WEBVTT

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Identity verification is to make us all more secure, Matt.

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I mean, all we have to do is upload our driver's license to apple.com or clubpenguin.com so that they can verify that I am not a child.

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I have so many thoughts about it.

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So many thoughts about this.

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Guess who also has been throwing around the same $100 million for the last two years?

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Jensen Wong, Microsoft, OpenAI, and Oracle, bro.

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The surge protector plugged into itself of the investment of like all of their valuations and like all the money being passed between these like multi-trillion dollar companies is very like, what the hell?

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Good morning, hackers.

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Welcome to The Lowdown presented by Mays, the best podcast on the internet for hackers, for those most amongst us.

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Matt, I heard you were sitting out there in the hot Texas sun.

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What's it like sitting out in 102 degree heat in September?

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How you doing?

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Dude, why do child's soccer leagues start in August in Texas?

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I have no idea why.

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We should be starting at Halloween.

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Like, this is crazy.

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It's torture.

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Have you ever watched Parks and Rec?

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I love Parks and Rec.

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One of my favorite shows.

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You know when they go camping and Tom Aziz Ansari's character Tom like rolls up with like the entire SkyMall magazine.

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Treat yourself.

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Yeah.

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100% dude.

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Yeah.

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And it's like, what is it?

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Is that DJ Roomba is like Premiere?

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DJ Roomba.

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Yes.

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Oh, I forgot about that.

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He's got a

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Roomba going around his tent and he's got like every luxury amenity possible in his tent.

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He's got like a margarita machine and like the, like the fun ice maker and like this big bed and couch and flat screen and all that.

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This is me at the side of soccer games.

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Now I went to one soccer game and just sweat and burnt my ass up because it's like 1130 in the morning and there's no shadows anywhere.

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And I was like, I felt like a rookie.

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I was like, what am I doing?

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What kind of like soccer parent am I in Texas?

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not bringing my own shade.

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So I like, while I was sitting there, like filled my cart and I was like, I never again.

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And what's crazy is you're like, you're experienced too, bro.

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You're, you're a pale pasty East coast.

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You're just like me.

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You should know better.

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You should know that you and I are allergic to the sun, bro.

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You got to bring that umbrella.

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I know.

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I know I'm like a UV shirt wearing, like, you know, that kind of dad at the beach.

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Yeah.

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I, uh, I tend to avoid the day star for sure.

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But, uh, yeah, I brought like one water bottle and like a camp chair and I was like, I'm an idiot.

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Right.

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And so,

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Uh, yeah, that did not happen this week.

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This week I rolled up with like a wagon that I bought to bring all of the stuff with me.

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I have like battery powered fans.

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I've got like special cooling towels that like you just wet and they evaporate faster or something.

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It's, it's like magic.

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I don't understand how they work.

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I thought I was buying them to like freeze them.

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And then like, you just wet them and they get really cold.

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I don't know.

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Like they're, they're called like chili frogs or something.

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I don't know.

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Not sponsored, but chili frog hit me up.

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But yeah.

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let us know if you want to tap into that six cyber security market with your cooling evaporative sponge towels or whatever outside time we uh we have to listen if your ac goes out you never know right as i sit here literally under a blanket because i was telling you my my studio has the ac cranking because it's 100 degrees outside and i'm freezing in my little shorts under here insane dude

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Yeah, man.

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Yeah.

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It's kind of, kind of fun.

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The other, my other fun thing is I bought a car from the 1900s.

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Vintage.

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Good job.

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19, uh, 1900s, uh, the late 19 hundreds.

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I'll go with that.

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But yeah, I got like the, the no door Jeep action going on, which, uh, is, is, it makes me slightly cooler rolling up to the soccer games in an, in an old Jeep, even though then I get the wagon with my shades out and prove that I'm actually a loser, but yeah.

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Oh, and a father.

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You know, those words may be interchangeable, but, you know, it's all good.

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Whatever.

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I got the high socks and the new balance.

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We're good.

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There you go.

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You're good to go.

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And the cargo shorts, potentially, I'm sure.

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You know, they can carry anything except for conversation with a female, but that's not important right now.

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I kicked my cargo shorts habit.

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You all memed me out of it.

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So funny.

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I didn't know this was a bit, but now it is.

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That's incredible.

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You know what else is a bit, Matt?

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Not the sponsor of today's video.

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They'll be later in the video.

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You know what else is a bit?

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What kind of perfect transition are you about to lay down?

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You know, identity verification is to make us all more secure, Matt.

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I mean, all we have to do is upload our driver's license to Apple.com or, you know, ClubPenguin.com so that they can verify that I am not a child.

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Matt, what are your thoughts on this?

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I have so many thoughts about it.

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So many thoughts about this.

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If the, like, several of you watching have ever watched my YouTube channel, I know the millions of you, like, in line to watch Low Levels channel.

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But, you know, several of you watch my channel.

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I've made tons of videos about this, right?

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Not to, like, self-disparage myself.

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But, no, I've, like, I've talked about this a lot because...

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it's such a hot button for me because the like guys of it is like to save the children.

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Right.

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And this is why it really bugs me.

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Okay.

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There's tobacco, right?

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Like we're talking about it today because there's a massive breach going on right now of a big database full of driver's licenses.

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Okay.

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The reason we don't do a lot of like, I call it breach porn content.

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You and I don't really do like make a video every time there's a big breach because we could do that literally every week.

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It's like an easy button.

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For the record, people watching this may be like, isn't that literally low levels whole channel?

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I do vulnerabilities.

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Those are way more fun.

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Shut up.

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Anyway, continue.

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Okay.

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I like to do, not that I never do breaches, but like some people it's literally like every breach, like your Gmail account, like, you know, whatever.

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And I call that breach porn.

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I try to not do it, especially if there's not like a lesson to be learned from it.

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And I think that's yours, right?

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With the vulnerabilities, it's like, let's look at the code.

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Why is this vulnerable?

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What can we learn from it?

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What could have been done in development to prevent this called a shift left, right?

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Like to make it not possible.

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Like that's my whole career, right?

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Yeah.

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Or like, hey, what do you have to go do right now with this piece of information that I'm giving you in a timely manner?

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Right.

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And so like breaches tend to not really fall into those buckets if it's just like, well, another retailer I used lost my email address this week.

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And it's like, OK, like my email address is public now.

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Right.

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So I don't really do this a whole lot.

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But this one.

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We're going to talk about two today and they're both kind of ridiculous.

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This one is specifically a hot button for me because like you can't ignore the cultural backdrop going on right now of all of these identity verification laws being pushed forward.

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Right.

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It's massive in Europe right now.

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Like the UK is like the champion of trying to de-anonymize your activity on the Internet in the name of something of your safety.

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Right.

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of the children's safety.

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But like it's because a bunch of corporations do business in the EU and want to follow those rules.

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We're seeing it.

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We're seeing the ripple effects.

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I talked recently about discord was like one of the bigger ones where discord is going to require identity verification to access certain discords that they consider adult material.

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Mm hmm.

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I think one of the reasons that we don't hear a lot of people speaking up against this is because like who wants to be on the side of like not protect the children.

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Yeah, right.

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Right.

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That's a common tactic in like a lot of political bills, right?

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Like they'll take this bill.

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There's a bunch of like chaff stuffed into it.

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They'll name it something very innocent and kind of opaque.

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And then if you oppose that, oh, well, you're a communist or like you're a homophobe.

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Like on either side, this is very common tactic.

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A hundred percent.

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And so this one, it's like, Oh, what?

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Like you want like see Sam to be out there and like be whatever.

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And it's like, no, of course I don't.

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Right.

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Like, you know, and so like that's, that's the part of why it's so hard to oppose this, but like pause for a second, right?

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Breathe, take the emotion out of it.

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Like take the, save the children out of it.

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Who is determining what is adult material?

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Like, where is that line drawn?

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Right.

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Is that,

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The regulators, is that the 85 year old congressperson asleep at the wheel?

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Is that like now on discord?

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Like, are you now saying discord?

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You have to self police when you do this or don't.

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That's like one whole conversation kind of out of scope of like what we're going to talk about here today.

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But like, it's just part of it.

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The other part is what we're talking about today.

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And it's why companies like Pornhub are refusing to play this game.

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Anytime a state enacts one of these laws, Pornhub just shuts off access to that state.

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They're like, no, we don't want to collect everyone's driver's license for this reason.

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We are an adult film website.

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Why should we have to be entrusted with the security of a very, very sensitive document?

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Right.

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Let's correlate all of the traffic to our site to this specific non-anonymized UUID that correlates to a guy and his address.

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Like, OK, maybe we don't do that.

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Yeah.

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So to kind of set the stage for like the cybersecurity edge of this, right, why are we talking about license plates and saving the children?

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The FBI probes a service selling 153 million driver's licenses.

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A new identity theft service launched on the dark web has been caught selling digital scans of 153 million driver's licenses.

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The one literally on the website here is...

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Who is this?

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Was it Peter?

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Pete, Peter Hegseth, potentially a name you've heard.

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Now is this identity theft organization going out and going to Pete Hegseth house and taking his ID from his wallet and scanning it and uploading it?

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Probably not.

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Right.

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It is likely that this cyber crime activity group,

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is just penetrating a variety of companies or likely their third party providers that get your license because you're required to upload it.

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Right.

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This incident ties to one.

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So this is, uh, there is a, there Brian Krebs, who wrote the article that we're reading, the journalist, he found, he got tipped off on this because his driver's license is part of it.

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And so he started digging into like, well, where is the source of this big treasure trove of information that I'm part of this?

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Um,

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data breach, this data leak, the pile is so well organized.

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It's like timestamped and everything.

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There's all sorts of information.

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All of the driver's licenses are in like triplicate front and back because they have the basic image and then they have ultraviolet and infrared scans and the barcode and like all of this stuff.

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Right.

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And the schema even says if the barcode is included and like all of this different stuff, you know, you can search this, you know,

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very well.

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This like Nexus is the service that they're selling access to that, that Krebs went in and looked.

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So he went and found his own.

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He also found his family.

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It was timestamped to a day that he was traveling, but then he remembered.

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So he was like, Oh, maybe it's TSA, right?

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Like, Oh, you're now you're handing over your driver's license, TSA.

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Then he remembered that he used his passport.

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at the airport that day and not his driver's license.

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And his mother's information was also in here and she was traveling with him that day.

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And it was timestamped to the same day.

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And they realized that they rented a car and they hand, they both handed their driver's license over to Hertz.

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So that seems to be one of the biggest sources of this.

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So everyone's like, okay, did Hertz get breached?

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It's like, well, no, then a security researcher goes through it and realizes that his ID is in there, but it's timestamped to DEF CON.

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And it's timestamped to DEF CON because he went to a marijuana dispensary in the hotel that he was staying at.

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And if you've ever gone to a marijuana dispensary legally, they...

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take your ID and they don't just look at it.

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They're not just age identifying you.

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They put it in like a machine.

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They take a picture of both sides and they, they have to like look up in a database if you're legally allowed to be a customer of theirs.

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Right.

234
00:12:12.669 --> 00:12:16.192
And they store this information that like you were a customer of theirs.

235
00:12:17.192 --> 00:12:18.113
And so they're like, wait a second.

236
00:12:18.173 --> 00:12:18.934
So it's not Hertz.

237
00:12:18.974 --> 00:12:20.255
It's not this dispensary.

238
00:12:20.495 --> 00:12:23.517
Turns out they're all using a similar third party thing.

239
00:12:23.557 --> 00:12:24.237
Like you just said.

240
00:12:25.483 --> 00:12:29.985
This one was called ID scan at ID scan dot net.

241
00:12:30.726 --> 00:12:40.330
And this one is kind of different than like the discord and all this stuff that we're talking about before the adult websites, because it's not like a digital verification service.

242
00:12:40.590 --> 00:12:43.131
It's all in person scans.

243
00:12:43.691 --> 00:12:46.713
So this is these are all like companies that use ID scan.

244
00:12:47.513 --> 00:12:54.455
are like if you had to show your ID to do something like, like transaction hurt, of course.

245
00:12:54.475 --> 00:12:55.715
Like, what are we going to tell people?

246
00:12:55.795 --> 00:12:59.476
Don't give the rental car company proof that you're allowed to drive a car.

247
00:12:59.516 --> 00:13:01.917
Of course, they're going to take your driver's license, right?

248
00:13:01.937 --> 00:13:02.657
So that sucks.

249
00:13:03.117 --> 00:13:11.219
But then like hotels, Target, FedEx, Motorola, Jack Henry, waste management, GameStop, like all these major, major vendors.

250
00:13:11.499 --> 00:13:13.560
So now you have like most of the continent.

251
00:13:14.120 --> 00:13:17.762
has given their ID over to one of these companies.

252
00:13:17.862 --> 00:13:19.523
It's not just driver's licenses, by the way.

253
00:13:19.563 --> 00:13:32.569
That's the headline, and that's obviously the big one and the big number, but they also have medical cards, travel documents, other government IDs, 10 million other identification cards, 500,000-some-odd medical cards.

254
00:13:32.789 --> 00:13:36.611
There's a bunch of other different stuff here, employment authorizations.

255
00:13:36.791 --> 00:13:41.714
So this ID scan does more than just this driver's license scanning, even though that's like the lion's share of this data.

256
00:13:42.014 --> 00:13:47.480
It kind of goes back to like we make this point a lot that a lot of the solutions to these problems like aren't technical.

257
00:13:47.520 --> 00:13:48.180
They're political.

258
00:13:48.721 --> 00:13:50.222
Like the listener to this might be like, why?

259
00:13:50.483 --> 00:13:59.091
You would think Hertz, a company whose job primarily is to take and scan driver's licenses, would have a secure driver's license storage solution.

260
00:13:59.451 --> 00:13:59.992
Well, sure.

261
00:14:00.012 --> 00:14:04.797
But then if you consider like, you know, the budget incentives and the profit incentives of that company –

262
00:14:05.197 --> 00:14:09.341
If a third party service offers the ability to do this for you, you're going to use that service.

263
00:14:09.361 --> 00:14:14.345
You're not going to justify standing up the infrastructure and team and security for a third party.

264
00:14:14.365 --> 00:14:15.426
You're just going to use a third party.

265
00:14:15.686 --> 00:14:18.168
But what do you not have control over with this third party?

266
00:14:18.188 --> 00:14:19.890
Their security posture, obviously.

267
00:14:19.970 --> 00:14:27.917
And so because of that, you have this kind of ironic thing where it's like the service that I'm required to give my driver's license to ultimately loses my driver's license.

268
00:14:28.017 --> 00:14:28.277
Yeah.

269
00:14:28.618 --> 00:14:33.884
And this is just like one pillar of why I'm anti this whole wave of ID verification, right?

270
00:14:34.244 --> 00:14:42.434
Is just like proof after proof after proof that the companies that we're handing this to just aren't equipped to actually store this stuff securely.

271
00:14:42.454 --> 00:14:46.538
We have no details of like how this breach actually happened yet, by the way.

272
00:14:46.879 --> 00:14:47.079
Right.

273
00:14:47.159 --> 00:14:47.359
Like,

274
00:14:48.240 --> 00:14:54.581
Uh, we don't know who, no one's like, no one's like stood up and claimed, uh, like, oh yeah, this was shiny hunters.

275
00:14:54.621 --> 00:14:56.422
And like, they got in via vishing or whatever.

276
00:14:56.442 --> 00:14:56.642
Right.

277
00:14:56.662 --> 00:15:06.744
Which we're going to talk about another one later, but like, uh, we don't know how they got this, but obviously they had like full access because this isn't like a few things.

278
00:15:06.784 --> 00:15:11.265
This is massive, massive data leak that took.

279
00:15:12.125 --> 00:15:15.847
Many like this compromise was happened over days, if not weeks.

280
00:15:16.188 --> 00:15:16.388
Yeah.

281
00:15:16.528 --> 00:15:16.708
Right.

282
00:15:16.728 --> 00:15:23.932
To actually even get all this data out in such a way that all of these different data fields are like searchable and indexable and all this kind of stuff.

283
00:15:23.972 --> 00:15:25.253
This is a complete compromise.

284
00:15:25.273 --> 00:15:27.495
This isn't like, oh, we got a little bit of it.

285
00:15:28.195 --> 00:15:41.324
Yeah, so it says it has 10 million identification cards, 3 million travel documents, and 579,000 medical cards revealing the information of over 170 million people in North America.

286
00:15:41.404 --> 00:15:43.185
Yeah, 150 million.

287
00:15:43.205 --> 00:15:51.411
This was tipped off to Krebs on security because someone saw this being posted on a Russian cyber security – or excuse me, a cyber crime form known as exploit.

288
00:15:51.431 --> 00:15:51.711
Yeah.

289
00:15:52.051 --> 00:15:53.152
Yeah, and they looked him up.

290
00:15:54.112 --> 00:15:55.433
His source looked Krebs up.

291
00:15:55.793 --> 00:15:59.015
Krebs was in it, and they were like, hey, yo, Krebs, you're in this.

292
00:15:59.055 --> 00:16:03.837
Matt, I have a question for you, though, a bit of a maybe black pill question, or I don't know what pill color this is correct.

293
00:16:03.857 --> 00:16:12.241
But so if you consider, like, the Internet of the early 2000s, where you can kind of do whatever you want, there really was no identity.

294
00:16:12.301 --> 00:16:16.604
There was, like, arguably true anonymity to a certain extent on the Internet back then, true in quotes.

295
00:16:17.204 --> 00:16:19.246
But now, and why was that, right?

296
00:16:19.646 --> 00:16:24.129
I think because so much of real life was not on the internet, that was possible.

297
00:16:24.229 --> 00:16:27.952
Like, you had an entire life outside of the internet, and the internet didn't really, like, matter to you.

298
00:16:28.593 --> 00:16:35.478
As life is becoming more digital, right, and, like, more and more of what we do is required to be online, right?

299
00:16:36.216 --> 00:16:41.562
Do you think a future exists where online anonymity is like not possible at all?

300
00:16:41.682 --> 00:16:44.925
Where like everything requires digital ID to make a Gmail account.

301
00:16:44.945 --> 00:16:48.970
Yeah, I think you kind of already have to like have an account that is linked to a real ID.

302
00:16:48.990 --> 00:16:52.574
Like does every service go that way as the world becomes more online?

303
00:16:52.594 --> 00:16:54.556
And what do we do from a security standpoint there?

304
00:16:54.576 --> 00:16:55.477
What does that what does it look like?

305
00:16:56.033 --> 00:16:58.896
Yeah, I've opined on this.

306
00:16:59.056 --> 00:16:59.597
It's weird.

307
00:17:00.117 --> 00:17:01.859
We're pointed in the wrong direction, I can tell you that.

308
00:17:02.279 --> 00:17:09.867
Because a lot of what's driving the direction we're pointed in is like data brokers and advertisers and like all this kind of stuff, people that want to

309
00:17:11.288 --> 00:17:23.515
be able to have control over information flow or have access to like your behavior on the internet for various reasons are, is like why we're pointed in this direction.

310
00:17:23.715 --> 00:17:23.935
Right.

311
00:17:24.415 --> 00:17:31.339
Like, and so I think a lot of it has to do with a consent, you know, like, yeah, like we've talked about this a lot, right?

312
00:17:31.379 --> 00:17:37.363
Like we could go full tinfoil body, like privacy, like pilled and you,

313
00:17:37.943 --> 00:17:41.445
at that point, you're like really not participating in modern society.

314
00:17:41.645 --> 00:17:41.805
Right.

315
00:17:41.865 --> 00:17:48.289
There's like concessions that we all make to like chip away at our privacy, even though you and I are cybersecurity like expert.

316
00:17:48.349 --> 00:17:50.591
I hate calling myself an expert, but like you and I are cybersecurity experts.

317
00:17:50.611 --> 00:17:51.551
I'm a guy that likes computers.

318
00:17:51.591 --> 00:17:53.332
My title here is a computer enjoyer.

319
00:17:53.612 --> 00:17:53.792
Yes.

320
00:17:53.812 --> 00:17:54.413
Same.

321
00:17:55.193 --> 00:17:55.834
I don't enjoy them.

322
00:17:55.854 --> 00:17:57.575
They're actually the cause of most of my problems.

323
00:17:57.615 --> 00:18:00.478
But here we are.

324
00:18:00.898 --> 00:18:04.901
But yeah, like I'd say I'm a privacy advocate, cybersecurity guy.

325
00:18:05.822 --> 00:18:13.549
And there are concessions that we make to like just, okay, yeah, we're like because we want to own iPhones and text each other with blue bubbles, right?

326
00:18:13.569 --> 00:18:16.031
Like there are things that like that comes along with.

327
00:18:16.051 --> 00:18:16.872
Yeah.

328
00:18:17.492 --> 00:18:18.092
So there's that.

329
00:18:18.813 --> 00:18:21.714
But we know what we're getting into to those degrees.

330
00:18:22.174 --> 00:18:24.575
We're also two heterosexual white males.

331
00:18:25.995 --> 00:18:32.858
And our identity on the internet isn't exactly something that people can come after us for just existing.

332
00:18:33.058 --> 00:18:36.662
Yeah, we don't live really in like, call it contested PvP territory.

333
00:18:36.702 --> 00:18:37.082
Right.

334
00:18:37.423 --> 00:18:50.557
There's entire groups of people that just their identity is the thing that they would like no one to know about as they go and like try to participate in these, like you said, increasingly digital communities, right?

335
00:18:51.198 --> 00:18:51.718
If you're...

336
00:18:52.339 --> 00:19:08.145
like a part of a group that's maybe certain political movements are pointed squarely at you, and you can only safely find your community in certain online forums, maybe you don't want to, like...

337
00:19:09.611 --> 00:19:37.116
inextricably tie your government ID to that online communication, which will eventually be leaked, either leaked via hack, or as we see time and time again, data brokers buy access to that information, or law enforcement misuses their access to this, as we've covered how many stories of law enforcement using these databases to stalk women or whatever it is, right?

338
00:19:37.176 --> 00:19:37.376
Yeah.

339
00:19:38.036 --> 00:19:46.401
Um, that's, that's why I'm just against these kinds of data piles continuing to get bigger and bigger and tying to more and more of our online behavior.

340
00:19:46.861 --> 00:19:47.062
Yeah.

341
00:19:47.902 --> 00:19:48.783
Yeah, it is interesting.

342
00:19:48.823 --> 00:19:56.027
Like I just, I see this trend where everything more and more requires me to have two factor with my driver's license and my passport.

343
00:19:56.047 --> 00:20:02.811
Like, I don't know what I was doing before, but like, it's, Hey, like get your phone out and take a video of you going left, right up, you know, up down.

344
00:20:02.891 --> 00:20:04.812
Even me doing on camera right now, it's probably a bad idea.

345
00:20:04.832 --> 00:20:06.373
I could just use that to like impersonate me.

346
00:20:06.393 --> 00:20:06.453
Oh.

347
00:20:06.593 --> 00:20:07.334
Oh, we're screwed, man.

348
00:20:07.374 --> 00:20:07.814
But whatever.

349
00:20:07.834 --> 00:20:11.597
You know, there's literally thousands of hours of me on YouTube doing this already.

350
00:20:12.478 --> 00:20:17.122
You know, my question is just like, you know, when I was younger, I would play on like Habbo Hotel.

351
00:20:17.342 --> 00:20:17.542
Right.

352
00:20:17.783 --> 00:20:20.505
And I'd make an anonymous account and I'd play Habbo Hotel.

353
00:20:20.805 --> 00:20:23.327
But when like, are my kids going to have that same luxury?

354
00:20:23.367 --> 00:20:23.908
You know what I mean?

355
00:20:23.968 --> 00:20:25.309
I don't think the answer is yes, unfortunately.

356
00:20:25.469 --> 00:20:28.350
You bring up a good point because like, why are we talking about this breach?

357
00:20:28.611 --> 00:20:31.752
Like we said at the beginning of this segment, like we don't really talk about a lot of breaches.

358
00:20:31.952 --> 00:20:33.493
Why is this one such a hot topic?

359
00:20:33.513 --> 00:20:34.594
A, everything I'm talking about.

360
00:20:34.854 --> 00:20:39.756
B, the repercussions of this particular data being stolen is exactly what you're talking about.

361
00:20:39.776 --> 00:20:45.319
Because a lot of online accounts now, if you try to recover an account, you forgot a password.

362
00:20:45.339 --> 00:20:47.420
It's not just like, what's the street you grew up on?

363
00:20:47.440 --> 00:20:49.701
Isn't the way you get back into your Google account, right?

364
00:20:50.061 --> 00:20:51.742
Thank goodness, right?

365
00:20:55.304 --> 00:20:58.606
block at the bottom of the get access to your world.

366
00:20:59.087 --> 00:21:01.829
A lot of it is your driver's license nowadays, right?

367
00:21:02.689 --> 00:21:16.279
And so now if someone can print physical copies of this using all the information, including barcodes, valid barcodes of your driver's license, can they compromise the account recovery flows of your accounts?

368
00:21:16.479 --> 00:21:19.141
You and I are at higher risk of this being very public people.

369
00:21:19.562 --> 00:21:23.825
I think YouTube is probably one of the ones that we probably need to worry about here.

370
00:21:24.645 --> 00:21:25.986
Uh, you know, I don't, I don't really know.

371
00:21:26.207 --> 00:21:26.427
Right.

372
00:21:26.767 --> 00:21:31.291
Um, that I, I hate that this is like the bottom Django block for a lot of things.

373
00:21:31.891 --> 00:21:33.052
You know, it's funny here.

374
00:21:33.132 --> 00:21:44.541
Krebs has been dealing with this kind of stuff for a while and his, I think it was his PayPal account got stolen over and over and over again, because if you contacted customer support that you lost access to your PayPal account.

375
00:21:44.561 --> 00:21:45.262
Uh,

376
00:21:45.382 --> 00:21:48.465
And the main question that they would ask was your social security number.

377
00:21:48.985 --> 00:21:53.329
Cribs' social security number was part of a data leak so long ago, it's basically public at this point.

378
00:21:53.630 --> 00:21:54.871
And people just kept stealing it.

379
00:21:54.891 --> 00:21:56.192
And he was like begging PayPal.

380
00:21:56.212 --> 00:21:59.735
He's like, please, I cannot rotate my social security number.

381
00:21:59.956 --> 00:22:00.696
It is public.

382
00:22:01.217 --> 00:22:05.381
Like, what can I do to stop this from continuing to happen?

383
00:22:05.561 --> 00:22:07.863
And I think driver's licenses are kind of the next iteration of that.

384
00:22:08.123 --> 00:22:09.844
I think a lot about solutions to this problem works.

385
00:22:09.884 --> 00:22:15.108
I mean, effectively what we've done is we as a society have created like a symmetric key for authentication algorithm.

386
00:22:15.128 --> 00:22:16.529
Like what is a symmetric key, right?

387
00:22:16.569 --> 00:22:17.710
It's ownership of your thing.

388
00:22:17.750 --> 00:22:18.470
It's my social.

389
00:22:18.870 --> 00:22:19.951
It's my driver's license, whatever.

390
00:22:20.752 --> 00:22:27.516
The question then becomes like, okay, is there a way to implement like an asymmetric algorithm that we all abide by as a society?

391
00:22:27.976 --> 00:22:32.560
The problem with that, though, is all asymmetric algorithms require a root of trust, right?

392
00:22:32.580 --> 00:22:37.123
So like if, for example, I were issued a private key and a public key at birth.

393
00:22:37.843 --> 00:22:47.214
The person issuing that, the government, would then now have the ability to arbitrarily issue IDs and make up fake people or speak on your behalf.

394
00:22:47.354 --> 00:22:49.437
But the problem, I guess, they kind of already have that power.

395
00:22:49.837 --> 00:22:52.300
It also introduces a really weird problem where...

396
00:22:53.101 --> 00:23:01.588
You know, you're like issued an idea at birth, which is like a big topic of conversation, like the tinfoil hat government takeover New World Order community.

397
00:23:01.608 --> 00:23:02.009
So I don't know.

398
00:23:02.249 --> 00:23:08.875
But I mean, that at least like would solve the problem of like if my if a signature of mine gets leaked, it's not my private key.

399
00:23:08.915 --> 00:23:09.095
Right.

400
00:23:09.215 --> 00:23:11.277
It's a it's an it's evidence through a public key.

401
00:23:12.197 --> 00:23:13.238
Yeah, this one's hard.

402
00:23:13.418 --> 00:23:14.058
This one's rough.

403
00:23:14.759 --> 00:23:19.021
I think a lot of hardware off solutions are really helpful here, right?

404
00:23:19.181 --> 00:23:23.284
It's like, oh, he issued at birth, not an ad, but you know, hit me up.

405
00:23:23.744 --> 00:23:25.145
Maybe not issued at birth, right?

406
00:23:25.185 --> 00:23:32.589
But like, you know, in terms of account recovery flows being tied to like hardware that you have along with like you have to layer this, right?

407
00:23:32.629 --> 00:23:33.449
I've been in charge of this.

408
00:23:33.489 --> 00:23:37.792
I've like I ran security for a fintech company and it was kind of like, oh, crap, how do we?

409
00:23:38.572 --> 00:23:41.395
handle a lot of this account recovery stuff.

410
00:23:41.515 --> 00:23:44.377
And like the chain gets weaker, right?

411
00:23:44.477 --> 00:23:49.561
If like, oh, you know, you ask them for some bit and they don't have it, right?

412
00:23:49.581 --> 00:23:51.643
It's like, oh, okay, well, what's the next thing?

413
00:23:51.923 --> 00:23:52.824
What's the next thing?

414
00:23:53.364 --> 00:24:02.332
You know, and that's why a lot of these companies are going to these ID scan.nets and saying, will you verify that that person is who they say they are as part of my process?

415
00:24:02.632 --> 00:24:05.975
And then I'll give them access to whatever it is that I'll give them access to, right?

416
00:24:06.575 --> 00:24:08.916
I think there are some companies that are doing better at this than others.

417
00:24:10.096 --> 00:24:13.417
And I don't hate the identity verification space in general.

418
00:24:13.557 --> 00:24:14.858
I think there's a lot of value there.

419
00:24:15.138 --> 00:24:25.021
Like we said, consensual, like, hey, I'm doing something like, you know, you're going to a marijuana dispensary, you're handing over your ID, you know what you're getting into, you know why you have to do that, right?

420
00:24:25.461 --> 00:24:26.502
Going to a discord?

421
00:24:27.503 --> 00:24:27.763
Sure.

422
00:24:27.923 --> 00:24:28.364
Yeah.

423
00:24:28.564 --> 00:24:31.208
Or whatever the hotel thing that you game that you play is.

424
00:24:31.248 --> 00:24:31.689
You know what I mean?

425
00:24:31.709 --> 00:24:34.273
It's a very, very different experience.

426
00:24:34.493 --> 00:24:34.754
Yeah.

427
00:24:35.014 --> 00:24:39.821
Activities that were otherwise recreational now require significant risk to my life.

428
00:24:40.182 --> 00:24:40.743
You know what I mean?

429
00:24:40.823 --> 00:24:42.245
That should not be the case.

430
00:24:42.465 --> 00:24:43.587
And ripple effects, right?

431
00:24:43.607 --> 00:24:52.338
If you identify yourself on one website, like, can you then identify other behavior across the web that becomes de-anonymized no matter what you're doing?

432
00:24:52.638 --> 00:25:00.629
The other, like, repercussion here is that we're now seeing bills be proposed to make VPNs illegal because they're avoiding the identity verification things.

433
00:25:01.049 --> 00:25:01.189
Right.

434
00:25:01.209 --> 00:25:04.031
It's like, oh, well, my state doesn't let me access Pornhub.

435
00:25:04.051 --> 00:25:08.234
So I got a VPN to the state over in order to get, you know, the videos that I want.

436
00:25:08.974 --> 00:25:11.516
And now they're like, well, now we're going to make VPNs illegal.

437
00:25:11.536 --> 00:25:12.016
It's like that.

438
00:25:12.036 --> 00:25:12.877
That's not how that works.

439
00:25:12.897 --> 00:25:14.418
You can't make network tunnels illegal.

440
00:25:14.518 --> 00:25:18.501
I say like, bro, do you are you trying to make data modulation illegal?

441
00:25:18.661 --> 00:25:20.622
Like, are you trying to make math illegal?

442
00:25:20.662 --> 00:25:21.723
Like, what are you talking about?

443
00:25:21.983 --> 00:25:22.363
Yeah, yeah.

444
00:25:22.484 --> 00:25:26.367
And every time we say that, there's always people in the comments like, there is math that is illegal.

445
00:25:26.447 --> 00:25:27.708
And it's like, OK, OK, OK.

446
00:25:27.768 --> 00:25:28.529
Wait, no, hold on.

447
00:25:28.589 --> 00:25:30.671
Elaborate, commenters and Matt.

448
00:25:30.751 --> 00:25:31.551
What math is illegal?

449
00:25:31.571 --> 00:25:31.912
Explain.

450
00:25:31.932 --> 00:25:36.756
Like, I know, like, crypto is like military grade weaponry or something from, like, export control standpoint.

451
00:25:36.776 --> 00:25:37.577
But also, like...

452
00:25:38.297 --> 00:25:39.558
China uses AES256.

453
00:25:39.658 --> 00:25:40.438
I don't know what to tell you.

454
00:25:40.458 --> 00:25:40.938
You know what I mean?

455
00:25:40.958 --> 00:25:42.039
Like, yeah, yeah, yeah.

456
00:25:42.179 --> 00:25:44.960
No, they're just like, there is like, I forget the acronym.

457
00:25:44.980 --> 00:25:48.802
There's an acronym of like, you know, fair use of like certain things.

458
00:25:48.922 --> 00:25:50.903
And like there are crypto things in there.

459
00:25:51.103 --> 00:25:56.426
Anyway, like we said, we don't really talk about a lot of breaches, but there's another one that's like equally as massive this week.

460
00:25:56.446 --> 00:26:00.388
And it would kind of be irresponsible for us to like not mention both of these really quick.

461
00:26:00.868 --> 00:26:07.551
So like this one, we probably have like less to talk about or more to talk about, but we're already kind of like a good chunk into this episode.

462
00:26:08.331 --> 00:26:09.512
But McKesson was breached.

463
00:26:09.532 --> 00:26:12.593
We both read this and thought it was McKenzie, which is not.

464
00:26:12.693 --> 00:26:14.433
I thought it was for like half an hour.

465
00:26:14.453 --> 00:26:15.494
Yeah, we're not.

466
00:26:15.854 --> 00:26:18.077
We literally both had that same reaction.

467
00:26:18.097 --> 00:26:20.639
So McKesson's like a massive health care provider.

468
00:26:21.580 --> 00:26:23.402
What was the number that we read while we were researching this?

469
00:26:23.422 --> 00:26:25.685
Like a third of all pharmaceutical transactions?

470
00:26:25.985 --> 00:26:30.650
Yeah, they did $403 billion in revenue last year, March to date.

471
00:26:31.291 --> 00:26:35.055
And yeah, they are responsible for a third of the pharmaceuticals in the U.S.

472
00:26:35.415 --> 00:26:40.657
So we don't have a lot of info about this breach from McKesson, which sucks.

473
00:26:40.677 --> 00:26:45.700
Like, I wish there would be a little bit more transparent at this point because we're a few weeks past the breach now.

474
00:26:47.060 --> 00:26:51.803
But 284 million patients data records are stolen.

475
00:26:52.023 --> 00:26:52.643
We don't know.

476
00:26:52.723 --> 00:26:56.505
Again, we don't know, like, what in the what what is a medical record.

477
00:26:56.645 --> 00:26:56.825
Right.

478
00:26:56.845 --> 00:26:56.985
Right.

479
00:26:57.225 --> 00:27:05.292
We're getting this from the 8K filing that the SEC requires companies that discover a data breach to file within like 48 hours.

480
00:27:05.712 --> 00:27:07.934
That's like all we have, right?

481
00:27:08.415 --> 00:27:12.198
But Shiny Hunters has raised their hand and claimed responsibility for this one.

482
00:27:13.039 --> 00:27:16.682
And Shiny Hunters is a pretty vocal threat cybercrime group.

483
00:27:17.482 --> 00:27:32.013
that does talk about like what they do and how and whatever their MO is one of the things that I scream from the rooftops is like you should be focusing on threat actors MO is because they're telling you exactly how they're going to do it I guarantee that this breach if it's shiny hunters

484
00:27:32.713 --> 00:27:38.098
is going to look exactly like a bunch of the other breaches that we've seen over the last couple of years out of this group, right?

485
00:27:38.118 --> 00:27:43.984
There's going to be some social engineering likely over the phone, but they also do text phishing.

486
00:27:44.424 --> 00:27:49.889
And they're really big fans of creating fake company websites that look like your company Octa login.

487
00:27:50.070 --> 00:27:51.731
They use a tool called Evil Engine X.

488
00:27:51.791 --> 00:27:53.433
That's how I pronounce it.

489
00:27:53.513 --> 00:27:54.434
I don't know how you pronounce it.

490
00:27:54.454 --> 00:27:55.194
Engine X, for sure.

491
00:27:55.275 --> 00:27:55.555
Yeah, yeah.

492
00:27:55.835 --> 00:27:58.416
Well, evil, it's spelled evil jinx.

493
00:27:58.776 --> 00:28:00.237
And if you say evil jinx, I don't trust.

494
00:28:00.257 --> 00:28:01.177
I'm doing Nginx all day.

495
00:28:01.497 --> 00:28:01.998
All day.

496
00:28:02.178 --> 00:28:06.299
Evil Nginx, which literally, so like literally they don't even clone your login page.

497
00:28:06.359 --> 00:28:07.580
It is your login page.

498
00:28:07.840 --> 00:28:13.863
Like this evil Nginx is like a proxy that you can host another company's Okta login on your domain.

499
00:28:15.063 --> 00:28:38.041
uh steal the creds through it and it also helps the evil engine x has tools built into it to help uh grab two-factor and like replay two-factor stuff through it as well they're very very very very good at this part okay they like blast the company with this fake login page they get a few successes that's all they need uh they grab an octa sso login and

500
00:28:38.782 --> 00:28:39.342
And they're in.

501
00:28:39.582 --> 00:28:44.283
And if you guys have ever used Okta, you log in, it's just a bunch of SaaS portals.

502
00:28:45.043 --> 00:28:47.564
And the one login just gets you access to all of that.

503
00:28:48.044 --> 00:28:51.665
They at machine speed pass the OAuth tokens off of all.

504
00:28:51.705 --> 00:28:55.526
They click everything instantly and they get all the OAuth tokens.

505
00:28:55.586 --> 00:28:56.986
They pass them to their team.

506
00:28:57.006 --> 00:29:00.147
They have a team of people ready for this success to actually occur.

507
00:29:01.147 --> 00:29:11.317
And they have people specialized in certain SAS services to start exfiltrating data from that OAuth token that they get to different parts of the world.

508
00:29:11.397 --> 00:29:13.920
So you can't even really do a lot of the geo stuff that you're meant to do.

509
00:29:13.940 --> 00:29:14.721
They're very, very good.

510
00:29:15.662 --> 00:29:17.844
I've seen I've seen the behind.

511
00:29:17.864 --> 00:29:20.927
I've been the incident responder on these types of attacks.

512
00:29:20.947 --> 00:29:24.670
I thought you were going to say that I've been in the cyber crime room where it's happening.

513
00:29:24.690 --> 00:29:24.951
I'm like.

514
00:29:25.945 --> 00:29:27.086
What was that, Matt?

515
00:29:27.266 --> 00:29:27.707
Hello?

516
00:29:28.868 --> 00:29:30.489
Excuse me, Brian Krebs, FBI.

517
00:29:30.789 --> 00:29:31.570
Right, right, right.

518
00:29:31.590 --> 00:29:32.170
Right here.

519
00:29:32.351 --> 00:29:33.492
R slash FBI open up.

520
00:29:35.453 --> 00:29:36.334
He's wearing the shirt.

521
00:29:36.374 --> 00:29:37.835
He's got it.

522
00:29:38.496 --> 00:29:39.377
He's a hacker.

523
00:29:39.657 --> 00:29:40.257
Oh, my God.

524
00:29:40.377 --> 00:29:45.342
The world of commercialized cybercrime as a service is so impressive to me, though.

525
00:29:45.362 --> 00:29:50.366
The fact that a team of people where there was probably a job posting on some dark web commercial,

526
00:29:51.727 --> 00:30:17.239
cybercrime form it's like yeah we're looking for like a a slack oauth api expert to act as our cybercrime and agree in some guy got hired to do that getting paid in monero you know what i mean it just it's it's not quite job boards but it is almost universally gaming forums and discords talked about this last time yeah how like gaming forums and gaming discords are like just the the cesspool that creates these cybercrime organizations

527
00:30:17.599 --> 00:30:20.000
They find each other, they identify their skill sets.

528
00:30:20.080 --> 00:30:22.141
They like, and then they want to show off to each other.

529
00:30:22.181 --> 00:30:24.782
So they develop new skill sets to be able to show off.

530
00:30:24.802 --> 00:30:25.622
They do like little things.

531
00:30:25.642 --> 00:30:27.083
And then it turns into like organized crime.

532
00:30:27.123 --> 00:30:35.026
It's like you do these little hits to prove that you have the skills so that you get called called on when this campaign fires off against McKesson.

533
00:30:35.486 --> 00:30:35.686
Right.

534
00:30:36.006 --> 00:30:38.127
And then they literally have people playing the roles.

535
00:30:38.147 --> 00:30:39.568
They have people that are the callers.

536
00:30:40.028 --> 00:30:42.371
that are good at the social engineering on the phone.

537
00:30:42.671 --> 00:30:43.552
A lot of them are women.

538
00:30:43.812 --> 00:30:44.312
Guess why?

539
00:30:44.332 --> 00:30:49.277
Like, you know, and so, yeah, it's like they have specialized.

540
00:30:49.297 --> 00:30:50.519
They're very Liam Neeson.

541
00:30:50.599 --> 00:30:53.582
I have a special set of skills developed over a long career.

542
00:30:54.012 --> 00:30:55.994
Yeah, we'll transition into this here in a minute, but I mean, like, same thing.

543
00:30:56.014 --> 00:31:02.859
If you look at Team PCP, right, they got rolled up recently, and, like, a lot of their activity was related to gaming and was related to Discord activity.

544
00:31:02.899 --> 00:31:03.739
Let's go right into it.

545
00:31:03.799 --> 00:31:04.640
Let's go right into it.

546
00:31:04.680 --> 00:31:09.384
Because, like, I don't have a ton to talk about this McKesson one, except for, like, I wish we had more to talk about on it.

547
00:31:10.164 --> 00:31:18.691
We have some threat intel about some of the domains that were used in the attack, not from Shiny Hunters, not from McKesson, just from, like, threat intel groups that, like, saw...

548
00:31:19.291 --> 00:31:29.318
these domains get spun up and are like, oh yeah, McKesson.claims, because Shiny Hunters just hacked ReliaQuest, a cybersecurity company, and they used ReliaQuest.claims or something, I think.

549
00:31:29.358 --> 00:31:32.060
And so they were like, oh, this is their new naming scheme in MO.

550
00:31:32.421 --> 00:31:46.651
Again, why I think it's such a priority to focus on these behaviors so that you can realize, hey, my detection engineer should probably have someone looking for my company.claims in registrar information and put the guards up, right?

551
00:31:46.931 --> 00:31:51.153
Before we dive into Team PCP and their roll-up, we should dive into a message from today's sponsor.

552
00:31:51.453 --> 00:31:54.994
Hey hackers, before we keep going, I want to take a quick break and say a quick thank you to our sponsors.

553
00:31:55.255 --> 00:31:58.756
Today's Lowdown episode is sponsored by our friends over at Maze.

554
00:31:59.256 --> 00:32:04.539
Maze has spent the last couple of years using AI to find and remediate vulnerabilities in the cloud.

555
00:32:04.639 --> 00:32:11.401
And now they've released Maze Code, AI agents that find and deeply investigate vulnerabilities in your code.

556
00:32:11.642 --> 00:32:12.442
Now we all know the deal.

557
00:32:12.822 --> 00:32:19.085
Software composition analysis tools and SaaS toolings are all historically really bad at just making more noise.

558
00:32:19.125 --> 00:32:25.969
They find issues that may not actually be real and just create a lot of problems for your engineers to deal with that don't solve real security vulnerabilities.

559
00:32:26.069 --> 00:32:26.489
I get it.

560
00:32:26.529 --> 00:32:27.110
We've been there.

561
00:32:27.750 --> 00:32:33.153
Maze code is a really cool tool because Maze code actually knows how your code works.

562
00:32:33.473 --> 00:32:38.534
MazeCode investigates every finding with the context of how your code is actually deployed.

563
00:32:38.934 --> 00:32:46.495
Sure, you're using a version of libxml2 that's vulnerable, but the actual code path to hit that vulnerability is not exposed in your Docker image.

564
00:32:46.775 --> 00:32:50.316
MazeCode can find that and won't show you that that vulnerability is a big deal.

565
00:32:50.456 --> 00:32:55.017
Every vulnerability that MazeCode reports comes with evidence that it's real and a way to fix it.

566
00:32:55.357 --> 00:32:59.437
Check out Maze at go.lowdownpod.com slash maze.

567
00:32:59.557 --> 00:33:03.018
That's go.lowdownpod.com slash maze.

568
00:33:03.198 --> 00:33:03.779
Thanks again, Mays.

569
00:33:03.919 --> 00:33:04.760
Let's keep going.

570
00:33:05.221 --> 00:33:05.982
And we're back.

571
00:33:06.002 --> 00:33:08.566
Yeah, we're going to transition into talking about Team PCP.

572
00:33:09.127 --> 00:33:10.569
Matt, Team PCP got rolled up.

573
00:33:10.589 --> 00:33:11.110
Isn't that crazy?

574
00:33:11.370 --> 00:33:17.359
They got arrested finally after, it feels like years, but in cybersecurity time, really just months of supply chain attacks, dude.

575
00:33:17.379 --> 00:33:18.080
It's pretty fucking nuts.

576
00:33:18.500 --> 00:33:20.221
This is a, this is a crazy one.

577
00:33:20.261 --> 00:33:21.421
I've seen some breakdowns.

578
00:33:21.461 --> 00:33:23.042
I think you're going to go into the breakdown for me.

579
00:33:23.082 --> 00:33:29.364
I've also seen some people rallied to the defensive team PCP, which I want to talk about, but first go into who are they?

580
00:33:29.404 --> 00:33:30.164
What's going on?

581
00:33:30.204 --> 00:33:35.486
We've talked a lot about supply chain stuff on both of our channels for the past year, crazy year.

582
00:33:35.506 --> 00:33:38.527
We're coming up on a year of a shy halut isms.

583
00:33:39.427 --> 00:33:41.408
So yeah, they started in late 2025.

584
00:33:41.488 --> 00:33:44.269
And I was like, oh, like that was only a couple of months ago.

585
00:33:44.289 --> 00:33:45.769
No, dude, it's like it's September.

586
00:33:45.850 --> 00:33:49.851
So about a year ago, Team BCP kind of like they showed up.

587
00:33:50.031 --> 00:33:54.773
Now, when I first started talking about this, I mistakenly said that they were like always in supply chain land.

588
00:33:55.033 --> 00:33:55.413
Not true.

589
00:33:55.914 --> 00:34:03.059
So Team PCP started to arise around the time that other threat actors were kind of kicking off these, like, supply chain attacks, right?

590
00:34:03.079 --> 00:34:07.783
They were getting into, you know, maintainers of large NPM repos.

591
00:34:07.803 --> 00:34:10.124
They were installing worms into, like, post-install scripts.

592
00:34:10.545 --> 00:34:12.947
And those were going out and, like, shy-looting the entire Internet.

593
00:34:13.667 --> 00:34:22.171
Around that time, Team PCP got really into this thing where they were attacking vulnerable instances of like CICD, right?

594
00:34:22.191 --> 00:34:40.881
So for example, when you're on GitHub, right, if you submit a pull request to a repo, if the repo is not set up properly, if it uses the wrong kind of pull request, you can get a CICD action to fire on behalf of the maintainer of the repo with your data in the pull request.

595
00:34:40.941 --> 00:34:41.281
And so...

596
00:34:41.681 --> 00:34:49.045
If, for example, like a bash script runs that uses data from your pull request, you can use that to compromise a CI CD instance.

597
00:34:49.085 --> 00:34:50.705
Okay, so they're really big with that.

598
00:34:51.386 --> 00:34:54.547
And then GitHub locked down a lot of the things that they were popping.

599
00:34:54.567 --> 00:34:58.309
And so after that, they shifted in early 2026 to the supply chain side, right?

600
00:34:58.329 --> 00:35:04.532
They kind of got on the Shai Halud train and they're responsible for at the time, the compromise of a lot of packages.

601
00:35:04.752 --> 00:35:10.274
through the mini Shaihalud worm, and then a variety of other CICD pipeline-type things, big ones being LightLLM.

602
00:35:10.475 --> 00:35:13.016
And then there was one security tool they actually popped.

603
00:35:13.036 --> 00:35:13.856
I forget what the name of it was.

604
00:35:13.896 --> 00:35:14.316
Trivi.

605
00:35:14.716 --> 00:35:15.257
Yeah, Trivi.

606
00:35:15.277 --> 00:35:16.657
They popped the Trivi tooling.

607
00:35:17.297 --> 00:35:21.239
Now, those guys, Guy, I guess, singular, maybe two, have been rolled up.

608
00:35:21.259 --> 00:35:21.920
They got arrested.

609
00:35:22.000 --> 00:35:26.962
So earlier this year, Flare, a sponsor of my channel but not on the podcast, was talking purely about cool research.

610
00:35:28.162 --> 00:35:33.545
They did some de-anonymization foo to figure out who this person was and eventually get them arrested.

611
00:35:33.925 --> 00:35:34.065
And –

612
00:35:34.545 --> 00:35:35.848
Like the research is cool.

613
00:35:35.888 --> 00:35:39.876
I love what they did, but like the OPSEC failure of this guy was actually so simple.

614
00:35:39.936 --> 00:35:41.038
It's like a little disappointing.

615
00:35:41.058 --> 00:35:42.060
You're like, come on, bro.

616
00:35:42.241 --> 00:35:43.042
Like really?

617
00:35:43.122 --> 00:35:43.664
This is what we're doing.

618
00:35:43.684 --> 00:35:44.465
So Matt, what happened?

619
00:35:44.485 --> 00:35:45.106
What did we get into?

620
00:35:45.528 --> 00:35:51.134
Yeah, it really just turned into a shared username across multiple accounts.

621
00:35:51.314 --> 00:35:52.895
Like you said, Flare does some pretty cool stuff.

622
00:35:52.916 --> 00:35:56.980
Dark web monitoring, like Telegram chat monitoring of threat actors, stuff like this.

623
00:35:57.560 --> 00:36:02.045
But yeah, this one was just like a specific account name.

624
00:36:02.185 --> 00:36:05.148
DeadcatX3, I think was one of the aliases.

625
00:36:05.748 --> 00:36:06.609
PCPCATX3.

626
00:36:07.390 --> 00:36:10.731
Team PCP, there was like a cat theme to a lot of this.

627
00:36:12.271 --> 00:36:24.373
And they were able to link some account activity from this like dead cat X3, which was like a GitHub account also to some like telegram handles that were like earlier telegram handles.

628
00:36:24.873 --> 00:36:30.814
It wasn't like the craziest like web that they had to even follow, but then they like stacked evidence, right?

629
00:36:31.054 --> 00:36:33.315
I think the one that was like the domino was...

630
00:36:33.855 --> 00:36:41.120
was DeadcatX3 on HackerOne, the bug bounty website, was like the one that was like, oh, wait, what's that?

631
00:36:41.240 --> 00:36:44.822
They have skills in cybersecurity and this is the username.

632
00:36:45.262 --> 00:36:49.545
And then they tied it to a hugging face profile.

633
00:36:49.585 --> 00:36:51.206
They tied it to a few different things.

634
00:36:51.867 --> 00:36:56.610
And then they were able to, I think through HackerOne, get the person's real name.

635
00:36:57.070 --> 00:37:00.651
Yeah, so it's like somehow like even more egregious than that.

636
00:37:00.671 --> 00:37:04.693
So this guy used the alias Deadcat3 all over the Internet, right?

637
00:37:04.713 --> 00:37:05.733
So it's on Twitter.

638
00:37:06.073 --> 00:37:06.893
It's on eBay.

639
00:37:06.933 --> 00:37:10.595
It's on Scratch, like the programming website, right, for like drag and drop programming.

640
00:37:11.035 --> 00:37:12.875
It's also on Hugging Face, right?

641
00:37:12.895 --> 00:37:16.437
Okay, so Team PCP being overtly associated to this handle Deadcat3.

642
00:37:16.937 --> 00:37:19.578
If you go to the Hugging Face profile of this account,

643
00:37:20.358 --> 00:37:27.500
DeadCat3, inside of one of the projects there, was literally the domain used in the mini ShyHaludWormC2.

644
00:37:27.740 --> 00:37:28.481
So like, okay, cool.

645
00:37:28.501 --> 00:37:30.781
So we've now associated this to DeadCat3.

646
00:37:31.021 --> 00:37:31.301
Awesome.

647
00:37:31.722 --> 00:37:35.863
Now, if we also go to the HackerOne profile of DeadCat3...

648
00:37:36.803 --> 00:37:38.204
Their name is Ruben Thompson.

649
00:37:38.365 --> 00:37:39.646
It's right there on the profile.

650
00:37:39.686 --> 00:37:41.187
That is his real life name.

651
00:37:41.207 --> 00:37:42.168
That is not an alias.

652
00:37:42.588 --> 00:37:49.554
And then so flare inside their system, they have a bunch of email addresses and other information collected from their monitoring of the dark web.

653
00:37:49.574 --> 00:37:52.037
And so they were able to associate Ruben Thompson's,

654
00:37:52.597 --> 00:38:01.710
email address from his school in Australia to another one of his aliases, surfing up eight at gmail.com, which then just associated him to a variety of real life platforms.

655
00:38:01.731 --> 00:38:06.578
Like his real LinkedIn, his real Twitter, his real Gmail, his real Tik TOK, et cetera.

656
00:38:06.958 --> 00:38:07.559
There's some other, uh,

657
00:38:08.260 --> 00:38:14.905
like follow on stuff about like the, his steam activity and his partner and how they rolled up his partner too.

658
00:38:14.925 --> 00:38:20.890
I think because like the, the partner was the one that was maintaining the get the, the Twitter that was very popular for a while.

659
00:38:20.910 --> 00:38:28.857
Then they also got arrested, but it's just pretty interesting that we talk a lot about like privacy hat people and like people who want to be like super duper anonymous.

660
00:38:28.877 --> 00:38:29.237
Yeah.

661
00:38:29.317 --> 00:38:32.321
And you would think like a cyber crime group, granted, they're on the younger side.

662
00:38:32.341 --> 00:38:35.585
They're like probably like, you know, late teens, early 20s because they're in college, I believe.

663
00:38:36.146 --> 00:38:39.731
You would think that they would have a little bit of a better of an opsec posture.

664
00:38:40.291 --> 00:38:46.620
But in this scenario, Homie just overtly associated his hacker handle to his real name all over the place, which is kind of funny.

665
00:38:46.960 --> 00:38:49.742
I think the steam account even like shared a cat profile picture.

666
00:38:49.762 --> 00:38:49.842
Yes.

667
00:38:49.962 --> 00:38:50.463
Some of them.

668
00:38:50.943 --> 00:38:53.805
So, um, the, the other bits, right.

669
00:38:53.905 --> 00:38:58.769
I think they wound up actually like turning themselves in when they kind of realized that they were cooked.

670
00:38:59.009 --> 00:39:04.012
Like as part of this investigation, there's a few like interesting bits besides just like hacker got arrested.

671
00:39:04.052 --> 00:39:04.313
Lol.

672
00:39:04.333 --> 00:39:04.653
Right.

673
00:39:04.673 --> 00:39:06.994
I'm like, I'm like, I'm like, I'm like, I'm like, I'm like, I'm like,

674
00:39:07.937 --> 00:39:10.718
Well, first of all, a lot of people are coming to the defense of Team PCP.

675
00:39:10.738 --> 00:39:11.398
Yeah, elaborate on that.

676
00:39:11.418 --> 00:39:12.238
That's very confusing.

677
00:39:12.638 --> 00:39:13.938
Yeah, so, like, there's this...

678
00:39:14.258 --> 00:39:18.239
I mean, this was, like, when I was getting into cybersecurity in the early 2000s.

679
00:39:18.319 --> 00:39:25.261
There was this, like, very much thinner line between the industry and, like, cybercrime.

680
00:39:25.461 --> 00:39:26.121
Yeah.

681
00:39:26.161 --> 00:39:29.202
Like, DEF CON itself was very associated with, like...

682
00:39:30.082 --> 00:39:32.265
bad hacker-ing, like, you know what I mean?

683
00:39:32.446 --> 00:39:33.427
Like, back in the day.

684
00:39:33.467 --> 00:39:42.019
Dude, my first DEF CON was 2013, and back then you could buy, like, a burner laptop in, like, a rogue cell tower for, like, a couple hundred bucks, like, at the vendors' area.

685
00:39:42.039 --> 00:39:44.182
That was, like, the vibe back then.

686
00:39:44.202 --> 00:39:46.385
Right, and, like, security research wasn't, like...

687
00:39:47.106 --> 00:39:48.306
hard, you know?

688
00:39:48.346 --> 00:39:50.827
So like literally if you were hacking, you were like succeeding.

689
00:39:50.887 --> 00:39:52.147
So it was like, well, what are you doing?

690
00:39:52.187 --> 00:39:52.347
Right.

691
00:39:52.387 --> 00:39:53.107
What are you stealing?

692
00:39:53.127 --> 00:40:00.409
Like, what are you finding issues with, you know, jackpotting ATMs, like getting free cell phone minutes, like whatever, right.

693
00:40:00.429 --> 00:40:06.270
There was like this culture, the hacker culture, like of the industry at the time, because that was the industry.

694
00:40:06.290 --> 00:40:09.631
There wasn't like this corporate side of cybersecurity that we have now.

695
00:40:09.971 --> 00:40:10.131
Right.

696
00:40:10.671 --> 00:40:13.392
So like the attitude of a lot of like,

697
00:40:14.391 --> 00:40:21.574
big hacks that went on and then people getting arrested was like, why was the company that vulnerable?

698
00:40:22.454 --> 00:40:22.694
Right.

699
00:40:22.734 --> 00:40:29.657
There was like this whole, the hack, the only way that this company finally listened was when they lost the information.

700
00:40:30.037 --> 00:40:30.258
Right.

701
00:40:30.778 --> 00:40:32.539
Or they, the bottom line got hurt.

702
00:40:32.559 --> 00:40:33.479
They lost the money.

703
00:40:33.959 --> 00:40:34.159
Right.

704
00:40:34.179 --> 00:40:35.800
They got sued, whatever it was.

705
00:40:36.861 --> 00:40:38.442
But it was like altruism to a point, right?

706
00:40:38.462 --> 00:40:44.028
It's like you're making this value judgment that like, yeah, the bottom line fell out, but you're making the rest of the world safer as a result.

707
00:40:44.048 --> 00:40:45.630
You're raising awareness.

708
00:40:45.930 --> 00:40:49.374
You're hurting profit for the sake of saving profit later, right, if you could want to call it that.

709
00:40:49.594 --> 00:40:49.814
Right.

710
00:40:49.934 --> 00:40:53.358
But it was like tied to hacker culture, right?

711
00:40:53.378 --> 00:40:57.562
It was like I'm doing this because I can and I shouldn't be able to.

712
00:40:58.263 --> 00:41:04.067
And like, therefore, you are making all of the users of your service or company or whatever less safe.

713
00:41:04.607 --> 00:41:13.994
And like me doing this and taking the fall for it is actually making like my comrades in arms, the fellow users of your service, more safe in the future.

714
00:41:14.334 --> 00:41:16.155
Not trying to save the company's profits or whatever.

715
00:41:16.195 --> 00:41:16.756
Not safe profits.

716
00:41:16.776 --> 00:41:19.998
You know, like a net positive or profits is wrong.

717
00:41:20.018 --> 00:41:20.478
Yes.

718
00:41:20.658 --> 00:41:21.239
This was like.

719
00:41:21.799 --> 00:41:24.280
This is the cybersecurity that I came up in, right?

720
00:41:24.541 --> 00:41:29.703
Now it's like much harder to hack like into just like any company ever, right?

721
00:41:30.044 --> 00:41:33.766
And cybersecurity teams exist at most of these companies where they didn't in the past.

722
00:41:33.846 --> 00:41:38.288
Usually it was like an IT guy that had cybersecurity as like a responsibility, right?

723
00:41:38.388 --> 00:41:39.128
Like way back when.

724
00:41:40.089 --> 00:41:41.690
And like, there's an industry here.

725
00:41:42.190 --> 00:41:47.293
And so there's like a further rift between like the career cybersecurity and like the hacker culture cybersecurity.

726
00:41:47.573 --> 00:41:53.338
And so like this incident was like one of the first times that I've seen that like veil start to thin again.

727
00:41:53.678 --> 00:41:53.878
Right.

728
00:41:53.898 --> 00:42:00.883
And I started to see people on Twitter that like, I know, you know, in person being like free team PCP.

729
00:42:00.924 --> 00:42:03.566
They did nothing wrong because they just pointed out.

730
00:42:04.662 --> 00:42:10.646
This glaring flaw in the house of cards that is us all sharing JavaScript code on NPM.

731
00:42:10.886 --> 00:42:13.247
People have been screaming about this weakness forever.

732
00:42:13.327 --> 00:42:26.216
Companies exist specifically to try to scan your supply chain for vulnerabilities, but it all hinges upon the maintainers of those pieces of code that wind up at NPM.

733
00:42:26.476 --> 00:42:28.017
Their account's not getting compromised.

734
00:42:28.697 --> 00:42:36.023
And so the defense of it is, hey, you all finally woke up to how weak this whole system is.

735
00:42:36.043 --> 00:42:36.503
Right.

736
00:42:36.563 --> 00:42:37.984
I'm not saying I agree with it, but like.

737
00:42:38.004 --> 00:42:38.284
Yeah.

738
00:42:38.545 --> 00:42:39.425
No, I'm thinking about that.

739
00:42:39.485 --> 00:42:41.046
And like to a point, I agree.

740
00:42:41.106 --> 00:42:41.267
Right.

741
00:42:41.307 --> 00:42:41.927
So like I am.

742
00:42:43.575 --> 00:42:48.600
I am not from the exact same era as you, but I got into cybersecurity around the same time.

743
00:42:48.620 --> 00:42:49.040
Hey, come on.

744
00:42:49.060 --> 00:42:50.301
We've been very public about our ages.

745
00:42:50.321 --> 00:42:53.404
Fuck off, Matt.

746
00:42:53.564 --> 00:42:55.245
I graduated college in 2016.

747
00:42:55.265 --> 00:42:58.768
I got started with all this stuff in 2013 when I was in college, interning at various places, right?

748
00:42:59.169 --> 00:43:01.731
And so, like, I'm aware of that.

749
00:43:01.811 --> 00:43:02.832
I'm aware of that culture.

750
00:43:03.032 --> 00:43:04.013
I agree with that culture.

751
00:43:04.714 --> 00:43:07.756
And so with Team PCP, I think I would agree if they hadn't been, like –

752
00:43:08.617 --> 00:43:31.341
actively slurping up credentials now to be fair like they served up they slurped up credentials they were caught doing that but i'm not sure if i actually ever heard of them like selling them or using them they didn't you could argue they only slurped those up to propagate their access to further their point so i mean i i see the other side of this for sure i've been saying that since these incidents have been going on is i am waiting for the other shoe to drop right because i didn't

753
00:43:34.342 --> 00:43:42.685
I still don't know if they were doing it to be the hackers of old and show the flaw in the system and not actually profit from it.

754
00:43:43.026 --> 00:43:43.906
I don't know that.

755
00:43:44.406 --> 00:43:45.307
I don't know these guys.

756
00:43:45.327 --> 00:43:47.768
I don't know their manifesto.

757
00:43:48.128 --> 00:43:53.170
But I've been saying that about all of these incidents is the list of secrets that they steal—

758
00:43:53.890 --> 00:44:00.533
and they stole during all of the Shaihaloom versions, Shaihalood versions were massive.

759
00:44:00.593 --> 00:44:04.435
They weren't just GitHub and NPM secrets that allowed them to propagate, right?

760
00:44:04.455 --> 00:44:13.399
There was AWS creds, Kubernetes creds, crypto wallet, like the things, all the environment variables on every box they got on, right?

761
00:44:13.839 --> 00:44:19.082
And I said, we never saw anything but NPM and GitHub creds get used.

762
00:44:19.722 --> 00:44:22.423
as part of these attacks, which I was always like, what is going on?

763
00:44:22.443 --> 00:44:30.204
They're sitting on a treasure trove of information that could be used to do some other seriously nefarious stuff on prod systems.

764
00:44:30.244 --> 00:44:33.645
These NBM developers have day jobs, right?

765
00:44:33.785 --> 00:44:35.825
And like their dev boxes got compromised.

766
00:44:35.865 --> 00:44:42.626
You've got to imagine their cloud keys and everything that were part of those same boxes were also compromised and nothing ever happened.

767
00:44:43.267 --> 00:44:45.227
So this is when people are like, hey, they did nothing wrong.

768
00:44:45.747 --> 00:44:45.947
Right.

769
00:44:46.428 --> 00:44:53.273
And, and then other people are like, ha ha lol hackers, like, you know, improve your opsec, like get screwed.

770
00:44:53.633 --> 00:44:54.474
I can see it too.

771
00:44:54.754 --> 00:44:55.434
I can see it too.

772
00:44:55.594 --> 00:44:58.136
It just feels hackery of old to me.

773
00:44:58.196 --> 00:44:58.497
Right.

774
00:44:58.537 --> 00:45:06.402
Like, you know, I remember some of the really big hacks back in the day, like the TJ max had like some really, really big ones that like the person didn't profit.

775
00:45:06.422 --> 00:45:07.964
They, but they went down for it.

776
00:45:07.984 --> 00:45:10.686
They went to jail, but they did it because they could.

777
00:45:11.046 --> 00:45:13.167
And that was the only way to get the company to like, listen, listen,

778
00:45:14.268 --> 00:45:14.729
during the thing.

779
00:45:14.809 --> 00:45:15.650
It feels like that.

780
00:45:16.010 --> 00:45:16.851
It feels like that to me.

781
00:45:16.891 --> 00:45:17.392
It's kind of weird.

782
00:45:17.992 --> 00:45:25.240
Wasn't there one instance of this supply chain attack leading to a downstream app getting a exploit thrower cooked into it?

783
00:45:25.480 --> 00:45:26.842
Wasn't there one instance of that?

784
00:45:26.862 --> 00:45:27.983
But I don't know if it was Team PCP.

785
00:45:28.003 --> 00:45:32.148
Again, there were a variety of actors in the supply chain space at the beginning of this year.

786
00:45:32.603 --> 00:45:36.304
Yeah, North Korea copied their playbook pretty instantly.

787
00:45:36.465 --> 00:45:38.886
And what I'm talking about actually was crypto mining too.

788
00:45:39.006 --> 00:45:39.906
So that makes complete sense.

789
00:45:40.126 --> 00:45:45.308
Yeah, North Korea copied this exact playbook during this wave and did it themselves.

790
00:45:45.988 --> 00:45:47.949
So yeah, I'm not coming to the full defense.

791
00:45:48.109 --> 00:45:51.771
Obviously, this approach is on the other side of legal.

792
00:45:52.391 --> 00:45:52.951
You know what I mean?

793
00:45:53.471 --> 00:45:55.372
And caused a ton of...

794
00:45:57.573 --> 00:46:13.886
dollars time incident response lawyers like i mean a ton but the other thing that's kind of interesting is i think one of the two that was arrested got arrested just for like by association yeah it seems like two guys went down and one didn't do any of the hacking and so like

795
00:46:15.103 --> 00:46:15.503
I don't know.

796
00:46:15.744 --> 00:46:20.128
Obviously we don't have all the details of like the legal stuff going on in Australia, uh, of all of this.

797
00:46:20.568 --> 00:46:25.513
But I think one of them was just like in the discord telegram and like ran the Twitter account or something like that.

798
00:46:25.573 --> 00:46:25.773
Right.

799
00:46:25.793 --> 00:46:26.454
Like you mentioned.

800
00:46:27.015 --> 00:46:31.779
So like, if talking about this stuff is illegal, you and I are screwed too, you know?

801
00:46:32.100 --> 00:46:32.320
Right.

802
00:46:32.900 --> 00:46:34.963
Better not travel to Australia anytime soon.

803
00:46:35.563 --> 00:46:45.734
But either way, it's a really cool... John Hammond, friend of the show, has a really cool video talking about the investigation here and how they kind of peeled it back.

804
00:46:45.754 --> 00:46:49.998
If you're interested in OSINT techniques that were kind of used to tie this stuff together.

805
00:46:50.679 --> 00:46:55.862
even though we're kind of laughing at the simplicity of some of it, it's still, it's still very valid and worked.

806
00:46:56.082 --> 00:46:56.302
Right.

807
00:46:56.442 --> 00:46:58.583
And so like the work itself is cool.

808
00:46:58.763 --> 00:47:04.746
I enjoy that because like the hard part with this stuff is having all of the data and aggregating it all and doing the de-anonymization chaining.

809
00:47:05.006 --> 00:47:11.249
The funny part is like bro was committing one of the world's largest cyber crime networks.

810
00:47:11.269 --> 00:47:12.409
He was, he was running that network.

811
00:47:12.429 --> 00:47:17.772
He was doing gigantic spy chain attacks, comma, and also didn't exercise basic OPSEC.

812
00:47:17.872 --> 00:47:18.332
You know what I mean?

813
00:47:18.352 --> 00:47:21.374
It's just the juxtaposition of those two things is very funny to me.

814
00:47:21.414 --> 00:47:21.755
I find that.

815
00:47:21.775 --> 00:47:24.296
This is like Allison Nixon.

816
00:47:24.316 --> 00:47:25.557
We brought her up a few times on the show.

817
00:47:25.577 --> 00:47:27.438
She tracks the scattered spider threat actor group.

818
00:47:27.458 --> 00:47:32.381
And she she spoke recently and we talked about like a LinkedIn post of hers that kind of like alludes to.

819
00:47:33.362 --> 00:47:36.985
there isn't like a point in time where you can choose now I'm going to do OPSEC.

820
00:47:37.145 --> 00:47:37.346
Right.

821
00:47:37.966 --> 00:47:38.186
Right.

822
00:47:38.386 --> 00:47:40.308
This was the windows GDID thing.

823
00:47:40.348 --> 00:47:40.528
Right.

824
00:47:40.628 --> 00:47:44.151
It was basically like, Oh, well now I'm going to take this seriously.

825
00:47:44.231 --> 00:47:49.296
And it's like, there's always breadcrumbs like to your past, like your old gaming handles or something.

826
00:47:49.376 --> 00:47:49.616
Right.

827
00:47:49.676 --> 00:47:54.300
That like, you know, they're going to be able to tie it's just whether or not law enforcement cares enough.

828
00:47:54.460 --> 00:47:58.564
And obviously team PCP was disruptive enough for law enforcement to care enough.

829
00:47:58.844 --> 00:47:59.044
Right.

830
00:47:59.324 --> 00:47:59.865
Totally agree.

831
00:48:00.775 --> 00:48:00.975
All right.

832
00:48:01.095 --> 00:48:08.519
This next one I threw on here is from, is about this meter company that I didn't hear about until like 16 hours ago.

833
00:48:08.539 --> 00:48:10.060
And I wish I didn't know about them.

834
00:48:11.261 --> 00:48:12.722
It was just kind of a pain.

835
00:48:13.582 --> 00:48:14.463
Did you read about this?

836
00:48:14.743 --> 00:48:18.145
So there's two sides to this, to this story.

837
00:48:18.505 --> 00:48:22.347
Meter M E T R is a nonprofit like nonprofit,

838
00:48:23.329 --> 00:48:28.650
nonpartisan, like third party AI safety organization.

839
00:48:28.910 --> 00:48:31.031
For the audio listeners, he's putting this in air quotes, by the way.

840
00:48:31.231 --> 00:48:33.151
So listen with caution.

841
00:48:33.831 --> 00:48:34.771
Big thick air quotes.

842
00:48:35.011 --> 00:48:35.852
Right, right, right.

843
00:48:36.152 --> 00:48:38.052
Of them not being partisan, right?

844
00:48:38.332 --> 00:48:39.412
Unbiased, right?

845
00:48:40.112 --> 00:48:49.094
They've come out and said that they don't get paid, but they receive free usage of the AI platforms as part of their services, right?

846
00:48:49.554 --> 00:48:52.075
Which is being paid in my opinion.

847
00:48:52.195 --> 00:48:52.455
Anyway.

848
00:48:53.115 --> 00:49:01.341
Um, they, uh, were the ones, they, they do a lot of AI safety, like benchmarking and stuff and evaluation and stuff like that.

849
00:49:02.042 --> 00:49:08.566
But they were the ones that were actually called in to analyze the hugging face, open AI incident.

850
00:49:09.287 --> 00:49:10.968
They were the third party called, right?

851
00:49:11.549 --> 00:49:15.411
So friend of the show, Zach Corman, uh, made a video recently.

852
00:49:15.552 --> 00:49:16.052
We'll link it.

853
00:49:16.312 --> 00:49:16.592
Um, yeah.

854
00:49:17.705 --> 00:49:21.128
that talks about why wasn't cybersecurity called?

855
00:49:21.148 --> 00:49:23.690
Because Meter is not a cybersecurity company.

856
00:49:24.090 --> 00:49:30.715
We couldn't find anyone on staff that actually has a cybersecurity background at all there.

857
00:49:31.396 --> 00:49:40.403
So they kind of publicly are talking about the Hugging Face incident, and they're talking about it via the lens of the transcripts

858
00:49:41.517 --> 00:49:46.839
of the agent prompts and responses, I would say chat, but it's not the agents are talking to themselves, right?

859
00:49:46.859 --> 00:49:48.779
It's not like chat.com, right?

860
00:49:48.859 --> 00:49:53.901
It's, it's like going on beyond the scenes and agents are talking to agents and prompts and response.

861
00:49:54.101 --> 00:49:59.902
But just those transcripts of the agents, like prompts and responses is all that was evaluated.

862
00:50:00.843 --> 00:50:01.363
Turns out,

863
00:50:02.889 --> 00:50:08.515
If you had someone that was actually a cyber incident responder, they'd be like, how about the logs, please?

864
00:50:08.615 --> 00:50:09.156
Show logs, please.

865
00:50:09.176 --> 00:50:09.676
Hello.

866
00:50:09.716 --> 00:50:09.937
Yeah.

867
00:50:09.997 --> 00:50:10.237
What?

868
00:50:10.357 --> 00:50:17.425
Like, this is just what the layer at the chat and prompt level has chose to surface here.

869
00:50:17.686 --> 00:50:21.910
This isn't universal output of like what actually happened on these boxes.

870
00:50:21.930 --> 00:50:22.411
Yeah.

871
00:50:23.129 --> 00:50:26.554
network logs, server logs, like anything, like what commands were being run.

872
00:50:26.574 --> 00:50:33.584
Like it's not universal that every command that an agent runs like winds up back in the prompt, right?

873
00:50:33.604 --> 00:50:35.908
Like that's just not how these things work.

874
00:50:36.809 --> 00:50:37.110
So Zach,

875
00:50:38.071 --> 00:50:48.537
kind of makes the big point of like, hey, the cybersecurity industry is like increasingly being sidelined in a lot of these main like major AI safety conversations by the frontier AI companies.

876
00:50:48.977 --> 00:50:53.880
Sam Altman is the one writing these letters saying like, it's time to take cybersecurity seriously.

877
00:50:54.400 --> 00:50:55.201
Oh, really, Sam?

878
00:50:55.761 --> 00:50:58.463
Oh, really, Sam, what the hell have I been doing my whole career, right?

879
00:50:58.923 --> 00:51:03.366
Like, yeah, no, we've all been saying this since the get that we should be taking cybersecurity seriously.

880
00:51:03.406 --> 00:51:08.670
And especially with the AI amplification of speed and capability and all this kind of stuff going on right now.

881
00:51:09.811 --> 00:51:15.095
Why are they the ones that are like have the megaphone about the cybersecurity issue instead of like pulling in?

882
00:51:15.475 --> 00:51:19.458
I don't know, Unit 42 from Palo or CrowdStrike or Mandiant or like any of these like.

883
00:51:20.098 --> 00:51:24.582
Actual, this is what they do for a living type people to come and analyze this actual incident.

884
00:51:24.923 --> 00:51:27.145
There's a second part of this, and then I'll throw it over to you.

885
00:51:28.666 --> 00:51:36.073
In the wake of this, and probably maybe because of all the attention to Meter, they were actually compromised this week.

886
00:51:36.473 --> 00:51:41.358
And their API meter was compromised this week.

887
00:51:42.411 --> 00:51:53.056
And their API key was stolen, and the attackers racked up $600,000 worth of API usage to some of the AI models that, again, they get for free, right?

888
00:51:53.076 --> 00:51:57.938
So I don't know if this was actually a bill because they get some access to tokens for their services.

889
00:51:58.398 --> 00:52:00.699
But they had a massive cybersecurity incident.

890
00:52:01.100 --> 00:52:05.942
And the line, we don't have a ton of details about the incident, but we do have...

891
00:52:06.522 --> 00:52:18.014
that it was a vibe coded app that suffered from a fail open vulnerability that silently disabled authentication, causing the agent orchestration dashboard to be exposed to the public Internet for several days.

892
00:52:18.795 --> 00:52:21.238
And then you went to go click on this while you were getting ready for the show.

893
00:52:21.338 --> 00:52:26.704
And it seems like a lot of their transcript viewer API stuff is still just down right now because of this.

894
00:52:26.764 --> 00:52:26.944
Right.

895
00:52:27.264 --> 00:52:28.646
Yeah, it's not great.

896
00:52:29.283 --> 00:52:31.264
So what else about this one?

897
00:52:31.284 --> 00:52:36.467
What's your thoughts about Meter, them looking into this, the hugging face incident?

898
00:52:36.507 --> 00:52:37.188
What are you seeing here?

899
00:52:37.568 --> 00:52:38.688
I feel a bunch of ways about this.

900
00:52:38.788 --> 00:52:49.034
I saw Guillermo, I forget his first name, but the CEO of Ursel effectively make a tweet that he's like, with AI, we should no longer assume that vulnerabilities can occur.

901
00:52:49.394 --> 00:52:51.696
We should assume that everything is vulnerable.

902
00:52:51.776 --> 00:52:53.177
And what do we do now?

903
00:52:53.917 --> 00:53:02.381
And I'm like, brother, that has been the posture, the mental posture of every cybersecurity person for the last like 10 or 15 years.

904
00:53:02.681 --> 00:53:02.842
Ever.

905
00:53:03.582 --> 00:53:03.782
Ever.

906
00:53:03.862 --> 00:53:05.703
Like, again, I've only been in this for the last 10 or so years.

907
00:53:05.743 --> 00:53:08.965
But like, it's this whole thing where it's like, I find it very frustrating.

908
00:53:08.985 --> 00:53:11.046
But at the same time, this is just how economics works.

909
00:53:12.037 --> 00:53:16.498
security is a cost center until it is not right.

910
00:53:16.858 --> 00:53:21.319
No one gives a fuck about it until it becomes this big public ordeal.

911
00:53:21.439 --> 00:53:27.040
And then the people with the loudest megaphones that tend to not be security people are the ones that bring attention to it.

912
00:53:27.100 --> 00:53:27.300
Right.

913
00:53:27.740 --> 00:53:28.680
That has been my shtick.

914
00:53:28.700 --> 00:53:33.801
That is kind of like the whole point of my YouTube channel is not that vulnerabilities can occur.

915
00:53:34.241 --> 00:53:37.502
It's that everything is vulnerable all the time, always right now.

916
00:53:38.042 --> 00:53:38.642
What are the,

917
00:53:39.522 --> 00:53:47.069
mental attitudes, risk models, and postures you should have such that when a vulnerability is published, you know what to do about it, right?

918
00:53:47.370 --> 00:53:49.952
And I think, again, AI is just making this more obvious, okay?

919
00:53:49.972 --> 00:53:51.093
So, like, this is not a new thing.

920
00:53:51.113 --> 00:53:55.618
This is just things that we're now hearing about more publicly because Sam and Guillermo and others are talking about it.

921
00:53:56.355 --> 00:53:57.656
It's everything but more so, right?

922
00:53:57.856 --> 00:53:59.937
You're injecting steroids into the problem, right?

923
00:53:59.957 --> 00:54:00.177
Exactly.

924
00:54:00.318 --> 00:54:05.741
I also like, again, for the audio listeners, I can air quote the CEO of Rissell, Guillermo, whatever his name is.

925
00:54:05.821 --> 00:54:08.483
I can air quote the hell out of his expertise on this topic.

926
00:54:08.963 --> 00:54:10.324
They had a security incident this year.

927
00:54:10.644 --> 00:54:15.888
He tweeted about it and was like, this was some AI-powered super hacker that broke in or whatever.

928
00:54:15.968 --> 00:54:17.809
It was one of his developers installed a Chrome extension.

929
00:54:18.049 --> 00:54:20.291
Yeah, and it got like, I think so as well.

930
00:54:20.331 --> 00:54:20.511
Yeah.

931
00:54:20.571 --> 00:54:22.353
No, no off token or whatever.

932
00:54:22.413 --> 00:54:22.613
Right.

933
00:54:22.713 --> 00:54:23.974
There was no AI super hacker.

934
00:54:23.994 --> 00:54:26.497
And this was the CEO's actual public statement about it.

935
00:54:26.757 --> 00:54:26.917
Right.

936
00:54:26.957 --> 00:54:27.137
Right.

937
00:54:28.398 --> 00:54:28.899
So there's that.

938
00:54:29.099 --> 00:54:29.339
Okay.

939
00:54:29.439 --> 00:54:30.720
Now you kind of went into you.

940
00:54:30.800 --> 00:54:34.784
You may have triggered a tin hat conspiracy theory.

941
00:54:34.804 --> 00:54:35.084
Okay.

942
00:54:35.104 --> 00:54:37.046
So listen, you mentioned hugging face.

943
00:54:37.186 --> 00:54:37.446
All right.

944
00:54:37.486 --> 00:54:42.291
When we first went into this conversation about the hugging face incident, this may have been like four or five podcasts ago.

945
00:54:43.451 --> 00:54:47.233
I talked a little bit about was there collusion Russia gate?

946
00:54:47.253 --> 00:54:47.573
No, I'm kidding.

947
00:54:47.873 --> 00:54:48.914
Was there collusion?

948
00:54:49.694 --> 00:55:01.680
Did open AI and hugging face potentially collaborate to say reposition open AI mentally in either our heads or the defense department's heads as a capable cyber model?

949
00:55:01.801 --> 00:55:03.822
Now, your response, rightfully so, was Ed.

950
00:55:04.162 --> 00:55:04.402
Come on.

951
00:55:04.822 --> 00:55:14.973
the PR blunder that would be for Hugging Face, why would they possibly take on the revenue damages that would incur to that company?

952
00:55:15.254 --> 00:55:15.674
I'm ready.

953
00:55:15.794 --> 00:55:16.735
I'm ready for a butt.

954
00:55:16.996 --> 00:55:17.897
I'm ready for a butt.

955
00:55:18.197 --> 00:55:21.481
Matt, guess who just bought Hugging Face?

956
00:55:22.702 --> 00:55:24.864
fucking Jensen Wong and friends.

957
00:55:25.465 --> 00:55:27.887
NVIDIA just purchased Hugging Face, dude.

958
00:55:28.247 --> 00:55:35.013
Guess who also has been throwing around the same $100 million for the last two years?

959
00:55:35.454 --> 00:55:38.677
Jensen Wong, Microsoft, OpenAI, and Oracle, bro.

960
00:55:39.097 --> 00:55:43.299
So, of course, if they're sharing revenue, they're going to share damages.

961
00:55:43.639 --> 00:55:53.342
And if this repositions OpenAI as, like, the cybersecurity model for, like, to kick Mythos out of the reins of that, of course they would do this.

962
00:55:53.382 --> 00:55:54.563
Now, I'm not saying...

963
00:55:55.303 --> 00:55:56.244
We didn't go to the moon.

964
00:55:56.424 --> 00:55:57.464
I think we went to the moon, right?

965
00:55:58.045 --> 00:56:07.471
However, there was economic incentive to get the Russians to spend money on a space program that wouldn't work to collapse the Soviet economy.

966
00:56:07.731 --> 00:56:08.031
Okay?

967
00:56:08.252 --> 00:56:09.492
That's all I'm going to say about it.

968
00:56:09.532 --> 00:56:10.133
Matt, respond.

969
00:56:11.612 --> 00:56:12.793
I'm just asking questions.

970
00:56:12.833 --> 00:56:13.874
I'm just asking questions.

971
00:56:15.456 --> 00:56:16.397
Those are the rules.

972
00:56:16.457 --> 00:56:18.659
That's how we have to do it now.

973
00:56:18.679 --> 00:56:19.920
What's that Tucker impression?

974
00:56:19.940 --> 00:56:20.761
I don't know the Tucker quote.

975
00:56:20.781 --> 00:56:23.704
You always bring up Tucker, and I'm not a Tucker listener, by the way.

976
00:56:24.024 --> 00:56:29.950
No, me neither, but there was a really good SNL impression by him recently, but he was famously like...

977
00:56:30.490 --> 00:56:31.670
I'm not saying this is it.

978
00:56:31.710 --> 00:56:32.771
I'm just asking questions.

979
00:56:32.831 --> 00:56:33.151
Right.

980
00:56:33.371 --> 00:56:34.951
Yeah.

981
00:56:35.091 --> 00:56:36.372
There's a really good SNL impression.

982
00:56:36.392 --> 00:56:37.432
He goes, those are the rules.

983
00:56:37.692 --> 00:56:39.573
Like that's what, that's the way it is now.

984
00:56:40.153 --> 00:56:41.253
I can't, I can't do the impression.

985
00:56:41.753 --> 00:56:42.994
Uh, I still don't think so.

986
00:56:43.134 --> 00:56:56.278
Obviously there is like the surge protector plugged into itself of the investment of like all of their valuations and like all the money being passed between these like multi-trillion dollar companies is very like, what the hell?

987
00:56:56.438 --> 00:56:56.778
Like, right.

988
00:56:56.958 --> 00:56:57.618
What did you say?

989
00:56:57.658 --> 00:56:58.439
Like, really?

990
00:56:58.899 --> 00:57:04.401
Literally when I saw the article that Nvidia bought Hugging Face, I'm like, brother, no way.

991
00:57:04.602 --> 00:57:04.882
What?

992
00:57:05.082 --> 00:57:07.883
Also for like big bucks, right?

993
00:57:07.903 --> 00:57:09.724
Like $13 billion or something like that.

994
00:57:10.044 --> 00:57:15.467
I saw the breakdown of all the investors and what they were going to make on their investment for Hugging Face.

995
00:57:15.567 --> 00:57:19.248
And then the founders, the founder, I think it's two or three founders walked away with $3 billion.

996
00:57:20.629 --> 00:57:22.692
founders still weren't even diluted enough.

997
00:57:22.792 --> 00:57:24.213
They got 3 billion.

998
00:57:25.335 --> 00:57:26.056
Yeah.

999
00:57:26.096 --> 00:57:26.316
Yeah.

1000
00:57:26.336 --> 00:57:27.417
That's a, that's a real number.

1001
00:57:27.437 --> 00:57:27.958
That's a real number.

1002
00:57:28.178 --> 00:57:33.284
Hey, uh, NVIDIA podcasting is the net is the future of media, by the way.

1003
00:57:33.304 --> 00:57:37.128
Um, YouTube channels on this particular topic.

1004
00:57:37.349 --> 00:57:39.611
Listen, if, if, if low level and I show up,

1005
00:57:40.693 --> 00:57:47.195
fully decked out in NVIDIA swag one week, and we get fully AI pilled, just know what happened.

1006
00:57:47.395 --> 00:57:49.315
We're not above the...

1007
00:57:49.556 --> 00:57:54.577
I will buy a NASCAR car, and I will put the NVIDIA logo on the windshield for $3 billion.

1008
00:57:54.597 --> 00:57:55.497
Are you kidding?

1009
00:57:55.637 --> 00:57:56.678
Come on, brother.

1010
00:57:56.698 --> 00:57:57.518
Let's go.

1011
00:57:58.338 --> 00:57:58.898
I have a number.

1012
00:57:58.978 --> 00:58:00.699
I have a number and it's way less than $3 billion.

1013
00:58:00.719 --> 00:58:01.480
That's so funny.

1014
00:58:01.740 --> 00:58:02.501
That's so funny.

1015
00:58:03.141 --> 00:58:04.602
I am not from Zim Money.

1016
00:58:05.582 --> 00:58:08.464
Yeah, you can hit the Matt becomes post economic button.

1017
00:58:08.604 --> 00:58:12.266
And this all turns into a very, very different channel.

1018
00:58:12.426 --> 00:58:16.249
And there is no pile of YouTube comments that will turn me otherwise.

1019
00:58:16.489 --> 00:58:18.130
Matt disappears from the face of the earth.

1020
00:58:18.535 --> 00:58:18.815
Yeah.

1021
00:58:18.936 --> 00:58:20.497
So no, no, no, no.

1022
00:58:20.717 --> 00:58:23.320
Like they're, they're probably buying me for, for this.

1023
00:58:24.501 --> 00:58:27.464
But I all of a sudden get a whole lot less critical of AI.

1024
00:58:27.905 --> 00:58:31.889
So speaking of being critical of AI, there's we've been a lot, like we had a lot of stories to cover today.

1025
00:58:31.909 --> 00:58:34.091
So I've been trying to lump them in our, in our show notes here.

1026
00:58:34.452 --> 00:58:37.355
And this one, not quite related, but like,

1027
00:58:37.935 --> 00:58:44.781
So Meter had their token stolen and a bunch of people hijacked their usage in the tune of hundreds of thousands of dollars.

1028
00:58:45.301 --> 00:58:57.652
Turns out other people are doing that now as well, to the point where it's a new main use case for info stealer malware, like big popular info stealer malware that you and I have talked about for years as part of this.

1029
00:58:58.332 --> 00:59:04.014
Tons of cybersecurity instruments, uh, info stealer malware that you've heard the name of probably Luma and some of these other ones.

1030
00:59:04.494 --> 00:59:13.938
They now have new major functionality just for stealing your Claude session in order to rack up usage on your Claude account.

1031
00:59:14.658 --> 00:59:23.081
Um, it's like a new behavior that we're seeing out of Vidar, Luma C2, Steel C, Redline and other popular info stealers.

1032
00:59:23.341 --> 00:59:24.161
Oh, it's so dumb.

1033
00:59:24.282 --> 00:59:24.782
I don't get it.

1034
00:59:25.022 --> 00:59:26.363
Like, sure, you got me.

1035
00:59:26.463 --> 00:59:27.043
You know what I mean?

1036
00:59:27.063 --> 00:59:28.844
Like, you made me spend some money.

1037
00:59:29.364 --> 00:59:32.045
It's more creative than crypto mining.

1038
00:59:32.106 --> 00:59:33.726
So I applaud it.

1039
00:59:33.866 --> 00:59:34.287
Thank you.

1040
00:59:34.447 --> 00:59:41.010
Thank you for doing something that isn't mining like 17 cents of Monero before I boot you off of my crappy laptop.

1041
00:59:41.130 --> 00:59:42.231
That's right.

1042
00:59:42.791 --> 00:59:45.752
Should we talk about, guys, I think we're going to go long today.

1043
00:59:45.832 --> 00:59:46.673
Let's just go long today.

1044
00:59:46.793 --> 00:59:47.373
We're going to go long.

1045
00:59:47.653 --> 00:59:48.514
We have a lot to talk about.

1046
00:59:49.034 --> 00:59:49.775
What year is it?

1047
00:59:50.115 --> 00:59:52.696
Every time you and I think about the old days, we've talked about this.

1048
00:59:52.856 --> 00:59:57.019
We were like, you think about 2009, I think about 2003, and that's almost our exact age difference.

1049
00:59:57.039 --> 00:59:58.440
Yeah, 2009 was when I peaked.

1050
00:59:58.680 --> 00:59:59.580
I was in high school.

1051
01:00:00.041 --> 01:00:05.364
I was playing Wrath of the Lich King every day with my friends after benching 135 in my friend's basement.

1052
01:00:05.424 --> 01:00:06.525
Like, it's just where I peaked, bro.

1053
01:00:06.545 --> 01:00:06.945
You know what?

1054
01:00:07.145 --> 01:00:09.086
Post-economic, that's what we're going to do again.

1055
01:00:09.106 --> 01:00:12.268
Okay, by the way, we're going to do a whole lot less sponsor ads.

1056
01:00:12.288 --> 01:00:14.909
We're going to do a whole lot more Wrath of the Lich King streams.

1057
01:00:15.070 --> 01:00:15.490
Let's go.

1058
01:00:15.950 --> 01:00:18.811
Um, so, uh, what's old is new again.

1059
01:00:19.691 --> 01:00:22.792
Nigerians are like the Kings of scams right now.

1060
01:00:22.832 --> 01:00:24.432
I mean, it was like a meme forever, right?

1061
01:00:24.452 --> 01:00:26.432
The Nigerian Prince, the Nigerian princes.

1062
01:00:26.492 --> 01:00:27.092
Yes.

1063
01:00:27.212 --> 01:00:28.073
Oh my God.

1064
01:00:28.173 --> 01:00:30.973
And is like, is ready to like, you know, whatever.

1065
01:00:32.214 --> 01:00:35.794
Nigeria is still like King of scam central.

1066
01:00:36.154 --> 01:00:39.195
And we're seeing a bunch of it this week in like really serious ways.

1067
01:00:39.235 --> 01:00:41.656
We'll, should I start with the more serious or the less serious one?

1068
01:00:41.996 --> 01:00:43.356
Uh, let's go less serious and ramp up.

1069
01:00:44.109 --> 01:00:53.495
Okay, less serious is 404 Media did a cool story about how some cyber sleuths actually tracked down some of these scammers to Nigeria.

1070
01:00:53.515 --> 01:00:57.658
And they actually got on a plane to Nigeria to like try to track them down for a YouTube video.

1071
01:00:57.978 --> 01:01:00.200
We are such rookie bullshit YouTubers.

1072
01:01:00.260 --> 01:01:09.526
Why does anyone watch us when there's people flying to freaking Nigeria to like meta Ray-Ban knock on doors of Nigeria scammers?

1073
01:01:09.746 --> 01:01:10.566
What are we doing?

1074
01:01:10.606 --> 01:01:11.407
We are lazy.

1075
01:01:11.787 --> 01:01:12.748
But that's what happened.

1076
01:01:13.108 --> 01:01:18.230
And they did it in like really stupid, silly OPSEC failure ways as well.

1077
01:01:18.671 --> 01:01:20.371
I like the YouTube thumbnail of this.

1078
01:01:20.431 --> 01:01:21.872
I was just going to comment on the thumbnail.

1079
01:01:21.892 --> 01:01:23.033
Oh, my God, it's perfect.

1080
01:01:23.153 --> 01:01:24.053
The YouTube thumbnail.

1081
01:01:24.093 --> 01:01:28.435
This guy, the hacker, has like a multi-monitor setup, but there's CRT monitors.

1082
01:01:28.715 --> 01:01:28.955
Yes.

1083
01:01:29.075 --> 01:01:33.497
It's like this old CRT monitor with a face with a Facebook thing.

1084
01:01:33.517 --> 01:01:35.597
It's obviously AI generated thumbnail, but it's super funny.

1085
01:01:35.617 --> 01:01:36.498
Yeah.

1086
01:01:37.018 --> 01:01:47.021
So they, they track them down the old fashioned way, sending them like setting traps, making fake profiles that like align with their right targets.

1087
01:01:47.822 --> 01:01:54.344
So like young, young people that might fall into a scheme that,

1088
01:01:55.196 --> 01:01:58.197
The scheme here, it just happens over and over again.

1089
01:01:58.438 --> 01:02:14.845
And you're going to see where the ramp up to the more serious gets on the next story is they get, they trick young guys into like getting into like a romantic type text message relationship with them to get them to send compromising photos of themselves or videos of themselves.

1090
01:02:15.085 --> 01:02:16.646
And all those industry dick pics.

1091
01:02:18.747 --> 01:02:19.467
explicit tag.

1092
01:02:20.948 --> 01:02:22.688
Hey, cooling towels sponsor.

1093
01:02:22.848 --> 01:02:24.289
You want to be on part of this podcast?

1094
01:02:25.209 --> 01:02:30.871
No, we're going to get like Carhartt sock sponsorships.

1095
01:02:30.951 --> 01:02:31.991
Oh my God.

1096
01:02:32.171 --> 01:02:43.794
So the, they immediately flip the script and extort the young individual who just sent the compromising photos to, you know, pay them or they're going to leak all this stuff.

1097
01:02:43.954 --> 01:02:44.174
Right.

1098
01:02:44.775 --> 01:02:46.075
So this is really,

1099
01:02:46.455 --> 01:02:51.920
uh, it's kind of a plague against like teenage people who are falling for this.

1100
01:02:52.000 --> 01:02:54.062
It really, really messes up a lot of their lives.

1101
01:02:54.122 --> 01:02:54.302
Yeah.

1102
01:02:54.322 --> 01:02:56.063
So like trigger warning suicide, right?

1103
01:02:56.084 --> 01:02:57.565
Like this is like a real issue.

1104
01:02:57.585 --> 01:02:58.846
And we're going to get to that in a sec.

1105
01:02:58.866 --> 01:03:03.350
There's like a tail end of the story, but these people set up these fake lore profiles.

1106
01:03:03.570 --> 01:03:04.050
They get, uh,

1107
01:03:05.351 --> 01:03:13.518
They get into these text messages with the scammers, and then they just do the old-fashioned send them a website that gets their IP address.

1108
01:03:13.958 --> 01:03:18.041
And then that got a certain bit of information about their IP and general location.

1109
01:03:19.282 --> 01:03:19.762
But then they...

1110
01:03:20.943 --> 01:03:27.165
the people that they had hook, line, and sinker, they started sending further and further lures on WhatsApp.

1111
01:03:27.565 --> 01:03:42.550
And some of them were even some of the stuff that we were talking about earlier, like identity, fake identity verification type stuff to like access certain bits of information and got them to do the face scan thing and the ID scan thing to get information about these scammers.

1112
01:03:43.010 --> 01:03:44.391
And they went and tried to confront them.

1113
01:03:44.791 --> 01:03:47.792
Spoiler on the video, they didn't actually get

1114
01:03:48.312 --> 01:03:50.514
like to confront any of these people face to face.

1115
01:03:50.554 --> 01:03:52.615
These people obviously avoided the crap out of them.

1116
01:03:52.635 --> 01:03:54.076
Didn't like come to the door and talk to them.

1117
01:03:55.918 --> 01:04:05.945
The, uh, the more serious tail end of this is that, uh, yes, the, in some of the more extreme cases of this, they call it sextortion, right?

1118
01:04:06.005 --> 01:04:09.447
Extortion via like sex crimes type stuff.

1119
01:04:09.927 --> 01:04:12.529
Uh, a lot of these kids are killing themselves.

1120
01:04:12.890 --> 01:04:16.932
And a few of these Nigerians actually got extradited.

1121
01:04:17.033 --> 01:04:17.513
Thank God.

1122
01:04:17.733 --> 01:04:19.854
Yes, this is not Team PCP.

1123
01:04:19.914 --> 01:04:22.816
No one is coming to the defense of these type people.

1124
01:04:24.197 --> 01:04:27.378
And so these people got extorted, extradited, I'm sorry.

1125
01:04:27.659 --> 01:04:34.823
They got extradited to the U.S. to face prison time for these deaths as responsible for these deaths.

1126
01:04:35.688 --> 01:04:44.871
The other reason that this is an interesting topic to talk about, besides just like Nigerian scam stuff, is the major threat actor groups that we talk a lot about, the Calm, Shiny Hunters, whatever.

1127
01:04:45.131 --> 01:04:47.292
This is also part of their MO.

1128
01:04:47.372 --> 01:04:50.973
This is also how they recruit young males to their thing.

1129
01:04:50.993 --> 01:04:54.755
Instead of extorting money out of them, they'll extort cybercrime out of them.

1130
01:04:55.575 --> 01:05:01.179
Um, they'll, this is like one of the ways that they'll like, there's a lot of infighting on these threat actor groups.

1131
01:05:01.420 --> 01:05:03.581
Like they'll, they do a lot of physical violence.

1132
01:05:03.621 --> 01:05:04.902
Nowadays they'll actually show up.

1133
01:05:04.922 --> 01:05:05.683
They call it bricking.

1134
01:05:05.703 --> 01:05:07.284
They'll throw bricks through people's windows.

1135
01:05:08.085 --> 01:05:16.111
Uh, they'll try to beat people up and threaten them, uh, with violence to, for, to unlock their crypto wallets to like drain people.

1136
01:05:16.351 --> 01:05:23.096
There's a lot of like really, and it's the same groups, the same groups that are doing the cyber attacks that we're talking about also do this other stuff.

1137
01:05:23.917 --> 01:05:24.057
Um,

1138
01:05:25.023 --> 01:05:28.665
And there are some particularly more violent subgroups in the comm.

1139
01:05:29.306 --> 01:05:31.347
One's called like 764 or 754.

1140
01:05:31.367 --> 01:05:33.368
I can't remember off the top of my head.

1141
01:05:33.869 --> 01:05:35.109
But they're big on this.

1142
01:05:35.129 --> 01:05:36.410
They're big on sextortion.

1143
01:05:36.890 --> 01:05:41.193
One group that, again, to bring up Allison Nixon, because she's just the goat in tracking these guys down.

1144
01:05:41.333 --> 01:05:44.655
I watched a presentation of hers at SleuthCon, a conference all about cybercrime.

1145
01:05:45.756 --> 01:05:48.518
And she talked about how at one point...

1146
01:05:49.238 --> 01:05:53.501
They were sextorting one of these guys, their victims, right?

1147
01:05:53.561 --> 01:05:55.643
Who was just another young kid in the gaming discord.

1148
01:05:56.243 --> 01:06:01.287
And at the same time, they were like threatening his girlfriend's school.

1149
01:06:01.747 --> 01:06:09.353
And like his school had to evacuate while they were like getting heard the girlfriend to self-harm while extorting.

1150
01:06:09.753 --> 01:06:12.215
It was this massive campaign to just like mess with this kid.

1151
01:06:13.636 --> 01:06:16.178
So these are like really, really not good people that we're talking about here.

1152
01:06:16.438 --> 01:06:23.440
Yeah, and it's good to see finally in scenarios like that people actually getting extradited, going to jail, getting I mean, there's pictures of them getting rolled up literally at the airport, which is nice.

1153
01:06:23.460 --> 01:06:24.401
Yeah, it's good.

1154
01:06:24.421 --> 01:06:24.601
Yeah.

1155
01:06:24.641 --> 01:06:25.141
Nigeria.

1156
01:06:25.521 --> 01:06:28.522
Luckily, there is extradition stuff going on here, right?

1157
01:06:28.542 --> 01:06:32.664
It's not the Eastern European black hole that like we never, ever hear from these threat actors again.

1158
01:06:32.684 --> 01:06:33.304
Yeah.

1159
01:06:33.908 --> 01:06:38.671
all right, man, I've been yapping enough, like certified pre-owned section of the podcast.

1160
01:06:38.751 --> 01:06:41.352
I just can't get enough of that term because we just keep talking about it.

1161
01:06:41.372 --> 01:06:45.935
There's more and more stuff about routers and streaming devices and stuff coming with packages.

1162
01:06:45.955 --> 01:06:46.935
What's going on now?

1163
01:06:46.975 --> 01:06:49.397
And it keeps getting, it keeps getting worse, right?

1164
01:06:49.417 --> 01:06:54.380
This is one of those things that you would think like as time goes on, vendor trust would go up.

1165
01:06:55.120 --> 01:07:01.962
users would pile more and more into a smaller set of vendors, and therefore they wouldn't buy these weird kind of like off-the-wall vendors.

1166
01:07:02.003 --> 01:07:02.223
Okay.

1167
01:07:02.703 --> 01:07:06.744
Now, on my YouTube channel, I talk a lot about vulnerabilities and backdoors.

1168
01:07:06.844 --> 01:07:07.064
Okay.

1169
01:07:07.084 --> 01:07:08.925
Now, to be very clear, those are separate things.

1170
01:07:08.965 --> 01:07:12.966
I think we commonly clump together a vulnerability with a backdoor.

1171
01:07:12.986 --> 01:07:16.268
I made a video about this recently, but I gave the example of like in 2024 –

1172
01:07:17.728 --> 01:07:26.333
There's a Windows 11 vulnerability that because of an IPv6 fragmentation issue, you could get RCE in the Windows kernel, okay, remotely, like on-off, like really, really bad.

1173
01:07:27.374 --> 01:07:30.176
Now, some people in the industry may call it a backdoor.

1174
01:07:30.416 --> 01:07:33.018
Well, for that to truly be a backdoor by the definition of a backdoor…

1175
01:07:33.558 --> 01:07:43.928
There would have to be intent by Microsoft to leave that vulnerability there to enable some third-party actor, intelligence agency, whatever, to use that vulnerability to get into Windows, okay?

1176
01:07:44.269 --> 01:07:51.376
And while that may be the case in some scenarios, I think generally it is truly just a issue that Microsoft had where they left bad code in.

1177
01:07:51.536 --> 01:07:52.237
Shit happens, right?

1178
01:07:52.257 --> 01:07:53.198
Their fuzzers missed it, whatever.

1179
01:07:53.298 --> 01:07:54.059
I wrote some of those fuzzers.

1180
01:07:54.099 --> 01:07:54.659
It's easy to do.

1181
01:07:54.719 --> 01:07:54.819
Okay.

1182
01:07:54.839 --> 01:07:54.960
Okay.

1183
01:07:55.653 --> 01:08:05.736
The definition of a backdoor is manufacturer leaves in functionality such that third-party actor can get in in the future with secret knowledge that the consumer doesn't know about.

1184
01:08:05.836 --> 01:08:06.076
Okay.

1185
01:08:06.756 --> 01:08:10.037
Made a video on this and this Tenda AC 1200, right?

1186
01:08:10.297 --> 01:08:14.658
Literally predictable password on this for the root account that you can use.

1187
01:08:14.878 --> 01:08:16.098
That's a function of the MAC address.

1188
01:08:16.198 --> 01:08:19.099
MAC address being generally either publicly available or brute forceable.

1189
01:08:19.399 --> 01:08:20.920
You can use that to tell it to the device, right?

1190
01:08:20.940 --> 01:08:21.760
Literally a backdoor.

1191
01:08:22.200 --> 01:08:26.204
The threat model here, though, is to be able to use this backdoor, they have to be in my home.

1192
01:08:26.244 --> 01:08:28.346
It'd be on the Wi-Fi network, on this router.

1193
01:08:28.886 --> 01:08:30.547
Not really that big of a deal.

1194
01:08:30.567 --> 01:08:31.008
Not great.

1195
01:08:31.128 --> 01:08:31.728
Not good.

1196
01:08:31.769 --> 01:08:32.509
Not bad, obviously.

1197
01:08:33.270 --> 01:08:34.911
The story we're talking about today, guys, is...

1198
01:08:34.931 --> 01:08:36.533
I don't know if you've been on Amazon recently.

1199
01:08:36.553 --> 01:08:38.414
You probably have if you're in the U.S.

1200
01:08:38.955 --> 01:08:40.776
There's this weird trend where, like, these...

1201
01:08:41.832 --> 01:08:48.675
No name manufacturers of electronics, networking devices in particular, are showing up on Amazon.

1202
01:08:48.855 --> 01:08:57.679
OK, and so this researcher, I think he's actually literally the CTO of Volncheck, bought this AX3000 dual SIM 5G Wi-Fi 6 router.

1203
01:08:57.699 --> 01:09:01.800
Say that five times fast from this company called ZBT Link.

1204
01:09:01.900 --> 01:09:07.523
OK, ZBT Link is a no name, literally like a Spotify or a Shopify dropshipper from Shanghai, China.

1205
01:09:08.363 --> 01:09:16.390
He ripped off the firmware of this device and sure as shit, there was a binary there that wasn't just like a hard coded password backdoor for someone to log into the device.

1206
01:09:17.070 --> 01:09:26.238
The device had a piece of malware in it that was actively beaconing out to Alibaba cloud that would allow Alibaba to get a shell on the device.

1207
01:09:26.258 --> 01:09:27.379
This thing beaconed out every 35 seconds.

1208
01:09:27.399 --> 01:09:27.499
And,

1209
01:09:28.580 --> 01:09:36.222
And it'd be one thing to be like, oh, sorry, we left in this debug manufacturer, like, you know, user assistance backdoor.

1210
01:09:36.622 --> 01:09:47.224
They literally renamed the binary inside the firmware image K-worker, which means they were trying to conceal the fact this binary was there and running as a kernel thread.

1211
01:09:47.744 --> 01:09:47.945
Right.

1212
01:09:47.965 --> 01:09:49.105
So they not only left in the malware.

1213
01:09:49.125 --> 01:09:49.245
Right.

1214
01:09:50.204 --> 01:09:51.566
tried to conceal it as a kernel thread.

1215
01:09:52.367 --> 01:10:00.638
And then if you actually go to the ZBT link website right now for a video, I was trying to reverse engineer the firmware to like pull this thing out and show, show my viewers.

1216
01:10:01.279 --> 01:10:05.785
If you go to the firmware download website right now for ZBT link, let me see if I can find it.

1217
01:10:06.586 --> 01:10:12.333
They said, oh, sorry, we're aware of the of the backdoor found in our firmware.

1218
01:10:12.814 --> 01:10:20.622
Actually, it was a debug instance to only help out consumers with their consent if they needed it are bad on that.

1219
01:10:20.723 --> 01:10:25.468
And so they tried to disable firmware downloads for further analysis of the researchers.

1220
01:10:25.768 --> 01:10:30.753
Turns out their actual website, the Shopify front end, still has the firmware downloads.

1221
01:10:30.773 --> 01:10:31.994
You can download it and go look right now.

1222
01:10:32.074 --> 01:10:36.578
And Volncheck has the research to like the links to go and download this firmware.

1223
01:10:37.039 --> 01:10:40.662
And so in making this video, this article came out like August 5th of this year.

1224
01:10:41.042 --> 01:10:44.565
I literally all I did was I clicked on the dude's name who wrote this article.

1225
01:10:44.585 --> 01:10:45.566
Like I said before, what's his name?

1226
01:10:45.787 --> 01:10:47.368
It's I'm pulling it up as we go through.

1227
01:10:47.408 --> 01:10:48.149
Jacob Baines, right?

1228
01:10:48.189 --> 01:10:48.909
CTO of Volncheck.

1229
01:10:49.650 --> 01:11:01.701
If you go to his Twitter right now, literally four days ago, he bought a different Amazon router looking for the same backdoor, the presumption being that the dropshipper is doing, like, nefarious installs on all these models.

1230
01:11:02.102 --> 01:11:06.686
He found a different variant of backdoor that was also beaconing out on the Baba Cloud.

1231
01:11:06.826 --> 01:11:07.107
Okay, cool.

1232
01:11:07.727 --> 01:11:09.128
So what is kind of the takeaway here?

1233
01:11:09.148 --> 01:11:12.490
I try to have takeaways for all my little, like, rants and stories, both in the podcast on YouTube.

1234
01:11:12.770 --> 01:11:16.553
Guys, please, for the love of God, don't buy routers off Amazon.

1235
01:11:16.833 --> 01:11:17.714
Go to Best Buy.

1236
01:11:17.894 --> 01:11:19.735
Buy a reputable manufacturer.

1237
01:11:19.815 --> 01:11:25.619
Like, I'm not sponsored by these guys, but, like, I don't know, Netgear, Ubiquiti, Asus, maybe, right?

1238
01:11:25.739 --> 01:11:26.820
Not TP-Link, not Tenda.

1239
01:11:27.640 --> 01:11:34.845
Because I think we're kind of starting to see the supply chain world, not only in, like, NPM cargo land go up, but also, like...

1240
01:11:35.345 --> 01:11:40.070
you buy a router from enemy of nation, you might get some extra features in there too.

1241
01:11:40.330 --> 01:11:42.092
It's just kind of like an egregious, like, holy shit.

1242
01:11:42.112 --> 01:11:47.357
This is like, like worst case scenario from both a complicity standpoint and also like functionality standpoint.

1243
01:11:48.285 --> 01:11:52.248
Yeah, there seems to be a lot of this, not even just like the no name routers.

1244
01:11:52.488 --> 01:12:01.195
Obviously, we talked about even like LG TVs apps that you install, like would get you as part of like residential proxies services.

1245
01:12:01.235 --> 01:12:06.699
They had to like purge all that, like 43% of all the apps in the freaking LG TV store.

1246
01:12:06.719 --> 01:12:08.140
I mean, that's ridiculous, right?

1247
01:12:08.340 --> 01:12:13.022
I love how we're calling it residential proxy now, like by reflex to botnet guys.

1248
01:12:13.182 --> 01:12:15.243
Not that you, not for you, but I'm saying like, no, you're right.

1249
01:12:15.363 --> 01:12:17.424
Five years ago, we would have called that a botnet.

1250
01:12:17.444 --> 01:12:18.044
You know what I mean?

1251
01:12:18.064 --> 01:12:19.965
No, it is like, you're right.

1252
01:12:20.085 --> 01:12:25.267
It's so normalized that it like turned into like a business or whatever that you can buy these residential proxy services.

1253
01:12:25.307 --> 01:12:25.688
You're right.

1254
01:12:25.828 --> 01:12:27.729
Like they're just getting added to a botnet.

1255
01:12:28.609 --> 01:12:30.330
There's another one literally just came out.

1256
01:12:31.479 --> 01:12:43.872
yesterday from ours talking about this is like another pile of devices off of Amazon, I guess, that do this, where it's these devices that are offering like free streaming services.

1257
01:12:44.685 --> 01:12:44.865
Yeah.

1258
01:12:44.945 --> 01:12:49.568
Like, so it's like, oh, this one is called a Superbox S7 Pro.

1259
01:12:49.869 --> 01:12:52.150
How are they not getting sued to oblivion for the S7?

1260
01:12:52.230 --> 01:12:53.711
Isn't that a isn't that an Android phone?

1261
01:12:54.011 --> 01:12:54.272
S7?

1262
01:12:54.412 --> 01:12:55.593
Yeah, the Samsung S7, I think.

1263
01:12:55.613 --> 01:12:56.053
Yeah, right.

1264
01:12:56.093 --> 01:12:58.234
Like, how are they not getting sued to crap about that?

1265
01:12:58.575 --> 01:13:00.436
But anyway, I mean, same thing.

1266
01:13:00.516 --> 01:13:04.919
This thing like is offering you free Netflix, basically, if you buy this thing.

1267
01:13:04.959 --> 01:13:05.680
And all it is.

1268
01:13:06.480 --> 01:13:06.820
That's it.

1269
01:13:07.401 --> 01:13:08.822
There's no legitimate purpose here.

1270
01:13:08.942 --> 01:13:15.807
It's just a device that you're bringing home and it's certified, like certified pre-owned.

1271
01:13:16.907 --> 01:13:18.228
It's just got malware on it.

1272
01:13:18.268 --> 01:13:20.350
As soon as you go into it, have you looked at this one?

1273
01:13:20.870 --> 01:13:21.771
No, I'm just pulling this up now.

1274
01:13:22.431 --> 01:13:22.992
This one's new to me.

1275
01:13:23.774 --> 01:13:24.214
Yeah, no.

1276
01:13:24.315 --> 01:13:29.299
So it's like, again, it's just these like stupid Android boxes, right?

1277
01:13:29.319 --> 01:13:33.923
That you're getting that are just sideloaded with all sorts of crap on them.

1278
01:13:34.383 --> 01:13:34.803
And that's it.

1279
01:13:34.984 --> 01:13:35.564
It's just malware.

1280
01:13:35.804 --> 01:13:37.546
Like there's no, there's no legitimate purpose.

1281
01:13:37.906 --> 01:13:45.012
So, I mean, like we could literally have, it feels like we have a reoccurring segment on the show now about this because it's just so prevalent right now.

1282
01:13:45.092 --> 01:13:48.195
So please, I mean, please, if you're listening, right.

1283
01:13:48.435 --> 01:13:49.416
Just like, yeah,

1284
01:13:49.694 --> 01:13:51.615
like low level said, buy reputable stuff.

1285
01:13:52.015 --> 01:14:01.497
If you do buy reputable stuff that has app stores like LG, don't install apps from no name developers that are like a random game on your TV or something like that, right?

1286
01:14:01.577 --> 01:14:05.038
Like go ahead and also buy yourself an Apple TV.

1287
01:14:05.059 --> 01:14:06.599
It's worth every dollar.

1288
01:14:06.899 --> 01:14:07.459
So worth it.

1289
01:14:07.559 --> 01:14:07.939
Oh my God.

1290
01:14:07.979 --> 01:14:16.202
Like the responsiveness of a, of a T like of a outside like device, like an Apple TV versus the built-in smart TV crap.

1291
01:14:17.182 --> 01:14:21.964
I wish I could buy an LG TV or a Samsung TV with no operating system whatsoever.

1292
01:14:22.024 --> 01:14:26.865
Just give me like the raw hardware of that thing and let me use my freaking Apple.

1293
01:14:27.766 --> 01:14:29.466
But yeah, this stuff is just all over the place.

1294
01:14:29.926 --> 01:14:30.587
Never ends, man.

1295
01:14:31.127 --> 01:14:32.347
We decided to not talk about it.

1296
01:14:32.547 --> 01:14:33.848
I just want to mention it really quick.

1297
01:14:34.508 --> 01:14:45.772
We've talked about this a ton, this J frog artifactory volumes that were like kind of in the wake of a lot of the the AI hugging face incident stuff that they were part of that whole conversation.

1298
01:14:46.312 --> 01:14:51.954
There's been a bunch of exploits either from that or around that that are now being actively exploited in the wild.

1299
01:14:52.594 --> 01:14:53.754
We don't do breached porn.

1300
01:14:53.794 --> 01:14:54.914
We kind of do vuln porn.

1301
01:14:55.134 --> 01:14:57.535
I definitely talk about vulns that are actively exploited.

1302
01:14:57.555 --> 01:14:59.976
This is like, hey, what's your priority?

1303
01:15:00.056 --> 01:15:03.877
Priority is, do I have this vuln that's currently being weaponized?

1304
01:15:04.297 --> 01:15:07.558
And the JFrog Artifactory one is, we had a good laugh about it.

1305
01:15:08.338 --> 01:15:31.708
during the show notes that like who the hell is putting artifactory on the internet and it's like oh too many people is the answer right just like the water plants with their plcs and stuff like this get your stuff off the internet yeah it's like guys all because your device has authentication right like i get it like ssh you have to ssh into this box you have to put the username and password to get into artifactory sure you're making a lot of assumptions about the remaining attacks be a

1306
01:15:32.268 --> 01:15:36.132
the implementation of that auth and B the remaining attack surface.

1307
01:15:36.152 --> 01:15:40.156
You now have to manage if you just don't do any kind of network filtering, right?

1308
01:15:40.196 --> 01:15:48.063
Like if you just allow anyone to touch this thing, even though you do have a username and password, it doesn't mean that, you know, there's not other stuff to be worried about.

1309
01:15:48.764 --> 01:15:49.084
Yeah.

1310
01:15:49.124 --> 01:15:51.727
Please get your artifactories off the internet and your PLCs also.

1311
01:15:52.207 --> 01:15:56.751
And if you're worried about your volumes as in development, check out me as our sponsor.

1312
01:15:56.771 --> 01:15:57.932
Sponsor updates podcast.

1313
01:15:57.952 --> 01:15:59.133
Hey, sign us off, Matt.

1314
01:15:59.153 --> 01:15:59.593
That was great.

1315
01:15:59.753 --> 01:16:01.895
Thanks for watching, guys.

1316
01:16:01.915 --> 01:16:02.876
Pro podcaster.

1317
01:16:03.196 --> 01:16:04.357
Guys, hey, we're coming up.

1318
01:16:04.417 --> 01:16:05.458
Actually, this is episode 11.

1319
01:16:06.079 --> 01:16:08.200
So, you know, podcast is well underway.

1320
01:16:08.561 --> 01:16:09.702
We really appreciate the support, guys.

1321
01:16:09.722 --> 01:16:10.782
We're having a good time doing this.

1322
01:16:10.923 --> 01:16:13.405
You know, it's just been a super, super fun time.

1323
01:16:13.505 --> 01:16:16.107
And we're looking forward to, you know, keeping this train rolling.

1324
01:16:16.147 --> 01:16:18.509
So if you enjoy this, best way to help us out, A,

1325
01:16:18.869 --> 01:16:19.370
Go check out Maze.

1326
01:16:19.390 --> 01:16:20.512
Seriously, they are a great company.

1327
01:16:20.532 --> 01:16:21.373
We love working with those guys.

1328
01:16:21.713 --> 01:16:22.915
And then B, go tell your friends.

1329
01:16:22.955 --> 01:16:24.338
Go tell your friends to go tell their friends.

1330
01:16:24.358 --> 01:16:27.723
And then get that machine rolling and listen to us on Spotify with a five-star review.

1331
01:16:27.743 --> 01:16:28.404
Appreciate it, guys.

1332
01:16:28.704 --> 01:16:30.126
We'll see you in the next one.

1333
01:16:31.068 --> 01:16:31.408
Peace.
