.344 --> 00:39:54.906
through the, at the time, native audio processing libraries of the browser.

667
00:39:55.086 --> 00:39:55.366
Okay.

668
00:39:55.646 --> 00:40:04.109
So they would play literally just a sawtooth wave and pump it through the audio processing of the browser and then read the output of that audio processing.

669
00:40:04.569 --> 00:40:13.491
And by parsing the output, they would get detailed information about specifically not only what browser are you on, but what OS are you on?

670
00:40:13.511 --> 00:40:18.313
Because different OSs have different native browser or different native audio processing.

671
00:40:18.333 --> 00:40:18.893
Okay.

672
00:40:18.893 --> 00:40:32.760
And then on top of that, potentially, based on differences in the floating point accuracy and the way that this CPU process is already over versus this CPU, information about the CPU that you're on for some form of fingerprinting.

673
00:40:33.100 --> 00:40:39.484
Now, I did admittedly pump this through Claude, because I'm like, why do you want to fingerprint browsers?

674
00:40:39.524 --> 00:40:44.667
In the world of exploitation, people want to know what browser you're on so they can throw the right V8 exploit at you.

675
00:40:44.687 --> 00:40:46.928
But other than that, what does AliExpress have to do with this?

676
00:40:47.668 --> 00:40:53.633
And so one good claim that Claude at least called out was like, this could be an anti-fraud thing, right?

677
00:40:53.914 --> 00:40:59.839
When you go to a website, the user agent is your browser telling the server who it is.

678
00:40:59.879 --> 00:41:00.920
Hello, I am Chrome.

679
00:41:01.100 --> 00:41:02.761
I am Safari.

680
00:41:02.842 --> 00:41:03.702
I am Firefox.

681
00:41:03.722 --> 00:41:05.484
But obviously that's just an advertisement.

682
00:41:05.504 --> 00:41:06.204
That's a claim.

683
00:41:06.585 --> 00:41:07.626
That's not actually a proof.

684
00:41:07.746 --> 00:41:08.987
Websites want to do their best.

685
00:41:09.287 --> 00:41:17.072
to figure out if the claim being made to the UA that you're claiming is actually who you are for a variety of reasons, one being anti-fraud, right?

686
00:41:17.112 --> 00:41:31.902
So if you're like a Vietnamese phone farm where you're like a bot factory and you're trying to like scrape AliExpress, it's in AliExpress's interest to know that you are a phone farm, that you're a Samsung Galaxy S8, but you're claiming to be a MacBook Pro, right?

687
00:41:32.242 --> 00:41:43.813
And so by doing this auditory processing, you were at one point able to make that distinction and say, oh, this user is actually on a Samsung phone instead of Chrome on a MacBook like they're claiming.

688
00:41:44.510 --> 00:42:06.705
Now, the reason I said that this is an old method that they got caught using is not a current method is because Firefox and Chrome both caught wind of this technique of using the native audio libraries to do fingerprinting, and so now the browsers each have their own independent in-browser audio processing so that you can't do this kind of in-out black box testing.

689
00:42:07.105 --> 00:42:10.328
You probably could still use that library in particular to...

690
00:42:11.228 --> 00:42:14.069
fingerprint if you're actually on Chrome or actually on Firefox.

691
00:42:14.609 --> 00:42:22.052
But the ability to go low level, it's the name of my channel, by the way, and figure out what OS you're on and maybe what even CPU you're on is no longer a thing.

692
00:42:22.132 --> 00:42:24.633
So again, this is a technique that I had no idea existed.

693
00:42:24.653 --> 00:42:25.373
It makes sense though, right?

694
00:42:25.413 --> 00:42:36.316
If you are able to, from the browser, touch any of the native code and then the native code leaves a fingerprint on the data, especially in the world of like audio processing, it's an easy, cheap way to figure out who you really are, you know?

695
00:42:36.577 --> 00:42:37.237
So pretty neat.

696
00:42:38.881 --> 00:42:45.267
Yeah, and then this Comcast one, I mean, it's just like – it just screams abuse to me.

697
00:42:45.607 --> 00:42:45.847
Yeah.

698
00:42:46.268 --> 00:42:46.488
Right?

699
00:42:46.628 --> 00:42:47.609
Where do you think it goes, though?

700
00:42:47.629 --> 00:42:52.453
Because, like, what this smells like to me is, like, the ring camera thing, right?

701
00:42:52.473 --> 00:42:53.995
It's like ring cameras, right?

702
00:42:54.235 --> 00:42:57.778
Back in the day, they were a Shark Tank, you know, startup, whatever.

703
00:42:57.818 --> 00:42:59.299
Didn't get Shark Tank funding.

704
00:42:59.680 --> 00:43:03.423
Eventually, they got really popular in, like, the early 2010s, and, like, they were super big, right?

705
00:43:03.603 --> 00:43:06.284
I think they got acquired by venture capital or PE at some point.

706
00:43:06.304 --> 00:43:11.627
And then like we saw the ad during the Super Bowl where it's like, find your lost dog with like the ring botnet.

707
00:43:11.647 --> 00:43:14.049
And everyone's like, oh, it's mass surveillance.

708
00:43:14.109 --> 00:43:18.431
Like they're just going to surveil us, which like bad, obvious, terrible use case.

709
00:43:18.951 --> 00:43:20.132
What happens with Xfinity, though?

710
00:43:20.152 --> 00:43:24.974
Because you can't mass surveil me like eating Cheetos with RF, ideally.

711
00:43:25.054 --> 00:43:25.515
You know what I mean?

712
00:43:25.535 --> 00:43:26.075
Where does this go?

713
00:43:26.539 --> 00:43:26.979
Ideally.

714
00:43:27.159 --> 00:43:38.942
So, yeah, I have a few concerns here, namely around like we've seen a lot of this make its way into smart TV land, a lot of like smarter advertising.

715
00:43:39.262 --> 00:43:45.343
Like there are cheaper TVs that like have cameras that are pointed at your couch and then like advertising bars on the bottom.

716
00:43:45.363 --> 00:43:51.845
And they're like using data from the camera and like all this sort of stuff to like advertise to you permanently on the TV.

717
00:43:52.005 --> 00:43:54.466
And like, look, the TV is cheaper.

718
00:43:54.726 --> 00:43:56.226
And it's just like, OK, this sucks.

719
00:43:56.966 --> 00:43:57.166
Right.

720
00:43:57.647 --> 00:43:59.848
So that's where my head goes on this.

721
00:43:59.888 --> 00:44:00.088
Right.

722
00:44:00.188 --> 00:44:07.553
Is like if there's any signal of like what kind of person, size person, do you have kids?

723
00:44:07.593 --> 00:44:10.075
How many pets?

724
00:44:10.155 --> 00:44:10.755
What kind?

725
00:44:10.815 --> 00:44:11.336
How many?

726
00:44:13.197 --> 00:44:14.618
How many times do you have guests over?

727
00:44:14.878 --> 00:44:20.141
And yeah, how granular can this like get right now?

728
00:44:20.201 --> 00:44:22.323
It's saying it can't identify specific people.

729
00:44:23.223 --> 00:44:32.210
Um, but if you can identify the size and shape of a, of someone moving around to be like, Oh, don't alert on a pet or a child, which they literally can do by the way.

730
00:44:32.230 --> 00:44:32.810
It's on the page.

731
00:44:32.830 --> 00:44:34.071
Like don't alert on pets, please.

732
00:44:34.091 --> 00:44:34.711
When I'm out of the house.

733
00:44:34.751 --> 00:44:36.232
So like, okay, it can pick up size.

734
00:44:36.593 --> 00:44:36.833
Right.

735
00:44:36.993 --> 00:44:39.295
So, so there is a level of granularity here.

736
00:44:39.315 --> 00:44:42.737
Uh, I I'm just saying like, this is going to get, this is going to get worse.

737
00:44:42.757 --> 00:44:44.058
It's going to get abused, right?

738
00:44:44.298 --> 00:44:44.718
Mostly.

739
00:44:44.919 --> 00:44:48.101
And I probably initially by advertisers, um,

740
00:44:48.541 --> 00:45:02.066
But then, I mean, we've just seen it over and over again that the privacy chipping away motions by advertisers wind up getting used in threat actors and data brokers and all sorts of other stuff that winds up going on here.

741
00:45:02.126 --> 00:45:02.566
Oh, yeah.

742
00:45:02.646 --> 00:45:12.310
Well, I mean, the easy button from like a threat actor perspective is like if I as a hacker can access this about your house, I know when to rob your house.

743
00:45:12.550 --> 00:45:14.691
Like, oh, there's been no motion in 10 hours.

744
00:45:14.791 --> 00:45:17.012
OK, I'm going to break in and like take whatever I want.

745
00:45:17.792 --> 00:45:25.237
From, like, an advertising perspective, it's important to note that not only can they see the weights of things, obviously, based on, like, the don't alert on pets thing.

746
00:45:25.637 --> 00:45:31.161
It also says motion detected by the smart TV, motion detected by the Canon printer.

747
00:45:31.181 --> 00:45:36.344
They're using, like, the signals of other devices getting interrupted to determine what device you're near.

748
00:45:36.784 --> 00:45:37.205
And so...

749
00:45:37.965 --> 00:45:41.446
There is like a dystopian world where it's like, okay, cool.

750
00:45:41.746 --> 00:45:48.748
We know when they're on this site for this much time, it tends to keep them on the couch 10% more watching the content.

751
00:45:48.768 --> 00:45:51.448
Because it's not only like, they're not just an RF provider, right?

752
00:45:51.488 --> 00:45:52.969
They're also your ISP.

753
00:45:53.029 --> 00:45:56.310
So they know they're correlating that data against your motion.

754
00:45:56.410 --> 00:45:57.810
Like you could sell that for sure.

755
00:45:58.310 --> 00:46:04.873
Yeah, I mean, and there's obviously physical activities that you only do in your home that probably would be fingerprintable.

756
00:46:06.093 --> 00:46:13.456
You know, like it just just stuff that like, hey, I just don't like more like privacy intruding things.

757
00:46:13.496 --> 00:46:20.439
And this is one of them, no matter how much they wash the PR to like sound like, well, we're just it's just a motion detector.

758
00:46:20.479 --> 00:46:22.080
It's like, well, I bought a Wi-Fi router.

759
00:46:22.100 --> 00:46:22.560
Why is it motion?

760
00:46:22.760 --> 00:46:44.278
detector like you know like this like it's just slippery slope uh on this one um both of these coming out in the same week yeah the browsers kind of stopped that particular fingerprint from working on aliexpress but just like it just got my head going into like radio signals being having dollar signs on them for people and i just don't like the direction that that's going

761
00:46:44.638 --> 00:46:49.862
Yeah, if you're curious how you can get away from this, I guess step one is don't use the router your ISP provides.

762
00:46:49.942 --> 00:46:58.367
If you can do anything to make yourself more secure or at least less surveilled, buy a cheap router, flash OpenWRT onto it if you know how to do that.

763
00:46:58.407 --> 00:46:59.348
If you don't, buy like...

764
00:46:59.868 --> 00:47:09.596
I don't know, like a newer Netgear, a newer Ubiquiti, something like that, and put that in place of your home Wi-Fi router, or your ISPs, rather.

765
00:47:09.876 --> 00:47:13.979
If you have to use your ISP, literally, I did this back in my house when I was in Georgia.

766
00:47:13.999 --> 00:47:19.223
AT&amp;T required us to use AT&amp;T router, which, by the way, gave them access to my house.

767
00:47:19.243 --> 00:47:22.106
I would literally get notifications when my internet went down.

768
00:47:22.126 --> 00:47:25.108
They're like, oh, yeah, we had a hard time getting into your router to do maintenance.

769
00:47:25.148 --> 00:47:26.209
And I'm like, I don't like that at all.

770
00:47:26.589 --> 00:47:27.070
So what you can do...

771
00:47:27.750 --> 00:47:37.776
is put a router behind it in some kind of firewalling where you can basically block all the traffic that the IP address of the outer router has from going into your house, for sure.

772
00:47:37.977 --> 00:47:39.438
There's still the question of RF, right?

773
00:47:39.458 --> 00:47:42.860
If you're really nitty-gritty, you can take that bitch apart and, like, ground the antennas, right?

774
00:47:42.900 --> 00:47:51.545
Or, like, at least put some kind of, like, metal shielding around it so, like, at least the MIMO, the RF protocol, or, I guess, like, spec that they use to do this gets interfered with.

775
00:47:51.585 --> 00:47:52.926
There are ways to get around this.

776
00:47:53.246 --> 00:47:54.927
My large complaint is that, like...

777
00:47:55.648 --> 00:47:56.969
I always use this analogy in my videos...

778
00:47:57.309 --> 00:48:02.073
You know, my grandma is not going to be taking apart her Xfinity router and grounding those antennas.

779
00:48:02.093 --> 00:48:04.636
She's going to be playing Mahjong tiles on the computer for fun.

780
00:48:04.696 --> 00:48:05.357
Like, that's what she does.

781
00:48:05.397 --> 00:48:05.857
You know what I mean?

782
00:48:05.877 --> 00:48:07.939
Like, I'm not going to do that, right?

783
00:48:07.979 --> 00:48:09.080
Like, you know what I mean?

784
00:48:09.260 --> 00:48:14.225
I'm security-minded, and I'm not going to rip the thing open and try to start disabling antennas, right?

785
00:48:14.305 --> 00:48:17.548
Like, it's just, like, this is what I'm saying.

786
00:48:17.568 --> 00:48:19.870
I just don't want the direction that this is going.

787
00:48:19.890 --> 00:48:20.391
You also...

788
00:48:21.191 --> 00:48:25.696
This was a story that made the chopping block floor for me, but you mentioned it.

789
00:48:26.076 --> 00:48:30.560
Ubiquiti themselves has just been on a like O-Day patching spree lately, too.

790
00:48:30.600 --> 00:48:34.604
I'm a fan of the company, but they've been having a hard time.

791
00:48:34.644 --> 00:48:41.011
And just these router manufacturers in general have just such a big target on their back because they're the edge device on a lot of these networks.

792
00:48:41.931 --> 00:48:46.256
But, yeah, I mean, it's just rough out there for edge devices.

793
00:48:46.376 --> 00:48:52.662
Ubiquiti patched 21 bones today, and the three of them are max CVSS 10s.

794
00:48:54.124 --> 00:48:56.886
So, I mean, we don't just, like...

795
00:48:57.627 --> 00:49:01.148
this isn't the CVE list podcast, but since you mentioned it.

796
00:49:01.428 --> 00:49:02.328
Yeah, no, for sure.

797
00:49:02.348 --> 00:49:02.528
Yeah.

798
00:49:03.068 --> 00:49:03.648
Yeah.

799
00:49:03.748 --> 00:49:05.188
On that note, update your shit.

800
00:49:06.109 --> 00:49:07.589
Put on auto updates, please turn that on.

801
00:49:07.669 --> 00:49:07.869
Yeah.

802
00:49:08.309 --> 00:49:08.829
Yeah.

803
00:49:09.289 --> 00:49:09.629
Hey, man.

804
00:49:09.649 --> 00:49:19.251
Speaking of vulnerabilities, bro, we're going to we're going to flash back to the what was that 2020 time period with a big scary bug that may have had a resurgence.

805
00:49:19.671 --> 00:49:21.611
Matt, what is log for Jay?

806
00:49:22.332 --> 00:49:23.192
Tell me a story.

807
00:49:23.272 --> 00:49:23.672
Pop off.

808
00:49:25.032 --> 00:49:25.653
Where were you?

809
00:49:27.374 --> 00:49:28.355
Where were you when?

810
00:49:28.875 --> 00:49:30.216
Well, Petridge Farm remembers.

811
00:49:31.757 --> 00:49:34.058
So Log4J, where do we start?

812
00:49:34.359 --> 00:49:43.905
Besides like spurring most cybersecurity vendors marketing for still, like to this day, a lot of people are like, well, this is how we would handle a Log4J incident.

813
00:49:44.725 --> 00:49:48.208
It's up there with like solar winds in terms of just like ripple effects of...

814
00:49:48.788 --> 00:49:53.673
like, oh, this vulnerability happened or this hack happened and then like the industry changed.

815
00:49:54.393 --> 00:49:54.814
Yeah, yeah.

816
00:49:55.154 --> 00:49:56.775
Lots of stuff happened in the wake of it.

817
00:49:56.815 --> 00:49:58.137
Log4j is one of those, right?

818
00:49:58.577 --> 00:50:00.539
So the vulnerability itself was remote code execution.

819
00:50:00.559 --> 00:50:04.422
But the reason that it was like spicy was that A, it was everywhere.

820
00:50:06.044 --> 00:50:08.405
And B, it was hard to find.

821
00:50:09.225 --> 00:50:16.970
And C, you didn't need a direct line to the internet to be exploitable because it was in the log pipeline.

822
00:50:17.350 --> 00:50:25.895
So like if like when Log4j dropped in whatever year of our Lord 20 something, right, that it actually happened.

823
00:50:26.715 --> 00:50:33.198
2021, I want to say it came out and the attackers like M.O.

824
00:50:33.438 --> 00:50:33.958
for that week.

825
00:50:33.978 --> 00:50:36.519
And it wasn't just like your normal attackers.

826
00:50:37.059 --> 00:50:37.279
Right.

827
00:50:37.900 --> 00:50:44.562
It was pretty much anyone because with just a very, very short string, like the exploit string for Log4j was incredibly short.

828
00:50:44.782 --> 00:50:44.942
Yeah.

829
00:50:45.042 --> 00:50:46.103
And you could just put it

830
00:50:46.863 --> 00:50:50.364
anywhere and hope that it would get popped somewhere.

831
00:50:50.745 --> 00:50:53.185
And in your exploit string, you just phoned home.

832
00:50:53.546 --> 00:50:56.727
And you just then watched your logs for phoning home.

833
00:50:56.747 --> 00:50:59.848
And that meant it worked with this couple characters.

834
00:51:00.248 --> 00:51:02.289
And then you can go, oh, OK, there's the vulnerability.

835
00:51:02.309 --> 00:51:04.910
Now I can go do something spicier than actually just phoning home.

836
00:51:05.770 --> 00:51:08.272
But people put this in user agents.

837
00:51:08.332 --> 00:51:24.525
People put this in every get parameter and post parameter and in cookies and whatever, because in the logging, whatever sucked it up, like sucked up parts of the HTTP packet is where the exploit would actually fire.

838
00:51:24.825 --> 00:51:33.132
And then on the nightmare side of the blue teamer, that like why it was like a really, really bad couple of weeks for those of us on the defensive side was it.

839
00:51:34.513 --> 00:51:37.235
this is a middleware package is what it's called, right?

840
00:51:37.255 --> 00:51:45.039
So like, it turns out that it's like really hard to wind up finding where you have this actually installed and like working.

841
00:51:45.139 --> 00:51:48.741
It's not like an open port that you can fingerprint.

842
00:51:48.801 --> 00:51:54.124
It's not like something that's easily identified, like, oh, yep, there it is.

843
00:51:54.164 --> 00:51:55.365
I'm running that over there.

844
00:51:55.465 --> 00:51:57.306
Look, this service is installed, whatever.

845
00:51:57.446 --> 00:52:00.788
It was like things that were, it's a thing that's installed in other things.

846
00:52:01.768 --> 00:52:06.193
I feel like this is where the industry's new SBOM conversation kind of started, right?

847
00:52:06.313 --> 00:52:13.159
SBOM was a thing, obviously, but from a security perspective, not that we didn't care, but we just didn't talk about it as much.

848
00:52:13.239 --> 00:52:20.306
But now it's like, oh, shit, this bug exists, and we literally don't know if we are vulnerable to it because we don't know what's in our code.

849
00:52:20.666 --> 00:52:23.749
Even if we knew what code is in our code, we don't know what code is in that code, you know what I mean?

850
00:52:24.129 --> 00:52:25.430
Yeah, and it's still a problem, right?

851
00:52:26.030 --> 00:52:29.553
We're five, six years later, and that's not solved.

852
00:52:29.633 --> 00:52:33.156
It's not like, oh, everyone's inventory is perfect now, right?

853
00:52:33.256 --> 00:52:36.879
Like the vendors have made it magically work, right?

854
00:52:36.939 --> 00:52:40.181
Like the right combination of cybersecurity vendors have like solved this problem.

855
00:52:40.201 --> 00:52:43.363
It's like not actually how it's gone, right?

856
00:52:43.503 --> 00:52:44.744
I've been on the blue team side of this.

857
00:52:45.785 --> 00:52:47.025
Many, many, many times, right?

858
00:52:47.105 --> 00:52:48.306
Like the, what do we have installed?

859
00:52:48.366 --> 00:52:50.006
Where is it on the internet?

860
00:52:50.186 --> 00:52:51.187
Does it have a vulnerability?

861
00:52:51.547 --> 00:52:52.327
Is it exploitable?

862
00:52:52.567 --> 00:52:57.249
Like all these kinds of questions are super, super hard to answer accurately and fast.

863
00:52:57.609 --> 00:52:57.769
Right.

864
00:52:58.589 --> 00:53:04.631
There are some cool tools like out there that like make this easier in certain situations, but like someone made a joke about this.

865
00:53:04.911 --> 00:53:10.553
I tweeted out log4j2 electric bungalow this morning and someone was like, well, at least this time we'll, we know where to find it.

866
00:53:11.685 --> 00:53:12.285
Oh, we do?

867
00:53:13.046 --> 00:53:21.250
Yeah, my joke was, yeah, because I'm sure we all perfectly maintained our inventories that we created during the incident response five years ago to log4j1.

868
00:53:21.650 --> 00:53:22.970
And that nothing has changed.

869
00:53:23.371 --> 00:53:25.151
And we have kept up to speed on all of this.

870
00:53:25.912 --> 00:53:28.393
That all being said, I'm not sounding the alarm on this one.

871
00:53:28.753 --> 00:53:29.374
Okay.

872
00:53:29.534 --> 00:53:32.798
It is a vulnerability in log4j that just dropped, right?

873
00:53:33.398 --> 00:53:38.784
There is a POC on GitHub, but it is not, from what we can tell, this is a few hours old.

874
00:53:39.485 --> 00:53:45.111
This is not, from what we can tell, as easily exploitable as that first wave.

875
00:53:45.251 --> 00:53:46.513
This is scary because...

876
00:53:47.133 --> 00:53:55.277
of the vulnerability that it is, remote code execution in this hard to identify platform and generally exploitable without internet access.

877
00:53:55.317 --> 00:53:56.737
That's like the other maiden thing, right?

878
00:53:56.757 --> 00:53:59.358
A lot of these vulnerabilities that we talked about, we just talked about routers.

879
00:53:59.398 --> 00:54:01.639
Why are routers always catching O days?

880
00:54:01.940 --> 00:54:06.422
Because they have to be internet accessible because they are the router, right?

881
00:54:06.642 --> 00:54:08.823
In a lot of situations, I'm oversimplifying.

882
00:54:09.043 --> 00:54:14.345
But Log4j does not need to be internet accessible to be exploited.

883
00:54:14.485 --> 00:54:16.046
But there's some conditions on this one.

884
00:54:16.386 --> 00:54:18.187
You looked into it a little bit, right?

885
00:54:18.307 --> 00:54:18.707
What's going on?

886
00:54:19.027 --> 00:54:33.873
So I guess to set the stage here, the reason why log4j 1.0, like the OG one back in the day was so bad, was any log4j sync that logged data that contained this JNDI markup, right?

887
00:54:33.893 --> 00:54:38.275
This JNDI string, and what that stands for is Java Naming and Directory Interface.

888
00:54:39.195 --> 00:54:46.097
would allow that server to call out and pull down another Java class file from anywhere on the Internet.

889
00:54:46.257 --> 00:54:55.479
So you put in the string effectively JNDI LDAP, the call home interface, the call home address port number, and a slash in the path.

890
00:54:55.879 --> 00:54:57.040
It would go out there.

891
00:54:57.848 --> 00:55:02.290
it would pull down that Java class, pull it down, and run it.

892
00:55:02.870 --> 00:55:04.071
That was the whole thing.

893
00:55:04.111 --> 00:55:04.991
And it was completely free.

894
00:55:05.031 --> 00:55:12.174
So if you were able to push traffic into a network that you could get that string in a place where there was log4j, that was it.

895
00:55:12.194 --> 00:55:13.535
That was all the preconditions required.

896
00:55:14.335 --> 00:55:23.499
The reason why this one is not necessarily log4j style in the sense of the original one is it has a bunch of preconditions for you to actually be exploited by this.

897
00:55:23.579 --> 00:55:24.080
First of all,

898
00:55:24.860 --> 00:55:30.524
Your application has to deploy a Java serialized log event receiver.

899
00:55:30.664 --> 00:55:30.884
Okay?

900
00:55:30.924 --> 00:55:33.606
So this isn't just like a string that lands in a sync.

901
00:55:34.086 --> 00:55:38.489
It is you have to have a particular kind of serialized event logger on.

902
00:55:39.410 --> 00:55:50.438
Not only that, but now you also have to have somewhere there is a path that an arbitrary user on the Internet or somewhere you don't trust can push those serialized events into that sync.

903
00:55:50.458 --> 00:55:50.558
Okay?

904
00:55:51.258 --> 00:55:56.602
You have to be using a vulnerable version of Log4j that has vulnerability, which is not all versions beforehand.

905
00:55:56.642 --> 00:55:59.424
I think Log4j 1.0 went back very, very far.

906
00:55:59.444 --> 00:56:01.926
This is only to, like, I think 2.16.

907
00:56:02.067 --> 00:56:04.428
It's a fairly new bug.

908
00:56:04.468 --> 00:56:06.030
It's not, like, as old as the original one was.

909
00:56:07.157 --> 00:56:19.447
And then the application that you are pushing your deserialization chain into needs to have other deserialization gadgets that allow you to effectively deserialize into RCE.

910
00:56:19.908 --> 00:56:25.873
And then on top of that, there has to be basically a lack of filtering going on that most applications do have.

911
00:56:25.893 --> 00:56:27.114
So the way that the exploit actually works...

912
00:56:27.654 --> 00:56:34.241
You are pushing a Java serialized event stream into this filter.

913
00:56:34.761 --> 00:56:38.826
The filter will look for only allowable filters or allowable types, right?

914
00:56:38.846 --> 00:56:41.849
One of them is like marshalable text, I think, or marshalable events.

915
00:56:42.389 --> 00:56:45.292
When it deserializes that, that's the outer layer...

916
00:56:46.213 --> 00:56:56.387
Inside of that marshalable event is another object that it did not get filtered through, and then that can be deserialized into, like, a deserialization chain-type attack.

917
00:56:56.507 --> 00:57:03.577
The problem is most applications will push that second stream through a filter, and then ultimately, like, that will get caught by whatever guards are there.

918
00:57:04.157 --> 00:57:12.604
So basically a lot of shit has to go wrong for this to be a true vulnerability that you care about, which is much, much different than Log4j 1.0.

919
00:57:12.624 --> 00:57:21.692
So, you know, obviously if you are in the world where you're doing Java-based applications and you, you know, look at your S-bomb, see if you have this version of Log4j, upgrade if you do, yada, yada, yada.

920
00:57:21.772 --> 00:57:26.116
But it's not the 7 alarm fire that the 2021 version was for sure.

921
00:57:27.502 --> 00:57:27.742
Yeah.

922
00:57:28.042 --> 00:57:28.483
Thank God.

923
00:57:29.763 --> 00:57:41.970
I mean, obviously, in case we're slightly mistaken on this, if you're if you're hearing this and you haven't at least sniffed this, if you are vulnerable, this is still serious.

924
00:57:43.091 --> 00:57:45.732
And there is a chance that you are vulnerable to this.

925
00:57:45.792 --> 00:57:50.175
So I would dust off that old S-bomb, make sure that it's up to date.

926
00:57:51.095 --> 00:57:54.296
Check the conditions on this and see if you match them, right?

927
00:57:54.336 --> 00:57:56.657
But it's not by default, basically, right?

928
00:57:56.677 --> 00:58:00.419
So this isn't the, like, Internet is on fire version of this.

929
00:58:00.799 --> 00:58:06.321
Yeah, one good call-out that the article I'm looking at has, we'll put the link in the description of the podcast.

930
00:58:06.781 --> 00:58:15.845
If you're a defender who's, like, monitoring network traffic for this type of intrusion, if you're concerned about it, the class you're looking for is a marshaled object.

931
00:58:15.925 --> 00:58:20.107
So if you see a lot of, like, marshaled object serialized traffic going on in your network,

932
00:58:20.567 --> 00:58:23.049
but it's likely indicative that someone is trying to exploit you with it.

933
00:58:23.710 --> 00:58:27.353
Now, if it's successful or not, it's a whole other monitoring and awareness problem.

934
00:58:27.393 --> 00:58:33.358
But yeah, that is at least the version of data that the publicly available POC uses right now.

935
00:58:34.518 --> 00:58:35.359
Sweet, sweet.

936
00:58:35.699 --> 00:58:38.862
Can I ask you a follow-up to something you mentioned earlier in the episode?

937
00:58:39.142 --> 00:58:39.603
Yeah, send it.

938
00:58:39.963 --> 00:58:44.687
What is the thing you kept saying you were working on that you used Umaki during?

939
00:58:45.615 --> 00:58:47.856
Oh, the Terminal Tower event.

940
00:58:47.876 --> 00:58:48.456
Are you aware of that?

941
00:58:48.917 --> 00:58:49.057
No.

942
00:58:49.197 --> 00:58:49.657
Oh, yeah.

943
00:58:49.697 --> 00:58:51.558
So me, oh, God, a bunch of people.

944
00:58:51.638 --> 00:58:57.501
Me, the Primogen, Tiege, Bash Bunny, Began, a bunch of others that I'm probably going to miss.

945
00:58:57.621 --> 00:58:58.561
S-Fan was there randomly.

946
00:58:59.862 --> 00:59:02.123
We had two separate events where we vibe-coded a game.

947
00:59:02.143 --> 00:59:06.085
The whole goal was in one week, can we vibe-code a game end-to-end to get it sold on Steam?

948
00:59:06.325 --> 00:59:06.545
Okay.

949
00:59:06.886 --> 00:59:12.094
So that was back when the models were like Sonnet three, five Sonnet three, seven.

950
00:59:12.194 --> 00:59:16.501
I think we're like the hot models at the time, uh, using cursor sponsored hashtag ad.

951
00:59:16.521 --> 00:59:17.062
It was a great time.

952
00:59:17.082 --> 00:59:17.563
I love cursor.

953
00:59:18.144 --> 00:59:18.324
Um,

954
00:59:19.140 --> 00:59:25.563
We did that for a week, and then the second event we did was a follow-up, because we didn't finish the game the first time, because shocker, game dev is hard.

955
00:59:25.603 --> 00:59:33.248
The second tower event we did in March of last year, I'm losing track of my years, honestly, but we used Omaki exclusively on that.

956
00:59:33.288 --> 00:59:41.452
So the whole setup there was we had BenQ monitors, we had chairs from, I think, either Fractal was the chair manufacturer.

957
00:59:41.752 --> 00:59:45.074
And then Omaki was our OS du jour while we were there.

958
00:59:45.094 --> 00:59:45.634
And it was cool, man.

959
00:59:45.694 --> 00:59:46.295
It was a good OS.

960
00:59:46.395 --> 00:59:46.915
I enjoyed it.

961
00:59:47.155 --> 00:59:52.238
The problem is I'm an i3 enjoyer when I'm in my Ubuntu environments, my Debian environments.

962
00:59:52.699 --> 00:59:56.461
And all of the keys are different on Omaki, so it was a big learning curve for sure.

963
00:59:56.481 --> 00:59:56.981
But it was fun, man.

964
00:59:57.001 --> 00:59:57.522
It was a good OS.

965
00:59:57.982 --> 00:59:59.343
I keep saying OS.

966
00:59:59.603 --> 01:00:00.523
It was a good distro.

967
01:00:00.683 --> 01:00:03.505
I enjoyed that distro of Arch for sure.

968
01:00:03.525 --> 01:00:03.865
It was fun.

969
01:00:04.346 --> 01:00:05.746
That's cool.

970
01:00:06.327 --> 01:00:07.167
Did you guys finish the game?

971
01:00:07.728 --> 01:00:07.888
No.

972
01:00:08.268 --> 01:00:08.328
No.

973
01:00:09.000 --> 01:00:09.581
Um, sort of.

974
01:00:09.621 --> 01:00:10.982
So, let's see.

975
01:00:11.102 --> 01:00:11.723
What the hell is it called?

976
01:00:11.743 --> 01:00:15.467
Towers of Mordoria Primogen GitHub?

977
01:00:15.487 --> 01:00:16.568
I'm just, I'm looking it up right now.

978
01:00:16.949 --> 01:00:18.110
I'm pretty sure he made it public.

979
01:00:18.490 --> 01:00:18.690
Yeah.

980
01:00:19.071 --> 01:00:21.053
So this is the current version of the game.

981
01:00:21.353 --> 01:00:22.174
It is a real game.

982
01:00:22.214 --> 01:00:24.196
So the whole shtick was we were making a...

983
01:00:25.217 --> 01:00:29.359
a tower defense that played sort of like Bellatro, right?

984
01:00:29.379 --> 01:00:41.286
So it was like Bellatro style and that it was a deck builder and you got these cards and the cards you played to cast a tower and then you would have enemies come down the paths and you would shoot the enemies and upgrade the towers.

985
01:00:41.566 --> 01:00:42.447
It played really well.

986
01:00:42.847 --> 01:00:47.069
The hard part was like we finished the game at like the last moment of the last day.

987
01:00:47.089 --> 01:00:49.450
It did like almost no balancings.

988
01:00:49.570 --> 01:00:51.972
I'm not even sure if the game is winnable in its current state, but

989
01:00:53.112 --> 01:00:54.433
but you can play it.

990
01:00:54.473 --> 01:00:55.093
It was fun, man.

991
01:00:55.533 --> 01:00:57.815
I just found the Prime posted on Reddit.

992
01:00:57.955 --> 01:00:59.255
Warning, this game is not fun.

993
01:01:00.736 --> 01:01:02.317
Yes, exactly.

994
01:01:02.737 --> 01:01:03.757
Mordoria is open source.

995
01:01:03.797 --> 01:01:05.018
Warning, this game is not fun.

996
01:01:05.338 --> 01:01:05.618
Yeah.

997
01:01:06.098 --> 01:01:07.139
Oh, so good, so good.

998
01:01:07.259 --> 01:01:09.040
It's like, do not open PRs.

999
01:01:09.080 --> 01:01:09.820
I will close them.

1000
01:01:09.880 --> 01:01:19.365
Oh, yeah, because we had a bunch of people making like, oh, because Prime posted this repo publicly, and then he made a video about people that were doing like PRs where they're like...

1001
01:01:20.085 --> 01:01:42.108
doing spelling errors like typos they were fixing them in readmes and saying like commit me please because they want like pr or like uh contributions and so we were getting a bunch of like rogue prs because he made that video the same day he dropped this repo of like you know typo fix this please it was funny so he publicly said hey i'm not gonna close any pr i think i made one actually let's see if it's still there hold on

1002
01:01:42.717 --> 01:01:44.038
We've got to think of our version of this.

1003
01:01:44.278 --> 01:01:45.079
What's our...

1004
01:01:45.159 --> 01:01:45.979
Yes, here it is.

1005
01:01:45.999 --> 01:01:47.520
My PR, please merge.

1006
01:01:48.220 --> 01:01:50.041
PR, please merge from low level.

1007
01:01:50.061 --> 01:01:50.442
That's funny.

1008
01:01:50.482 --> 01:01:54.464
We've got to think of our version of this.

1009
01:01:54.504 --> 01:02:00.047
What can we lock ourselves in a house and hack on live stream for a while?

1010
01:02:00.267 --> 01:02:01.808
I've thought about this for a long time.

1011
01:02:01.888 --> 01:02:05.931
What is the Mordoria Tower hacker house version of this?

1012
01:02:06.131 --> 01:02:06.731
You know what I mean?

1013
01:02:06.771 --> 01:02:09.733
What can we do that's fun to stream for a week straight?

1014
01:02:10.133 --> 01:02:10.854
Hacking is like...

1015
01:02:11.614 --> 01:02:15.417
When it's in a movie, it's neat, but like real life hacking is boring as shit, dude.

1016
01:02:15.517 --> 01:02:16.437
No, I want to make some.

1017
01:02:16.457 --> 01:02:20.980
I don't want to I don't want to like necessarily just hack and like find bones like like Bug Bounty Live or whatever.

1018
01:02:21.121 --> 01:02:22.702
Like, you know, it exists.

1019
01:02:22.742 --> 01:02:24.022
It's fun sometimes to watch.

1020
01:02:24.042 --> 01:02:24.263
Right.

1021
01:02:24.343 --> 01:02:26.364
Like, but like, what could we make?

1022
01:02:26.604 --> 01:02:26.844
Right.

1023
01:02:26.864 --> 01:02:30.207
Like, what could we like make to put out or not finish and make jokes about it after?

1024
01:02:31.607 --> 01:02:36.089
Speaking of like random live streams, we mentioned it last week and our comments were like into the idea.

1025
01:02:36.329 --> 01:02:37.130
The DEF CON live stream.

1026
01:02:37.150 --> 01:02:38.930
I would like everyone to know I am working on it.

1027
01:02:39.050 --> 01:02:42.892
Like we're trying to identify like the right people, the right talks, all this kind of stuff.

1028
01:02:42.972 --> 01:02:45.433
And then I will make I will beat.

1029
01:02:46.393 --> 01:02:50.697
Ed's calendar into submission and pick a day that, and my own calendar into submission.

1030
01:02:50.717 --> 01:02:58.023
And we'll pick like a Friday that we can just kind of go live and kick it and watch a bunch of Vegas talks and maybe get some of the people to fireside chat.

1031
01:02:58.083 --> 01:03:02.186
So heard loud and clear in the comments that you guys were interested in that idea.

1032
01:03:02.206 --> 01:03:03.147
And I think it'd be really fun.

1033
01:03:03.207 --> 01:03:03.427
So.

1034
01:03:03.527 --> 01:03:06.609
We also have some interviews in the pipe with a few people.

1035
01:03:06.629 --> 01:03:09.031
Those will be fun for sure, getting them scheduled.

1036
01:03:09.051 --> 01:03:10.912
Calendars are so hard.

1037
01:03:10.932 --> 01:03:16.335
It turns out people that are really, really interesting to talk to have really busy, crazy lives.

1038
01:03:16.355 --> 01:03:19.357
I feel like I've been on fire just since DEF CON.

1039
01:03:19.457 --> 01:03:21.659
Every day it's just been go, go, go, go, go.

1040
01:03:21.679 --> 01:03:22.820
Yeah, same, same.

1041
01:03:23.660 --> 01:03:50.765
um looking forward to that day off for gta 6 um let's do that let's do a gaming stream too we've got more ideas than we know what to do with but let's do like a chill thing so that'd be fun for sure all right i think that's it take us out man all right y'all hey seriously thank you for listening i appreciate it we've been loving the podcast how run episode i think this is 10 we're doing this is episode 10 zero index so 11 uh but y'all thanks for watching we really appreciate it we have a really good time with this and maze obviously thank you for helping us get this podcast going and sponsoring us

1042
01:03:51.246 --> 01:03:52.956
helping us kick this bad boy off.

1043
01:03:53.178 --> 01:03:55.593
And we'll see you in the next one.

1044
01:03:56.096 --> 01:03:56.679
Happy acting, guys.

1045
01:03:56.921 --> 01:03:57.082
Bye.
