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Good morning, hackers.

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Welcome back to The Lowdown presented by Maze, the best podcast on the Internet for hackers.

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Matt, how are we doing, man?

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Listen, before you start, I want to go, okay?

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Your boy is a little tired.

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Why are you tired, little level?

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Great question.

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I have two kids.

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One is three.

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One is one.

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And we decided it would be a good idea to go on a beach vacation with my two children.

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What do you think?

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What are your thoughts on that?

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Man, I was just, I was watching our podcast back from last week and I, I was the rookie dad complaining about going to a hot soccer game without an umbrella.

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Now you're the rookie dad going to a sandy beach, sunny location with two kids that don't want to wear suntan lotion.

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Don't want to wear the rash guard.

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one or both are still taking naps.

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Definitely one.

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One for sure.

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Both should be, but he refuses.

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So right, right, right.

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And so what you're doing the like, leave a baby monitor in the hotel room and like sit somewhere or you're in the hotel room.

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Oh, it's actually rad for me because I'm pasty white and antisocial.

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So like when my kid has to go down for a nap, I'm in there and I'm like, oh no, I got to watch the baby guys and they leave me alone.

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It's fucking awesome.

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Okay, okay.

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That's like a good excuse for you.

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I got it.

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I don't know.

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We've done this.

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So I was telling you before we recorded the trick is, and you're almost at that age is to travel with their friends.

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Yeah.

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And then like, it just starts to get a little easier because you're, then you're not like the only source of all of their attention and energy is pointed at you and your wife.

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Right.

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Right.

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And it's like, Oh no, look, another, you know, three, four year old, like go, right.

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Go outside for 16 hours, please.

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Goodbye.

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Yeah.

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Yeah.

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Like four is probably the good age for that.

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Like, it's worth this weight in gold.

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Find another couple that you really vibe with that is a kid the same age.

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And it's just like, ooh, okay, things start to magically happen.

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And then vacations become vacations again.

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Slightly more, slightly more.

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We'll get there.

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Someday.

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Someday I will have my vacations back.

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Yeah.

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Yeah, I acknowledge very lucky, very privileged even be able to go on vacation.

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It's just yeah.

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Yeah.

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As one of my friends told me recently, it is literally just parenting in a hostile environment.

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You know what I mean?

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That's a really good way to put it.

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It's really good.

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I know you're probably wondering, you know, guys, isn't this a hacking podcast?

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We're talking about kids.

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Well, here's a problem, right?

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You start as a hacker and eventually you have a family.

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And then you have to figure out how do I mentally balance being a hacker and a parent?

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And then these worlds kind of weave together a little bit.

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So I was thinking about, you know, exploitation and zero days on the beach while my three-year-old cried about his Mickey Mouse falling into the pool.

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So it's an interesting dichotomy with it.

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The way I like to phrase it, I mean, we're not just hackers.

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We're also like entrepreneurs, I guess, right?

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We both run our own businesses.

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Yeah, I know.

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We're not like we're not VC backed.

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you know, software companies, but we both are self-employed.

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Yet, yet, yet.

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Ooh, little foreshadowing.

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No, but I like to say that we're doing startup life on hard mode with, you know, with little kids at home.

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It's like when you're 20 and you can survive off of like Pringles and ramen and caffeine and like cigarettes and like no sleep.

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It's like, oh yeah, of course you could do a startup.

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Like when you're in your like

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early for your case, late for my case, 30s with like small children and, you know, mortgage and all this kind of shit.

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It's like, oh, wow.

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Yeah, no, I got to like go to bed at a reasonable hour, which I did not do last night.

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And so I'm also kind of feeling feeling it with you.

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You know who else is feeling it right now?

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LG?

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The sponsor of today's video.

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Just kidding, not yet.

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Yes, LG, bro.

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Listen, guys, we've been talking a lot about certified pre-owned, right?

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Certified pre-owned.

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And the topic of that conversation was a lot of these TVs are, or not even TVs, a lot of these devices you buy online, routers, Amazon Firesticks, cheap Chinese knockoffs of Amazon Firesticks, are showing up pre-owned.

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The issue there, or kind of like the solution to that problem, is that these are brands you've never heard of.

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There's a fundamental trust misalignment.

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You don't trust these brands.

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You, therefore, should be able to trust other brands.

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But the issue here is we're starting to see a shift, fundamentally, a paradigm change in how brands are behaving.

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And LG, I think one of those brands that we thought we could trust for a long time, has kind of turned the tide.

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Matt, I see you tensing up.

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What's going on, man?

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I am so angry about this one.

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I have so many big feelings about this one.

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I went, I, like I live streamed yesterday for the first time in a few weeks of all the travel and everything.

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Right.

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I was raging, right?

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Raging because exactly that, exactly that.

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These are $3,000 devices.

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Imagine you fired up your MacBook Pro that you just spent way too much effing money on or your Mac Studio that took 18 weeks to get to you because everyone had to install OpenClaw a few weeks ago and it cost you, you know, thousands of dollars for this premium piece of hardware.

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And you opened it up and it was like...

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Please install McAfee and we're going to spy on everything you effing do.

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And we're siphoning all your data off so that we can better advertise to you.

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No, this is why Mac is Mac.

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And like the $400 Windows laptop at Best Buy is the $400 Windows laptop at Best Buy.

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Right.

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What's the difference?

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Well, it's not just the fact that these things work and like there's speed and like hardware specs.

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No, the equivalent hardware spec Mac.

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to like Windows device is not the same price.

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The reason that you're paying this luxury tax is for this luxury experience.

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And what do we get out of LG right now?

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Well, to kind of butt off of that, there's also like the psychological element of like premium pricing, right?

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Like if I'm gonna spend $3,200 on a thing,

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there's a marketing choice that they do there to try to make, like trick me into believing that I'm getting a good product.

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And I think with Mac, you really do get that.

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I think you're paying for high quality hardware, high quality software, good security, whatever.

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And so for certain other brands, you would assume that that translates, right?

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Oh, I'm getting a $3,200 TV.

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Okay.

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Surely that means I have smooth feel on the remote.

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All the apps are responsive and, Oh, I'm paying a high price.

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So therefore it doesn't need to be subsidized by advertiser ID.

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Right.

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And the,

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Lo and behold, not the case.

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Yeah, I guess if you've missed what we're talking about, which I don't know, I've made content about this before the podcast and the video that we're going off of is two hours and 15 minutes long with like last I checked over three million views, I believe.

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I mean, this is obviously pushed a hot button for people.

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The Gamers Nexus crew, which has taken a turn in terms of YouTube direction in a way that I am very supportive of.

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They've got hackers and stuff in there.

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They were walking around a hardware lab.

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They were doing stuff that looked like you would have loved, right?

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They got the backs pulled off of these consumer electronics, and they're doing very low-level things.

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Name of the channel.

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In the channel, by the way.

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And so, yeah, like kudos.

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I watched this.

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I watched all two hours plus of it more than once.

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I've like combed through it because I've made a bunch of content about this.

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I've written about it.

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I've tried to like summarize each of the specific findings that I thought were super spicy.

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So let's set the stage, right?

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I'm angry.

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Obviously, the backdrop is LG's kind of expose about some privacy concerns.

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There's also security concerns, by the way.

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We can talk about some remote code execution in your TV that we don't have the details of yet.

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It's unpatched.

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That's great.

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O-days.

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So if you don't listen to the rest of the podcast, just go take...

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If you have an LG TV, just don't put it on the network.

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How about that?

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Right?

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That's like the TLDR.

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The video goes into a few things.

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We could also critique some of the video if we wanted to.

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Did you watch it?

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Have you gotten to catch up on it?

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Let's just run down what we're actually talking about.

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The TLDR, before we go into details here, is that LG TVs have been caught spying actively in your home.

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And I know that's kind of been like...

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A thing that's assumed, unfortunately, like, oh, TV has microphone, TV has ads, therefore it's listening to me and it's going to like sort that data up and push it somewhere.

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Right.

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And again, it's an unfortunate world that we live in.

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We're like, that is now the assumed posture of our technology.

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But there really has been no hard definitive proof in a lot of these cases.

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Well, so Gamer Nexus went in with I don't know the name of the other researchers, but they did, again, a two hour expose.

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showing by exploiting a vulnerability to get them a root shell on the TV, even when listening mode is quote-unquote disabled, the microphone is still recording and transcribing all room audio into plain text on the device,

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and caching it for some reason.

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And then they also found that there are multiple remote code execution vulnerabilities, emphasis on remote, like over-the-internet vulnerabilities, in these TVs, right?

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The worst part is that LG was put on the spot and tried to address it, and they basically said, uh-uh, that's not true, that's not real, even though, like, literally they had a root shell on the device, and it was actively occurring.

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Gosh, it is so much worse than even summing it up could possibly make.

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This is why it took two hours to go through it.

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So we're going to do our best.

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But that's the crux of it.

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The most egregious findings is that, A, did I even realize that my LG TV had a microphone?

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Yeah.

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No.

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Did I realize it had a wake word?

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No.

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Like if I say Siri, it's by mistake.

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Right.

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I never want a wake word for anything.

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Right.

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Like, you know, I've pulled all Alexis out of my house again.

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Small children at home make that a nightmare.

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You know, and yeah, I just don't like Internet connected microphones just like around all the time that I don't have like a decent idea of what's going on.

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I think there's a lot of conspiracy theories around your phones listening to you and then advertising stuff shows up later.

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A lot of that has been at least not proven, maybe not disproven, whatever.

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But we haven't found a ton of evidence that that's actually happening, even though everyone kind of says it.

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We've all had that experience, right?

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Where you're scrolling Instagram and you're like, I was just talking about this yesterday.

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Like, what the hell?

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But this is actually truly happening on your TV, and they have evidence of it, of conversations that you're having going over the wire in clear text, including sensitive information.

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There's absolutely no filtering, including when the device is unplugged from the network and including when the device is powered off, screen off, screen black.

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It is still recording audio.

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It has four gigs of built-in memory to shovel whatever it's recording away for the next time that it is woken up and put on a network.

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Kind of ridiculous.

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The acronym, you know, du jour on this story is ACR, Automatic Content Recognition.

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And the thing that like really pisses me off because they have a response to the Gamers Nexus thing, what we can get to and we can show.

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The thing that grinds my gears is in the Gamers Nexus video, the executives from LG are like on panels and on podcasts and on at Cannes Lions and all these different advertising conferences

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bragging about the capability that they are now trying to like walk back after everyone's like yelling at them.

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They're like, well, ACR, what are you talking about?

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That's like, well, a that's opt in and they try to, you know, kind of hide behind that.

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And it's like, well,

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Okay, I have to breathe.

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The opt-in, did you see the opt-in part?

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It's like the select all is auto-highlighted.

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They really shadily try to get you to opt-in to all of this stuff.

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It's dark pattern shit.

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It's the same argument people make events like every time Windows 11 pushes a new update, you have to re-go through the freaking obstacle course that is getting your device started automatically.

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And every time they change the default settings of Cortana microphone access, like, Oh, is co-pilot on?

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Are you sure you don't want it on?

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Like all of that shit.

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It's the same dark pattern shit.

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Yep.

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Yep.

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And like no one is consciously opting in to like advertise to me more daddy.

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Right?

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Like that's not like no one is reading the 50,000 page doc and going, yes, like, please may I have another, like take all of my living room conversations and serve me a,

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like nanosecond speed AI contextual ads of it.

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And that's what he's literally on stage bragging about.

228
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The president of LG ads who LG ads is a private separate entity from the public LG.

229
00:12:47.966 --> 00:12:49.148
And that's important because.

230
00:12:50.350 --> 00:12:54.232
This guy is barred from the SEC from running a public company for doing scams in the past.

231
00:12:54.853 --> 00:12:56.454
Wow, that I was not aware of.

232
00:12:56.474 --> 00:12:57.234
That's insane.

233
00:12:57.414 --> 00:12:57.654
Yeah.

234
00:12:57.734 --> 00:13:02.637
So this guy, the president of LG ads is barred from the SEC from running a public company.

235
00:13:02.797 --> 00:13:03.618
So he goes on.

236
00:13:04.198 --> 00:13:07.840
If you watch any part of the video, I think this is probably the most revealing of what's going on.

237
00:13:07.940 --> 00:13:09.081
It's like early in the video.

238
00:13:10.062 --> 00:13:17.753
the exact there's like a clip of a bunch of these different LG ads, again, separate entity executives talking about their capability.

239
00:13:17.773 --> 00:13:19.576
And they like, they like to use this phrase.

240
00:13:19.636 --> 00:13:20.757
We own the glass.

241
00:13:20.777 --> 00:13:21.098
Yeah.

242
00:13:21.752 --> 00:13:24.132
We own the glass, which just gives me the creeps.

243
00:13:24.573 --> 00:13:25.713
It's like, we own the glass.

244
00:13:25.753 --> 00:13:29.574
Well, I thought I just paid $3,400 for the glass, but okay, cool.

245
00:13:29.974 --> 00:13:30.334
Do you?

246
00:13:30.354 --> 00:13:32.534
You bought a license for the glass, good sir.

247
00:13:32.554 --> 00:13:33.914
Right, right, right, right.

248
00:13:34.275 --> 00:13:39.316
And cue GTA 6 hacker issue.

249
00:13:39.716 --> 00:13:40.336
What's going on?

250
00:13:40.376 --> 00:13:41.436
We don't own anything anymore.

251
00:13:41.976 --> 00:13:42.996
But they're literally bragging.

252
00:13:43.016 --> 00:13:46.137
They're like, people sit and watch TV, and they sit on their phone.

253
00:13:46.877 --> 00:13:55.965
And they then know the other thing that I don't think you mentioned in your summary is that they're also scanning the entire local network for all the other devices on the network.

254
00:13:56.286 --> 00:14:03.212
So not just audio capture, but they're also doing basically NMAP scans because it's not even just like, oh, this is the device.

255
00:14:03.572 --> 00:14:08.257
They even had examples of like, it's a Windows device with these services exposed.

256
00:14:08.277 --> 00:14:08.457
Yeah.

257
00:14:08.732 --> 00:14:14.754
I wanted to ask, so I didn't go into the article or watch the video yet, I read kind of the headlines on the Twitter post about this.

258
00:14:15.234 --> 00:14:21.756
When they said it's doing network scanning, are we talking about actual NMAP TCP SYN scanning?

259
00:14:22.156 --> 00:14:24.057
Is it doing SSDP?

260
00:14:24.077 --> 00:14:28.378
Because when people say network scanning, that word means so many things.

261
00:14:28.438 --> 00:14:33.920
There are certain protocols that are there by design to enable scans, like SSDP for example.

262
00:14:34.920 --> 00:14:36.521
simple service discovery protocol.

263
00:14:36.902 --> 00:14:40.524
It's a protocol that exists literally to enumerate a network on purpose.

264
00:14:40.564 --> 00:14:41.685
It's not nefarious action.

265
00:14:42.145 --> 00:14:48.089
But if they're doing, like, TCP, SYN level, and map-style scanning, that feels a lot more nefarious.

266
00:14:48.109 --> 00:14:57.555
I'm curious, not that it makes it any better, it just kind of, I think, helps paint LG into the proper hacker corner that they're acting like, right?

267
00:14:58.806 --> 00:14:59.006
Yeah.

268
00:14:59.106 --> 00:15:03.650
And they, they might've gotten into that in the video and I just haven't committed that specific detail to memory.

269
00:15:04.031 --> 00:15:06.493
Um, but I do have a screenshot that I can pull up.

270
00:15:07.273 --> 00:15:10.036
Um, I could show you, let me just like post it in the show notes.

271
00:15:10.056 --> 00:15:10.976
We can put it on the screen.

272
00:15:10.996 --> 00:15:16.621
Um, that, uh, I put, I like wrote, uh, an X article I've never written.

273
00:15:16.641 --> 00:15:20.465
I don't write like Twitter articles or anything, but I wrote one summing up this video.

274
00:15:20.485 --> 00:15:22.706
Cause I was like, Hey, not everyone's got two hours to watch this.

275
00:15:22.746 --> 00:15:24.488
Like, here's all the findings that I think are interesting.

276
00:15:24.708 --> 00:15:29.111
And one of the screenshots from it is all the devices on the network.

277
00:15:29.291 --> 00:15:29.531
Right.

278
00:15:30.031 --> 00:15:35.695
And so I don't I don't like have this specific like, well, what on the Wireshark like did they see actually happen?

279
00:15:35.735 --> 00:15:38.896
Because they did do that right in the lab and all that.

280
00:15:39.377 --> 00:15:42.058
But the the list here, they redact a bunch of it.

281
00:15:42.078 --> 00:15:44.180
And the one that I have, like I left highlighted.

282
00:15:45.761 --> 00:15:50.385
kind of told me a little bit more about the scan that went on.

283
00:15:50.785 --> 00:15:59.954
So it says Vitaly's computer is the name of the computer, Windows PC, parentheses, team viewer running detected via MDNS.

284
00:16:00.374 --> 00:16:07.221
So it's like not just, oh, there's this Windows box on this network at that IP, but it has services running on it.

285
00:16:07.321 --> 00:16:07.461
Right.

286
00:16:07.481 --> 00:16:08.402
So that seems a little bit.

287
00:16:09.643 --> 00:16:10.243
lower down.

288
00:16:11.084 --> 00:16:19.852
And then, yeah, I just, they pulled this info from the TV logs and the TV phoning home, like network traffic.

289
00:16:20.072 --> 00:16:20.292
Right.

290
00:16:21.373 --> 00:16:24.556
So it is phoning home with like every other device on your network.

291
00:16:25.677 --> 00:16:32.062
They've like walked a lot of this back and said like, well, this is just like the access, the permissions that we need to be a smart TV.

292
00:16:32.122 --> 00:16:32.543
Like we need,

293
00:16:33.723 --> 00:16:36.004
probably your phone could be a remote, right?

294
00:16:36.344 --> 00:16:41.386
So in order for your phone to be a remote, it needs to be able to like, understand that your phone is on the same wifi.

295
00:16:41.546 --> 00:16:46.327
And like, there's like a pairing handshake thing that winds up happening, you know?

296
00:16:46.647 --> 00:16:48.748
And like, that's probably what they're talking about, right?

297
00:16:49.148 --> 00:16:54.390
But then you don't need to like send the name of all these devices home, first of all.

298
00:16:54.630 --> 00:16:55.090
Second of all,

299
00:16:56.191 --> 00:16:59.195
back to the execs on all the podcasts bragging about everything.

300
00:16:59.876 --> 00:17:05.964
They're saying we understand like on, like on purpose, they're like, we know every device in the LG household.

301
00:17:07.278 --> 00:17:12.002
We can extend the advertising experience off the TV onto your other devices.

302
00:17:12.763 --> 00:17:15.566
These are the things that they're flexing that they can do.

303
00:17:15.786 --> 00:17:17.908
So, like, no, you're sorry.

304
00:17:18.608 --> 00:17:21.311
We're just doing the things that smart TVs need to do.

305
00:17:21.331 --> 00:17:31.000
It doesn't hold water when you then go on stage and brag about being able to extend the advertising experience to the other devices on the network that aren't your LG TV.

306
00:17:31.535 --> 00:17:31.755
Yeah.

307
00:17:32.376 --> 00:17:38.445
As a person who invests in the stock market a little bit, it makes me very concerned that, like, companies are just out of ideas.

308
00:17:38.706 --> 00:17:43.493
And, like, all we have left to do is milk the advertising market a little harder.

309
00:17:43.934 --> 00:17:46.337
And my question becomes, like, what happens when that...

310
00:17:46.878 --> 00:17:54.303
either kind of starts to get more found out like this, starts to get more heavily regulated, and all we have left to do is shove AI in things.

311
00:17:54.503 --> 00:17:56.485
Are we as a society out of things to build?

312
00:17:56.665 --> 00:17:57.085
Are we done?

313
00:17:58.646 --> 00:18:02.149
You've had the tinfoil hat animation show up on your head.

314
00:18:02.529 --> 00:18:11.756
Mine is we do not have a USA GDPR equivalent because too much of our economy and stock market depends on...

315
00:18:12.456 --> 00:18:19.923
Exactly this advertising is propping up so much of the market that they fear our government fears.

316
00:18:20.303 --> 00:18:28.470
If we put too much consumer privacy regulation in place that the popsicle sticks holding this whole thing up start to chip away.

317
00:18:28.690 --> 00:18:28.910
Right.

318
00:18:28.991 --> 00:18:32.674
The Jenga block on the side of the whole thing gets kicked out.

319
00:18:33.078 --> 00:18:33.679
Yeah, it's not great.

320
00:18:33.699 --> 00:18:38.763
I mean, yeah, but look at like, have there really been any significant technological improvements in the last like 15 years?

321
00:18:38.883 --> 00:18:47.751
Obviously, RAM's gotten better, CPU's gotten faster, but it's all just been like the experiences have been the same and it's just been more data getting slurped up.

322
00:18:47.791 --> 00:18:51.013
I mean, it's why I mean, AI is the answer to that, right?

323
00:18:51.034 --> 00:18:54.817
And that's why there's so much focus on AI specifically.

324
00:18:54.837 --> 00:18:54.937
Yeah.

325
00:18:55.266 --> 00:18:58.809
Hey hackers, before we keep going, I wanna take a quick break and say a quick thank you to our sponsors.

326
00:18:59.069 --> 00:19:02.592
Today's Lowdown episode is sponsored by our friends over at Maze.

327
00:19:03.072 --> 00:19:08.376
Maze has spent the last couple of years using AI to find and remediate vulnerabilities in the cloud.

328
00:19:08.476 --> 00:19:15.221
And now they've released Maze Code, AI agents that find and deeply investigate vulnerabilities in your code.

329
00:19:15.461 --> 00:19:16.262
Now we all know the deal.

330
00:19:16.662 --> 00:19:22.904
Software composition analysis tools and SaaS toolings are all historically really bad at just making more noise.

331
00:19:22.944 --> 00:19:29.806
They find issues that may not actually be real and just create a lot of problems for your engineers to deal with that don't solve real security vulnerabilities.

332
00:19:29.906 --> 00:19:30.306
I get it.

333
00:19:30.346 --> 00:19:30.926
We've been there.

334
00:19:31.586 --> 00:19:36.948
Maze code is a really cool tool because Maze code actually knows how your code works.

335
00:19:37.288 --> 00:19:42.351
MazeCode investigates every finding with the context of how your code is actually deployed.

336
00:19:42.751 --> 00:19:50.335
Sure, you're using a version of libxml2 that's vulnerable, but the actual code path to hit that vulnerability is not exposed in your Docker image.

337
00:19:50.616 --> 00:19:54.138
MazeCode can find that and won't show you that that vulnerability is a big deal.

338
00:19:54.278 --> 00:19:58.840
Every vulnerability that MazeCode reports comes with evidence that it's real and a way to fix it.

339
00:19:59.181 --> 00:20:03.283
Check out Maze at go.lowdownpod.com slash maze.

340
00:20:03.403 --> 00:20:06.845
That's go.lowdownpod.com slash maze.

341
00:20:07.005 --> 00:20:07.605
Thanks again, Mays.

342
00:20:07.745 --> 00:20:08.565
Let's keep going.

343
00:20:08.726 --> 00:20:09.346
Oh, that was another thing.

344
00:20:09.426 --> 00:20:09.886
Okay, hold on.

345
00:20:09.986 --> 00:20:10.746
I got to tell you this one.

346
00:20:10.986 --> 00:20:11.846
This one really pissed me off.

347
00:20:12.207 --> 00:20:24.450
The president of LG ads, again, talking at like some advertising conference, bragging about their capabilities, starts to talk about this ACR, automatic content recognition, which is recognizing the stuff that's on your screen.

348
00:20:24.650 --> 00:20:27.711
And it's also recognizing the stuff you're saying around your screen, right?

349
00:20:27.731 --> 00:20:30.372
But it's also what's on your screen, which like...

350
00:20:31.112 --> 00:20:31.532
I don't know.

351
00:20:32.312 --> 00:20:45.818
I don't really think, oh, my TV manufacturer is going to know what I watch, even if I'm not using their app or something like that, just because they can do this content recognition of what's on the screen.

352
00:20:46.018 --> 00:20:47.618
Maybe people don't realize that, right?

353
00:20:47.958 --> 00:20:50.219
And that's not very transparent.

354
00:20:50.920 --> 00:20:51.900
He is out there saying...

355
00:20:53.077 --> 00:20:59.919
Their kind of milk, you know, their big technological idea is the exact scenario he described.

356
00:21:00.059 --> 00:21:09.101
You're watching a bar scene and a certain brand of drink is like in the scene and there's a product placement in the show that you're watching.

357
00:21:09.581 --> 00:21:10.641
How does Bo Burnham say it?

358
00:21:10.661 --> 00:21:12.642
It's with the label facing out.

359
00:21:12.922 --> 00:21:13.262
Right.

360
00:21:13.282 --> 00:21:13.503
Right.

361
00:21:13.883 --> 00:21:14.964
Right.

362
00:21:15.004 --> 00:21:15.344
Right.

363
00:21:15.764 --> 00:21:17.706
And so that kind of scene is happening.

364
00:21:18.307 --> 00:21:38.284
And he's saying with ACR and LG tied to their AI platform for contextual analysis, capturing that content, they can then in real time serve you an ad for that particular drink that you just watched the actor drink in your favorite show on your phone.

365
00:21:41.066 --> 00:21:42.508
Who is opting into this?

366
00:21:42.948 --> 00:21:43.529
You know what I mean?

367
00:21:43.569 --> 00:21:45.971
Like, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no.

368
00:21:46.151 --> 00:21:46.371
Right?

369
00:21:46.572 --> 00:21:46.852
Wow.

370
00:21:46.892 --> 00:21:47.272
So hold on.

371
00:21:47.292 --> 00:22:00.466
So even if I use, like, an Apple TV and I push my Mac screen to my Apple TV to, like, work or whatever, they are still capturing the HDMI output of the Apple TV into their TV and selling me whatever.

372
00:22:00.526 --> 00:22:03.948
This is like what the ACR, this is like all the ACR stuff, right?

373
00:22:04.028 --> 00:22:10.132
If you use a lot of their apps, they even have more because then they've got like different DNS queries and stuff that they set.

374
00:22:10.612 --> 00:22:17.276
So like if you know how like all the smart TVs have like that fake cable shit that's like built in now that like feels like channels, right?

375
00:22:18.757 --> 00:22:21.959
And it's just like NCIS reruns and like, you know, whatever.

376
00:22:24.000 --> 00:22:29.283
They showed the DNS queries like reporting back exactly what channel you're watching.

377
00:22:29.443 --> 00:22:30.924
I was like, that's not that big a deal, whatever.

378
00:22:31.104 --> 00:22:31.985
Okay, cool.

379
00:22:32.005 --> 00:22:34.246
I'm watching NBC or whatever.

380
00:22:34.387 --> 00:22:35.227
Okay.

381
00:22:35.868 --> 00:22:40.151
But again, just dark patterns of what you're saying.

382
00:22:42.272 --> 00:22:44.394
Then there's remote code execution vulnerabilities.

383
00:22:44.534 --> 00:22:54.141
So everything that we just talked about is LG being kind of annoying, advertising, data, brokery, weird behaviors.

384
00:22:55.150 --> 00:23:01.197
But all the capabilities that we just mentioned that this hardware can do that everyone's putting in their living room and their boardrooms.

385
00:23:01.517 --> 00:23:07.023
I had teachers DMing me about this video saying we have 85 of these things in our classrooms.

386
00:23:08.085 --> 00:23:12.550
Really worried of how to approach this with my school board and all this kind of stuff.

387
00:23:12.570 --> 00:23:15.893
I'm like, geez, I don't envy you having to figure out.

388
00:23:16.654 --> 00:23:21.756
what kind of student privacy concerns you now are facing, right?

389
00:23:22.456 --> 00:23:25.537
Not like ignore LG and advertising completely.

390
00:23:25.557 --> 00:23:41.043
The fact that this thing has remote code execution vulnerabilities and the four gigs of memory and of storage and microphones that are connected to the internet mean that a threat actor could do all of this

391
00:23:41.963 --> 00:23:43.304
very, very, very easily.

392
00:23:43.324 --> 00:23:57.334
And a bunch of the Chinese threat actors have proven that they have absolutely no problem hacking residential devices that have RCE on them for residential proxy stuff or for whatever else is going on.

393
00:23:57.414 --> 00:23:58.955
So that's another major concern here.

394
00:23:59.478 --> 00:23:59.698
Yeah.

395
00:23:59.958 --> 00:24:02.400
Again, the whole we talk about this a lot, right?

396
00:24:02.740 --> 00:24:08.003
With these technologies, it's a question of acknowledging your threat model, right?

397
00:24:08.023 --> 00:24:13.185
Acknowledging what risk you're willing to take on as a person and building your life kind of around that.

398
00:24:13.946 --> 00:24:18.508
I think that no one should have to take on the threat model of like, oh, LG is watching me.

399
00:24:18.628 --> 00:24:18.768
Right.

400
00:24:18.828 --> 00:24:19.989
LG is spying on my family.

401
00:24:20.489 --> 00:24:36.081
And so in my opinion, I think what everyone should do, and again, not sponsored, but you know, hit me up, is buy like a 55, 65 inch, simple $800 Samsung TV with no microphone, with no camera, and strap in a fucking Apple TV, man.

402
00:24:36.141 --> 00:24:39.824
And those things are hands down the best device that I've ever used.

403
00:24:39.844 --> 00:24:40.945
They're extremely responsive.

404
00:24:41.465 --> 00:24:47.910
And Apple, you know, there could be some breaking expose in five years on Apple as well, but they kind of posture themselves as like the privacy company.

405
00:24:47.930 --> 00:24:48.451
There's no real

406
00:24:48.991 --> 00:24:54.919
public indication that they're doing the similar kind of advertising, slurp up all your data, food that other companies are.

407
00:24:55.000 --> 00:25:02.410
So that is my home recommendation for TVs because it just feels like every company is getting caught with their pants down doing this kind of stuff.

408
00:25:04.054 --> 00:25:08.836
I have a feeling that LG is not going to be the last brand decimated in this way.

409
00:25:08.856 --> 00:25:11.497
I used to be a Samsung loyal.

410
00:25:11.657 --> 00:25:20.661
Their whole operating system and ecosystem started to really just feel like crap for me, even though I'm also Apple TV pilled and like you, it's worth the money.

411
00:25:20.761 --> 00:25:21.501
It's responsive.

412
00:25:21.541 --> 00:25:21.922
It works.

413
00:25:21.942 --> 00:25:23.022
It doesn't advertise to you.

414
00:25:23.082 --> 00:25:23.422
It's great.

415
00:25:25.043 --> 00:25:26.404
But I don't know.

416
00:25:26.544 --> 00:25:28.285
I can't stand here and be like, yeah, Samsung.

417
00:25:28.305 --> 00:25:32.607
And then you're good because like their OS feels like crap too.

418
00:25:32.887 --> 00:25:33.108
Right.

419
00:25:33.268 --> 00:25:36.590
So like I can't imagine that they're not also doing stuff.

420
00:25:37.230 --> 00:25:41.913
The real like the end of the day kind of why this is all happening.

421
00:25:42.073 --> 00:25:43.633
The economics of this is insane.

422
00:25:43.834 --> 00:25:44.054
Right.

423
00:25:44.494 --> 00:25:45.715
Like how many TVs do you buy?

424
00:25:47.130 --> 00:25:47.871
a year, right?

425
00:25:48.091 --> 00:25:49.432
0.1, right?

426
00:25:49.773 --> 00:25:53.957
I think every, like every five years, maybe we have maybe, maybe.

427
00:25:54.017 --> 00:25:54.237
Right.

428
00:25:54.317 --> 00:25:59.222
I think I had, I think I had my other one at my, uh, at my old house, like for a decade.

429
00:25:59.262 --> 00:25:59.483
Right.

430
00:25:59.523 --> 00:26:00.444
And I was like, ah, it's good.

431
00:26:00.564 --> 00:26:04.488
You know, like they've kind of like, there was a while where they were iterating rapidly with like new features.

432
00:26:04.508 --> 00:26:07.030
And now it's kind of like, well, how thin do you need the damn thing?

433
00:26:07.070 --> 00:26:07.250
Right.

434
00:26:07.290 --> 00:26:07.451
Right.

435
00:26:07.511 --> 00:26:07.731
Right.

436
00:26:07.851 --> 00:26:08.011
Right.

437
00:26:08.191 --> 00:26:08.352
Um,

438
00:26:08.932 --> 00:26:10.152
And so that's part of the problem.

439
00:26:10.293 --> 00:26:14.394
And so the profit margins on these ad businesses are insane in the 60s.

440
00:26:14.894 --> 00:26:27.859
And so they're like, you know, they're basically seeing SaaS multiples on like the ad business for a commodity hardware business where you're competing against like $200 Vizios or whatever the heck, you know.

441
00:26:28.719 --> 00:26:31.941
Best Buy store brand stuff is, is what you're competing against.

442
00:26:32.642 --> 00:26:36.725
And so have you seen that chart where inflation and everything is like...

443
00:26:36.745 --> 00:26:39.907
Cost of everything has gone nuts over the last 20 years.

444
00:26:40.307 --> 00:26:41.368
The TVs have just gone to...

445
00:26:41.408 --> 00:26:42.529
The TVs are at the bottom.

446
00:26:42.549 --> 00:26:44.310
They've bottomed out, right?

447
00:26:44.330 --> 00:26:46.272
And it's like, well, here's why, right?

448
00:26:46.332 --> 00:26:51.335
They've figured out this... Well, yeah, we'll sell you a cheap device and then do this other stuff to you.

449
00:26:51.496 --> 00:26:53.037
But that's why it makes me so mad.

450
00:26:53.197 --> 00:26:54.418
The LGs are not...

451
00:26:55.038 --> 00:27:19.869
the cheap timu ones are not the cheap best buy one right it's like these are a premium device that you shouldn't be figuring out how to you know get me to install the mcafee subscription on the cheap laptop is like what it feels like here it's so annoying dude are you a cryptocurrency enjoyer are you a crypto person zero percent zero zero percent wow interesting

452
00:27:20.249 --> 00:27:20.489
0%.

453
00:27:20.509 --> 00:27:25.335
Yeah, so I don't have a whole Bitcoin, but I have parts of a Bitcoin.

454
00:27:25.375 --> 00:27:33.945
And so I very lightly follow the cryptocurrency community, not so much like the meme coin, the shit coin community, but like the hardware community, right?

455
00:27:33.965 --> 00:27:34.946
I'm a hardware guy.

456
00:27:34.986 --> 00:27:36.227
I'm a hardware vulnerability researcher.

457
00:27:36.307 --> 00:27:37.188
I like exploits.

458
00:27:38.230 --> 00:27:38.710
And so...

459
00:27:39.571 --> 00:27:47.397
This Trezor email popped off, and I was kind of concerned that potentially my wallet, not a Trezor, it's an offset concern, I would never tell you what I have, may be compromised.

460
00:27:47.417 --> 00:27:49.639
But it turns out the whole thing was a phishing campaign.

461
00:27:49.659 --> 00:27:50.460
Matt, what are we talking about?

462
00:27:50.480 --> 00:27:50.880
What's going on?

463
00:27:51.641 --> 00:27:54.663
Dude, this company is cooked.

464
00:27:54.983 --> 00:27:59.887
Like, I can't even understand how many different ways they're screwed, right?

465
00:28:00.067 --> 00:28:00.448
It's bad.

466
00:28:00.868 --> 00:28:01.989
Like, A...

467
00:28:03.600 --> 00:28:09.365
like crypto is a target for hackers for exactly these kinds of reasons, right?

468
00:28:09.585 --> 00:28:14.770
Once stolen, like is gone is generally people's experience with stolen crypto, right?

469
00:28:14.790 --> 00:28:17.192
It's like why North Korean threat actors are focused on it.

470
00:28:17.792 --> 00:28:21.335
Cause like, they're really good at targeting it, mixing it and all this kind of stuff.

471
00:28:21.435 --> 00:28:28.541
We have like a number of crypto stories to talk about today, including like a massive crypto scrammer going to jail.

472
00:28:28.902 --> 00:28:29.883
But this treasure one,

473
00:28:31.020 --> 00:28:37.703
They, their customers just got hit with probably one of the nastiest phishing campaigns I've seen this year.

474
00:28:38.404 --> 00:28:42.586
Because the phishing, the call was coming from inside the house, low level.

475
00:28:43.486 --> 00:28:50.849
The phishing email came from their official, like, company email signed, like, TLS cert.

476
00:28:50.970 --> 00:28:53.551
Like, everything was good about this.

477
00:28:53.671 --> 00:28:55.051
I'm seeing people dump the headers.

478
00:28:55.071 --> 00:28:56.052
I'm seeing people dump...

479
00:28:56.532 --> 00:29:00.959
They're like email security tools output on this treasure phishing email.

480
00:29:01.460 --> 00:29:03.002
And then what is treasure tweet?

481
00:29:03.883 --> 00:29:05.325
What is treasure tweet?

482
00:29:05.706 --> 00:29:06.207
Sorry.

483
00:29:06.227 --> 00:29:08.129
Oh, we're so sorry.

484
00:29:09.011 --> 00:29:11.715
Our third party email provider has been breached.

485
00:29:12.055 --> 00:29:22.283
Please be aware the email named quote, critical security alert, STM 32 entropy vulnerability is not coming from us and is a phishing attempt.

486
00:29:22.424 --> 00:29:23.545
Do not click any link.

487
00:29:23.985 --> 00:29:27.207
And then in that thread, you could see, I mean, it's a pretty good phishing email too.

488
00:29:27.828 --> 00:29:41.019
But then also in that thread, this email, this, this company continues to be cooked because people then are asking the company Twitter account, which I hope that is an official communications channel that is still trustworthy because this is crazy.

489
00:29:41.599 --> 00:29:50.622
And someone's tweeting them with a picture of physical mail that got sent to their house with QR codes on it that talk about like their treasure wallet.

490
00:29:50.682 --> 00:29:51.562
And they're like, I don't know.

491
00:29:51.622 --> 00:29:52.142
How about this?

492
00:29:52.202 --> 00:29:52.962
Is this official?

493
00:29:53.062 --> 00:29:55.243
I don't know how this even got my current address.

494
00:29:55.283 --> 00:29:56.883
I've moved a bunch of times, but here it is.

495
00:29:57.544 --> 00:30:09.767
And yes, I also got the email today and treasure replies, Hey, unfortunately, another completely different third party we use that for shipping also experienced a breach.

496
00:30:10.187 --> 00:30:17.332
And they were targeting our customers to get their addresses to send these kinds of scam physical mail to people.

497
00:30:17.632 --> 00:30:28.139
So Trezor has like a had a lot of security concerns, but B is doing a really piss poor job picking third party providers for very mission critical things, apparently.

498
00:30:28.483 --> 00:30:39.370
Yeah, the reason why this is such a devastating blow is obviously having your TLS cert for your email compromised is like one thing, because that is supposed to be like the root of trust.

499
00:30:39.390 --> 00:30:41.531
Like mathematically, it is proven that it is me.

500
00:30:41.731 --> 00:30:45.114
Like that is the bar for trust.

501
00:30:45.194 --> 00:30:46.214
Okay, so that got compromised.

502
00:30:46.875 --> 00:30:48.736
Also, physical security, right?

503
00:30:48.956 --> 00:30:51.077
Physical email provider got compromised.

504
00:30:51.317 --> 00:30:51.558
Shit.

505
00:30:51.678 --> 00:30:52.378
Okay, so that's bad.

506
00:30:52.838 --> 00:30:54.119
But if you top all that off...

507
00:30:55.540 --> 00:31:02.563
The reason why this is so bad is everyone was already primed for there to be an STM-32 vulnerability in Trezor.

508
00:31:02.583 --> 00:31:05.744
So going back a couple months ago, I'm going to look at the exact date here.

509
00:31:05.784 --> 00:31:07.264
This was literally last month, August.

510
00:31:07.945 --> 00:31:14.427
Cold Card, so this is another hardware wallet, was also compromised, quote-unquote, there was an entropy vulnerability.

511
00:31:14.847 --> 00:31:16.408
So again, I'm not a crypto expert.

512
00:31:16.528 --> 00:31:19.929
I'm just going to talk a little bit about how I understand the blockchain to work, okay?

513
00:31:20.249 --> 00:31:21.550
So for Bitcoin, for example, right?

514
00:31:22.290 --> 00:31:27.336
If you want to purchase or sell a Bitcoin, the way that it works is you have two keys, right?

515
00:31:27.356 --> 00:31:32.241
You have just like any kind of asymmetric scheme, any kind of PKI, you have a private key and a public key.

516
00:31:32.281 --> 00:31:43.233
Now, what you do is you have the ledger of how much money you have and you sign with your private key a transaction that says, I want to give this many Bitcoin to this other wallet.

517
00:31:43.253 --> 00:31:43.974
That transaction.

518
00:31:44.194 --> 00:31:48.717
transaction goes out into the blockchain and other nodes verify it's a valid transaction.

519
00:31:49.097 --> 00:31:52.740
And you use that to keep the public ledger of who has how much money.

520
00:31:53.440 --> 00:31:58.744
The crux of that is that the private key obviously remains private, right?

521
00:31:59.084 --> 00:32:05.108
The private key being a fundamental piece of cryptography that is generated on a hardware wallet when it is instantiated.

522
00:32:05.148 --> 00:32:05.388
Okay.

523
00:32:05.809 --> 00:32:06.049
Now the

524
00:32:08.170 --> 00:32:10.953
is a function of this thing called a seed phrase.

525
00:32:11.173 --> 00:32:21.364
Okay, like any kind of crypto algorithm, the randomness is super important because being able to predict the seed phrase on this hardware wallet allows you to therefore predict the private key.

526
00:32:21.424 --> 00:32:27.830
From a 12 or 24 word seed phrase that every hardware wallet has, you can therefore predict the private key.

527
00:32:28.451 --> 00:32:36.282
This cold card had this issue where they pushed a firmware update in 2021 that changed how the seed phrase was derived.

528
00:32:36.743 --> 00:32:44.374
It used a form of RNG that used an internal timer inside of the wallet at boot.

529
00:32:44.674 --> 00:32:47.055
which could relatively be predicted, right?

530
00:32:47.095 --> 00:32:54.340
The boot timer that it takes to boot up your wallet is probably going to have a fixed timer amount by the time you get to the RNG creations phrase.

531
00:32:54.940 --> 00:33:03.104
And so because of that, it reduced the total entropy of the seed phrase generation step from 128 bits, which has, I think, what is it?

532
00:33:03.445 --> 00:33:09.808
A quadrillion, a fake made-up number, a very large number that could never be brute-forced, down to 40 bits of entropy, okay?

533
00:33:09.848 --> 00:33:10.008
Okay.

534
00:33:11.269 --> 00:33:28.323
Because of this, the way that a blockchain works is you are able to now guess, effectively, the seed phrase, therefore the private key, on the network of who – like, you could basically brute force these private keys, put them out to the network, and drain wallets for free.

535
00:33:28.363 --> 00:33:30.445
Okay, this is a big vulnerability that happened last month.

536
00:33:30.905 --> 00:33:35.827
And so everyone's like, oh, my God, like very nervous about Trezor potentially being vulnerable to this.

537
00:33:36.567 --> 00:33:37.328
Ultimately, it was not.

538
00:33:37.388 --> 00:33:39.709
It was just a big, you know, phishing campaign.

539
00:33:39.769 --> 00:33:42.470
But it's just the worst case scenario, right?

540
00:33:42.810 --> 00:33:45.051
Real bug in a different manufacturer exists.

541
00:33:46.107 --> 00:33:49.310
This bug comes out, not a real bug, looks like a real bug.

542
00:33:49.450 --> 00:33:50.511
Oh, but it's signed by Trezor.

543
00:33:50.531 --> 00:33:51.251
I'm going to go act.

544
00:33:51.572 --> 00:33:54.774
And in doing that, you do a Bitcoin migration from your wallet.

545
00:33:55.075 --> 00:33:58.117
And oops, who you migrated to is not actually a real wallet.

546
00:33:58.237 --> 00:33:58.938
It's a fake account.

547
00:33:59.098 --> 00:34:03.422
So if you are vulnerable or if you've been compromised with this, I'm very sorry.

548
00:34:03.522 --> 00:34:04.683
That is wildly unfortunate.

549
00:34:04.703 --> 00:34:09.907
Like Matt alluded to previously, the problem with crypto is there are no regulatory bodies.

550
00:34:09.927 --> 00:34:11.529
There's no FDIC insurance.

551
00:34:11.569 --> 00:34:13.891
So you're kind of just shit out of luck, unfortunately.

552
00:34:14.889 --> 00:34:19.911
Yeah, I think the space is like primed for scams like this too, right?

553
00:34:19.991 --> 00:34:23.173
Because it's, A, it's hard to tell what's real for most people.

554
00:34:24.874 --> 00:34:26.434
I mean, good fishing is good fishing.

555
00:34:26.474 --> 00:34:27.535
It works for a reason.

556
00:34:28.075 --> 00:34:32.717
Now you got people in like heightened sensitivity because there's like money involved and all this kind of stuff.

557
00:34:34.418 --> 00:34:35.599
These kinds of things can happen.

558
00:34:36.720 --> 00:34:39.121
Case in point, the next two stories we're going to talk about.

559
00:34:39.201 --> 00:34:55.171
So number one, it seems like we have some people calling themselves white hat hackers who some other people might debate the color of said hat who have found a vulnerability in liquid network, which can you do you know much about?

560
00:34:55.191 --> 00:34:56.051
I actually don't.

561
00:34:56.071 --> 00:34:57.172
I have no idea what that is.

562
00:34:57.192 --> 00:34:59.053
Okay, it's a Bitcoin market.

563
00:34:59.714 --> 00:35:01.515
It's as much as I'm willing to talk about it.

564
00:35:01.575 --> 00:35:02.816
It's not a crypto guy either.

565
00:35:03.256 --> 00:35:10.061
But they were drained of a couple hundred million dollars.

566
00:35:11.141 --> 00:35:16.205
And so the thing with crypto and the blockchain is there's a lot of people watching Bitcoin.

567
00:35:16.485 --> 00:35:25.450
a lot of these blockchains and can report what they're seeing in terms of like big anomalous movements before we ever actually get a news story about it.

568
00:35:25.831 --> 00:35:27.331
This is one of those such cases, right?

569
00:35:27.752 --> 00:35:29.593
So we have like some Twitter accounts.

570
00:35:30.313 --> 00:35:36.737
Liquid network was drained of approximately 4,000 Bitcoin, which is like $320 million over the past several hours.

571
00:35:37.858 --> 00:35:42.760
The hackers left the following on chain message, quote, we are white hats.

572
00:35:43.121 --> 00:35:44.962
Contact us on chain.

573
00:35:46.740 --> 00:35:49.824
Do you talk to any of your friends on chain?

574
00:35:50.044 --> 00:35:50.545
I do not.

575
00:35:50.705 --> 00:35:51.587
I like privacy.

576
00:35:51.727 --> 00:35:55.853
And by the definition of the technology, the blockchain is not private.

577
00:35:55.953 --> 00:35:56.574
So no thank you.

578
00:35:57.067 --> 00:36:00.288
I'm going to just start adding on chain to random sentences for me.

579
00:36:00.428 --> 00:36:02.209
It's like, Hey, do you guys want a cop?

580
00:36:02.229 --> 00:36:03.729
I'm going to go grab a coffee on chain.

581
00:36:04.050 --> 00:36:05.050
On chain.

582
00:36:05.710 --> 00:36:06.610
You want, you want anything?

583
00:36:06.991 --> 00:36:08.471
It's going to be a running bit of mine.

584
00:36:09.011 --> 00:36:09.892
I actually have it.

585
00:36:10.112 --> 00:36:11.092
I don't think I have it in the office.

586
00:36:11.152 --> 00:36:14.033
I have a cinder block on a chain like necklace.

587
00:36:14.113 --> 00:36:15.994
And it's got my blockchain.

588
00:36:16.574 --> 00:36:18.775
So the other bits about this.

589
00:36:18.895 --> 00:36:23.196
So yeah, the hacker said this and then the hackers returned the money.

590
00:36:23.817 --> 00:36:24.377
All of it, right?

591
00:36:25.037 --> 00:36:25.358
All of it.

592
00:36:25.758 --> 00:36:27.359
Totally returned all of it, right?

593
00:36:29.141 --> 00:36:29.381
Right?

594
00:36:29.862 --> 00:36:30.482
Yeah, I hope.

595
00:36:30.503 --> 00:36:31.524
I'm sure they did.

596
00:36:31.584 --> 00:36:32.524
No, they didn't.

597
00:36:32.545 --> 00:36:35.928
They returned 3,400 of the 4,000 stolen Bitcoin.

598
00:36:35.948 --> 00:36:40.492
They kept 600 Bitcoin for themselves, claiming it as a...

599
00:36:41.972 --> 00:36:44.873
bounty for the vulnerability that let them train this.

600
00:36:44.893 --> 00:36:48.214
They're like, yeah, okay, Liquid Network, you're welcome.

601
00:36:48.514 --> 00:36:53.536
Our fee for finding this flaw and draining $320 million worth of Bitcoin was $47 million, which is...

602
00:36:58.018 --> 00:37:06.869
Today I learned that if you find the bank may have left their door open, it is completely legal to tell them after having robbed the vault.

603
00:37:07.069 --> 00:37:07.349
Yes.

604
00:37:07.449 --> 00:37:07.830
Listen.

605
00:37:07.850 --> 00:37:08.390
For sure.

606
00:37:08.571 --> 00:37:13.917
Listen, if what's actually going on here, I have a theory.

607
00:37:13.937 --> 00:37:15.399
I have a theory.

608
00:37:15.639 --> 00:37:17.742
This isn't actually hackers.

609
00:37:19.105 --> 00:37:23.189
This is mythos.

610
00:37:23.349 --> 00:37:24.010
It's mythos.

611
00:37:24.270 --> 00:37:27.673
And so since it's mythos, this isn't a felony.

612
00:37:28.414 --> 00:37:29.415
It's just misaligned.

613
00:37:29.455 --> 00:37:34.540
This is a misalignment from the goal of the mythos level model.

614
00:37:35.561 --> 00:37:42.887
It obviously is doing what mythos is good at and found a vulnerability in this Bitcoin market.

615
00:37:43.688 --> 00:37:50.433
And who's going to pay mythos data center bills if not the bounties on these kinds of things?

616
00:37:50.493 --> 00:37:52.294
No, I obviously don't actually think that.

617
00:37:52.374 --> 00:37:53.615
I just want to make it very clear.

618
00:37:53.955 --> 00:37:59.399
Brother, I mean, all they had to do was put, please don't charge a $40 million bug bounty fee in their sandbox.md.

619
00:37:59.439 --> 00:38:01.120
I mean, guardrails.md.

620
00:38:01.160 --> 00:38:02.221
Guardrails.md.

621
00:38:02.521 --> 00:38:03.461
Spec.md.

622
00:38:04.022 --> 00:38:04.302
Yeah.

623
00:38:04.682 --> 00:38:05.283
Yeah, yeah, yeah.

624
00:38:05.403 --> 00:38:05.643
Totally.

625
00:38:05.663 --> 00:38:06.403
It's kind of crazy.

626
00:38:06.503 --> 00:38:07.944
Firewall rules 0.0.0.

627
00:38:09.105 --> 00:38:10.706
I'm all for people getting paid, right?

628
00:38:10.786 --> 00:38:21.549
Like if you're gonna do bug bounty, but let's make sure we like read the scope and the context of the bug bounty and know what we're getting into before we go robbing large corporation of 40 mil.

629
00:38:21.649 --> 00:38:22.369
You know what's wild?

630
00:38:22.630 --> 00:38:28.511
The bug that the crypto space has some of the largest confirmed legal actual bounty payouts.

631
00:38:28.552 --> 00:38:30.812
Like it's a very lucrative space to do research.

632
00:38:30.832 --> 00:38:33.953
Cause if you could find something like this where you could steal $320 million, they will actually pay you

633
00:38:36.414 --> 00:38:38.756
Way above the Apple and Google.

634
00:38:39.036 --> 00:38:40.537
They'll pay you tens of dollars.

635
00:38:41.177 --> 00:38:42.798
Yeah, way above that.

636
00:38:42.898 --> 00:38:49.622
We have confirmed multi-million dollar bounty payouts out of some of these crypto companies.

637
00:38:49.982 --> 00:38:51.483
The highest confirmed bounties on record.

638
00:38:52.064 --> 00:38:56.626
So not 47 million.

639
00:38:56.866 --> 00:39:01.589
Coinbase launches a new $5 million bug bounty program with rewards up to $5 million USDC.

640
00:39:03.263 --> 00:39:04.284
Yeah, the coin bit.

641
00:39:04.324 --> 00:39:05.524
I don't think they've ever paid that one.

642
00:39:05.644 --> 00:39:12.208
There's some like other smaller markets that have actually paid seven figure bounties, which are kind of nuts.

643
00:39:13.049 --> 00:39:13.729
So, okay.

644
00:39:14.729 --> 00:39:19.012
One more crypto story and then we can kind of like stop pretending that we know a lot about this.

645
00:39:19.152 --> 00:39:20.613
But this was this one's kind of gnarly.

646
00:39:20.993 --> 00:39:22.614
So I want to recommend another YouTuber.

647
00:39:23.814 --> 00:39:24.075
There's.

648
00:39:24.895 --> 00:39:26.697
The YouTuber account is called Crumb.

649
00:39:27.217 --> 00:39:30.140
If any of you follow the account, I'm a fan.

650
00:39:30.700 --> 00:39:36.145
Sometimes when I live stream and get tired towards the end of stream, I'll do some live React videos.

651
00:39:36.906 --> 00:39:40.950
You've unfortunately seen your own face if you hang out in my stream a few times.

652
00:39:41.050 --> 00:39:41.891
And you're like, I'm out.

653
00:39:41.991 --> 00:39:42.391
This is awkward.

654
00:39:42.411 --> 00:39:43.052
I'm watching my own videos.

655
00:39:43.652 --> 00:39:49.197
Uh, but, uh, crumb is one of them and he, he kind of goes in and it's very dark net diaries ask, right?

656
00:39:49.237 --> 00:39:57.704
Like kind of talk talks about stories about threat actors getting caught and like what they were doing with their schemes before that.

657
00:39:58.365 --> 00:40:03.870
And we've got this, uh, this scammer who was extremely prolific.

658
00:40:04.290 --> 00:40:05.571
His name is Malone lamb.

659
00:40:06.552 --> 00:40:09.754
He was from Singapore, citizen of Singapore, but then moved to...

660
00:40:10.855 --> 00:40:14.357
If you had to pick a city that was filled with crypto scammers, what would you pick?

661
00:40:15.297 --> 00:40:16.378
Hmm.

662
00:40:16.398 --> 00:40:16.538
LA.

663
00:40:16.898 --> 00:40:17.338
No, Vegas.

664
00:40:18.219 --> 00:40:18.979
Oh, man.

665
00:40:19.119 --> 00:40:20.900
I thought this was a shoe-in.

666
00:40:21.000 --> 00:40:21.421
Miami.

667
00:40:21.481 --> 00:40:22.021
It was Miami.

668
00:40:22.901 --> 00:40:23.462
Yeah, come on.

669
00:40:23.542 --> 00:40:25.683
It's like crypto capital of the world, right?

670
00:40:26.543 --> 00:40:29.245
So I've actually done a bunch of digging into this.

671
00:40:29.345 --> 00:40:31.346
Sorry, side tangent.

672
00:40:31.446 --> 00:40:32.807
It always super fascinates me.

673
00:40:33.427 --> 00:40:34.148
If you stole...

674
00:40:35.226 --> 00:40:40.272
$240 million in Bitcoin like today, right?

675
00:40:41.073 --> 00:40:44.197
How would you like realize that to improve your life?

676
00:40:44.217 --> 00:40:44.798
Any, any,

677
00:40:45.808 --> 00:40:46.208
Oh, yeah.

678
00:40:46.328 --> 00:41:04.219
I mean, I was looking through the photos before we went live here, and you can see that person having a truly existential moment where they don't know how to be happier with their money because of the number of cars and shoes and, and, and, and, and they were buying to try to hit the next dopamine level.

679
00:41:04.459 --> 00:41:05.219
Are we happy yet?

680
00:41:05.299 --> 00:41:06.420
To get that rush going.

681
00:41:06.460 --> 00:41:06.900
Yeah, man.

682
00:41:07.240 --> 00:41:09.322
Again, I have a number for sure.

683
00:41:09.662 --> 00:41:12.343
It is nowhere near 240 million, dude.

684
00:41:12.403 --> 00:41:13.264
I don't even mean that.

685
00:41:13.344 --> 00:41:14.064
We could talk about that.

686
00:41:14.264 --> 00:41:14.605
I mean...

687
00:41:15.265 --> 00:41:19.148
Physically, how do you like oh, yeah, you go to the club you go to the whatever.

688
00:41:19.348 --> 00:41:21.009
How do you spend stolen Bitcoin?

689
00:41:21.290 --> 00:41:21.510
Right?

690
00:41:21.610 --> 00:41:25.633
Oh, yeah, are you are you asking me how to launder money and Matt FBI open up?

691
00:41:26.366 --> 00:41:26.987
Knock, knock, knock.

692
00:41:27.147 --> 00:41:32.311
I've worked at big banks and like when you walk in the door, they make you take all this like anti-money laundering training so you can spot it.

693
00:41:32.451 --> 00:41:37.316
I learned more about money laundering from anti-money laundering training working at a bank than I ever knew before.

694
00:41:37.416 --> 00:41:49.246
First of all, second of all, a lot of like what you think of as like crypto laundering, like I would have said, if you would have asked me this before I went down the rabbit hole of this, I would have said, oh, there's like mixers, right?

695
00:41:49.506 --> 00:41:53.950
Like people, you know, you send a bunch of crypto into this thing, they take a fee, they sell it,

696
00:41:53.990 --> 00:41:56.593
spread it out a bunch of, you know, a gazillion wallets.

697
00:41:56.633 --> 00:42:00.598
And then it's like, it goes to Monero and then it's like, whatever.

698
00:42:00.618 --> 00:42:01.639
It's like harder to trace to you.

699
00:42:01.679 --> 00:42:09.087
And it's like, comes back clean, but like you keep pulling that thread and it's like, okay, now I've got Monero in a wallet in Asia.

700
00:42:09.107 --> 00:42:09.488
Right.

701
00:42:09.508 --> 00:42:09.648
Right.

702
00:42:09.888 --> 00:42:12.250
How do I buy my Lamborghini in Miami?

703
00:42:12.830 --> 00:42:14.972
I still couldn't figure out the jump, right?

704
00:42:15.772 --> 00:42:17.774
And I was trying to truly understand this.

705
00:42:18.134 --> 00:42:21.697
Yeah, obviously, this sounds funny, but no, not for my own whatever.

706
00:42:21.717 --> 00:42:22.918
It's just like, this is what we do, right?

707
00:42:22.978 --> 00:42:24.359
So how do these threat actors do this?

708
00:42:25.099 --> 00:42:26.200
Listen, there will be signs.

709
00:42:28.402 --> 00:42:31.364
If Lola and I come into $240 million, there will be signs.

710
00:42:31.424 --> 00:42:33.585
It won't be a Lamborghini for me, but there will be signs.

711
00:42:34.966 --> 00:42:35.207
So...

712
00:42:36.302 --> 00:42:42.503
It turns out that a lot of what you saw in all those pictures might not have just been a dopamine jackpot.

713
00:42:43.024 --> 00:42:49.405
The supercars in the luxury house driveway, first of all, they're renting all those houses, right?

714
00:42:49.545 --> 00:42:51.065
And a lot of those supercars are rented, too.

715
00:42:51.565 --> 00:42:52.326
Some of them are purchased.

716
00:42:52.986 --> 00:42:57.807
Turns out Miami has luxury dealers that will accept cryptocurrency.

717
00:42:58.467 --> 00:42:59.769
No way.

718
00:43:00.370 --> 00:43:06.218
Miami specifically has Rolex dealers and supercar dealers that will take crypto payment.

719
00:43:08.756 --> 00:43:10.898
For what purpose other than money laundering?

720
00:43:11.378 --> 00:43:14.160
Well, dude, what purpose does crypto have other than scale?

721
00:43:14.260 --> 00:43:15.321
Like, period, right?

722
00:43:15.361 --> 00:43:16.422
Like, exactly.

723
00:43:16.462 --> 00:43:17.322
This is my point.

724
00:43:17.382 --> 00:43:17.823
What was it?

725
00:43:18.023 --> 00:43:21.285
Live overflow of the video recently where he talked about, like, I forget what he was about.

726
00:43:21.305 --> 00:43:25.248
But basically, like, in part of the video, he was like, yeah, I did my master's thesis in crypto.

727
00:43:25.428 --> 00:43:30.372
I'm fascinated by the technology, but it literally has no purpose other than money laundering and theft.

728
00:43:30.592 --> 00:43:31.713
Like, it's true.

729
00:43:31.733 --> 00:43:32.774
I don't know what else it's used for.

730
00:43:33.182 --> 00:43:34.803
Yeah, I mean, it's wild.

731
00:43:34.903 --> 00:43:42.107
And so, yeah, this is one of the reasons why Miami is a hotspot for it is that you can liquidate to real life assets.

732
00:43:42.848 --> 00:43:45.149
So now I understand, right?

733
00:43:45.529 --> 00:43:54.734
You get all these cars and Rolexes, not just because you're 18 and dumb and stole $240 million, even though that seems to be a huge part of a lot of this.

734
00:43:55.675 --> 00:43:56.335
You have an asset.

735
00:43:56.355 --> 00:43:57.436
You can now sell that car.

736
00:43:59.031 --> 00:44:05.114
Yeah, you could totally sell a supercar for a quarter million dollars and get physical a quarter million dollars.

737
00:44:05.174 --> 00:44:07.475
And I was like, okay, now I get it, right?

738
00:44:07.695 --> 00:44:08.635
That's why you go buy the Rolex.

739
00:44:08.975 --> 00:44:11.476
Well, this guy, sorry, tangent.

740
00:44:12.157 --> 00:44:13.097
Don't do anything I just said.

741
00:44:13.117 --> 00:44:13.877
Money laundering tangent.

742
00:44:14.258 --> 00:44:14.858
Sorry.

743
00:44:15.558 --> 00:44:19.760
Don't do anything I just said because this guy's going to jail forever, like forever, ever.

744
00:44:19.840 --> 00:44:21.741
They're making an example of this guy, right?

745
00:44:21.761 --> 00:44:27.523
So Malone Lamb, 22, citizen of Singapore, resident of Miami, pled guilty in Washington, D.C. today.

746
00:44:29.362 --> 00:44:36.145
to steal and launder cryptocurrency valued at more than $245 million, which we also just read the court docs while we were getting ready.

747
00:44:37.005 --> 00:44:44.248
He's expected to actually forfeit all $245 million, which as we see from the photos, a lot of it was spent and is gone, right?

748
00:44:45.288 --> 00:44:53.334
I don't think that these supercars that I don't even know the names of brands of because I'm not in that tax bracket hold their value very well.

749
00:44:53.414 --> 00:44:58.098
I would not assume that, you know, you could just turn around and sell it for what you walked out of there with.

750
00:44:58.158 --> 00:44:58.358
Right.

751
00:44:59.719 --> 00:45:00.420
This guy was nuts.

752
00:45:00.700 --> 00:45:07.165
The crumb YouTube video goes into like his actual crime empire that this guy wound up building.

753
00:45:08.786 --> 00:45:11.469
They were prolific, prolific social engineers.

754
00:45:12.049 --> 00:45:17.915
So they had callers, they had drainers, they had people with different skill sets doing different parts of the scam.

755
00:45:18.916 --> 00:45:24.841
And a lot of this couple hundred million dollars were from like one or two whales, they call it, right?

756
00:45:24.861 --> 00:45:28.364
These targets, they actually buy, basically thread intel.

757
00:45:29.282 --> 00:45:30.602
They buy target intelligence.

758
00:45:30.622 --> 00:45:39.844
They buy Intel from like insiders at some of these companies that don't really want to be involved in this whole world, but they'll sell data on the whales.

759
00:45:40.124 --> 00:45:40.364
Right.

760
00:45:40.424 --> 00:45:43.845
So it's like, oh, we know the real name of this guy because he did KYC.

761
00:45:44.025 --> 00:45:46.225
Like he uploaded his driver's license, all this kind of stuff.

762
00:45:46.886 --> 00:45:51.306
We know this guy's real name and he has hundreds of millions of dollars in crypto in our exchange.

763
00:45:51.366 --> 00:45:53.167
And then they then they know who to go target.

764
00:45:53.407 --> 00:45:53.607
Right.

765
00:45:54.207 --> 00:45:56.009
My question is, what am I doing wrong, bro?

766
00:45:56.169 --> 00:45:58.711
Because this guy is 22 years old.

767
00:45:59.232 --> 00:46:01.474
I feel like I've only recently come into my prime.

768
00:46:01.514 --> 00:46:03.055
I'm 32, bro.

769
00:46:03.636 --> 00:46:05.537
He's got $245 million at 22.

770
00:46:05.577 --> 00:46:07.539
I feel like I'm on the... Am I the wrong career, Matt?

771
00:46:07.559 --> 00:46:08.560
What are we doing?

772
00:46:09.141 --> 00:46:10.122
He doesn't have it...

773
00:46:11.543 --> 00:46:12.625
Janine Biro has it.

774
00:46:13.826 --> 00:46:14.247
Sorry.

775
00:46:15.389 --> 00:46:17.471
My question is more like, when did he start doing this?

776
00:46:17.551 --> 00:46:19.034
Was he a criminal at 14?

777
00:46:19.174 --> 00:46:20.115
What the hell?

778
00:46:20.536 --> 00:46:24.441
Dude, they're all Minecraft and Roblox gamers.

779
00:46:24.541 --> 00:46:25.242
That's so creepy.

780
00:46:25.262 --> 00:46:25.763
All of these like...

781
00:46:28.847 --> 00:46:35.775
people that we talk about that are not nation state cyber threats, like these E like cyber criminals that aren't nation backed.

782
00:46:35.975 --> 00:46:36.196
Yeah.

783
00:46:36.576 --> 00:46:40.801
Almost all of them are tied to gaming discords.

784
00:46:41.121 --> 00:46:45.387
And a lot of them get started hacking these game accounts because they could sell, um,

785
00:46:46.865 --> 00:46:48.585
desirable usernames.

786
00:46:48.945 --> 00:46:50.086
What was the forum called?

787
00:46:50.186 --> 00:46:51.246
OG names or something?

788
00:46:51.426 --> 00:46:52.746
Were you a gamer kid?

789
00:46:52.826 --> 00:46:56.027
No, I only know this from Threadactor research.

790
00:46:56.047 --> 00:47:02.308
I don't know this like from my gaming past, but there was like a exchange, basically a market to sell OG names.

791
00:47:02.348 --> 00:47:12.730
So like a name on Roblox or Minecraft or Twitter that is just like a name with no numbers, like a short name or like a desirable name.

792
00:47:13.290 --> 00:47:13.530
Right.

793
00:47:13.931 --> 00:47:20.236
And so there would be a real dollar amount that you could go sell a desirable account name for.

794
00:47:20.317 --> 00:47:22.418
And so they would target and social engineer.

795
00:47:22.879 --> 00:47:32.387
And this is how they got these skills by hacking Minecraft accounts and then turning around and selling those accounts with desirable names, short names or no numbers or whatever.

796
00:47:32.427 --> 00:47:33.689
Right.

797
00:47:34.009 --> 00:47:36.731
And then they were like, oh, this exact skill set.

798
00:47:37.592 --> 00:47:39.953
would work for these crypto accounts as well.

799
00:47:39.993 --> 00:47:41.294
And that's where a lot of this comes from.

800
00:47:41.394 --> 00:47:44.815
And a lot of them hit like moral boundaries, right?

801
00:47:44.835 --> 00:47:47.336
Where they're like, oh, I'm just lulls hacking Minecraft accounts.

802
00:47:47.356 --> 00:47:47.856
Who cares?

803
00:47:48.376 --> 00:47:52.818
And then ones that we read about in the news are literally have different wiring in their brain.

804
00:47:52.838 --> 00:47:54.359
They just don't hit that moral wall.

805
00:47:54.399 --> 00:47:57.320
They do not care that they're stealing grandma's life savings, right?

806
00:47:57.540 --> 00:47:58.481
That is insane, dude.

807
00:47:58.721 --> 00:47:58.941
Yeah.

808
00:47:59.141 --> 00:48:01.662
These people are enigmas to me for sure.

809
00:48:01.862 --> 00:48:02.382
It's kind of crazy.

810
00:48:02.542 --> 00:48:03.703
A lot of it ties to gaming stuff.

811
00:48:03.723 --> 00:48:04.103
It's crazy.

812
00:48:05.251 --> 00:48:06.072
You know what else is enigma?

813
00:48:06.212 --> 00:48:07.935
You know what else kind of boggles my mind?

814
00:48:09.697 --> 00:48:10.799
AI billionaires.

815
00:48:11.219 --> 00:48:13.362
You know what I mean?

816
00:48:13.442 --> 00:48:15.285
The worst transition of the year so far.

817
00:48:15.325 --> 00:48:15.545
Sorry.

818
00:48:15.565 --> 00:48:17.868
Hey, shut up, Matt.

819
00:48:18.209 --> 00:48:19.931
I'm over here sailing the ship.

820
00:48:21.686 --> 00:48:28.089
So I don't know if you guys are following this, but, you know, nothing news breaking here, nothing too crazy.

821
00:48:28.549 --> 00:48:36.072
Only 10% chance that AI eradicates humanity in the next decade.

822
00:48:36.393 --> 00:48:37.973
Not 25%, so that's good.

823
00:48:38.053 --> 00:48:39.314
So that's a good side.

824
00:48:39.334 --> 00:48:41.195
The bad side is that it is potentially 10%.

825
00:48:42.455 --> 00:48:43.095
Joking here.

826
00:48:43.296 --> 00:48:49.958
Well, joking about it being funny, but the real news is that recently an Anthropic researcher, Jacob, was it Coxon, I guess?

827
00:48:49.978 --> 00:48:59.302
I don't want to mispronounce his name, resigned from Anthropic on the grounds that they are being completely irresponsible with their safeguards for AI.

828
00:48:59.442 --> 00:49:07.226
We've seen this both in OpenAI and Anthropic, right, with all the mythos escaping the lab and Codex hacking all these companies and, you know... Not Codex.

829
00:49:07.286 --> 00:49:09.367
And, you know, the hugging face situation...

830
00:49:10.587 --> 00:49:16.228
Now, you would think that Anthropic would respond with a, oh, no, he's just being ridiculous.

831
00:49:16.268 --> 00:49:17.049
That's not true.

832
00:49:17.109 --> 00:49:17.629
Come on, guys.

833
00:49:17.649 --> 00:49:21.090
There's no world where AI eradicates humanity.

834
00:49:21.130 --> 00:49:30.172
Well, Evan Humminger, who is literally a, what is this, alignment scientist at Anthropic, says, Jacob is correct here, M-Dash.

835
00:49:30.212 --> 00:49:34.133
We really do earnestly believe that AI could kill all humans.

836
00:49:34.193 --> 00:49:38.554
I personally think that it is greater than 10% within the next decade.

837
00:49:38.574 --> 00:49:40.034
Matt, what the hell are we doing?

838
00:49:40.534 --> 00:49:42.016
How is this their official stance?

839
00:49:42.196 --> 00:49:44.799
Like, how is this like, yeah, yeah.

840
00:49:45.159 --> 00:49:45.820
Yeah, probably.

841
00:49:45.840 --> 00:49:46.661
Yeah, probably.

842
00:49:46.681 --> 00:49:47.501
Like...

843
00:49:50.117 --> 00:50:08.329
I like I Ben Affleck smoking a cigarette meme of like the comms employee at Anthropic that like needs to now figure out like this is again, I've worked in big financial institutions and like heavily regulated industries and they just do not let you do social media for this exact reason.

844
00:50:08.529 --> 00:50:09.090
You know what I mean?

845
00:50:09.130 --> 00:50:17.856
It's like, oh my God, it's now national headlines that this person that is actually, you know, tied to alignment and thropic is like, yeah, I mean,

846
00:50:18.676 --> 00:50:23.017
We do earnestly believe AI could kill all humans, exclamation point.

847
00:50:23.737 --> 00:50:24.137
Like, what?

848
00:50:24.177 --> 00:50:27.438
Like, how is this the official communications out of this, people?

849
00:50:27.858 --> 00:50:31.439
Yeah, I have a bit of a, I mean, I think tinfoil hat is the wrong word here.

850
00:50:31.659 --> 00:50:33.519
I have an idea with this.

851
00:50:34.299 --> 00:50:46.242
It just feels like since the beginning, Anthropic has been so hungry for government regulation and that this is just them, like, adding more fuel to that flame

852
00:50:46.842 --> 00:50:51.184
I don't think I fully understand what the end state is for the government regulation.

853
00:50:51.204 --> 00:51:01.950
But if you look at anything that Dario says, Sam Altman says for OpenAI, what this guy is saying, which this is like this has to be a PR cleared, like communications director cleared statement.

854
00:51:01.970 --> 00:51:06.292
You can't be an exec at Anthropic and just be tweeting for free.

855
00:51:06.312 --> 00:51:08.534
There has to be clearance that goes on there.

856
00:51:09.174 --> 00:51:12.456
The company can't have this direction without it being semi-intentional.

857
00:51:13.216 --> 00:51:21.581
Now, I think we talked kind of offline before the podcast about, like, maybe the government regulation comes and it kills small companies and gets rid of open weight models.

858
00:51:22.441 --> 00:51:25.603
But that's just, in my opinion, the open weight model conversation is non-enforceable.

859
00:51:25.623 --> 00:51:28.265
Like, I have Quen 3-7 downloaded upstairs right now.

860
00:51:28.905 --> 00:51:29.586
What are they going to do?

861
00:51:30.306 --> 00:51:30.866
Come to my house?

862
00:51:31.127 --> 00:51:32.627
Like, no, that's not possible.

863
00:51:32.928 --> 00:51:33.268
Maybe.

864
00:51:33.388 --> 00:51:33.668
I don't know.

865
00:51:33.688 --> 00:51:34.989
I mean, fucking FBI open up, I guess.

866
00:51:35.049 --> 00:51:35.249
Maybe.

867
00:51:35.509 --> 00:51:36.910
Like, where do we go with this?

868
00:51:38.135 --> 00:51:40.698
I like the Anakin meme.

869
00:51:41.678 --> 00:51:44.441
There's a 10% chance AI kills everyone, right?

870
00:51:44.461 --> 00:51:46.423
And then Padme's like, so you're going to stop it, right?

871
00:51:46.623 --> 00:51:47.564
Yeah.

872
00:51:48.185 --> 00:51:48.865
And Anakin.

873
00:51:49.766 --> 00:51:49.967
Right.

874
00:51:50.287 --> 00:51:52.249
I mean, I've been saying this since before.

875
00:51:52.309 --> 00:51:52.609
I mean...

876
00:51:53.670 --> 00:51:56.892
I guess I'm glad that like cyber isn't the topic this week.

877
00:51:56.912 --> 00:51:59.173
And now we're just talking about eradicating all humans.

878
00:51:59.773 --> 00:52:01.674
Thanks for the break on the cyber doomerism.

879
00:52:01.974 --> 00:52:09.358
But like, I've been saying this even since the cyber doomerism stuff that like, or even before that, like the real, real doomerism.

880
00:52:10.373 --> 00:52:18.941
like mainstream doomerism conversation, Sam and Dario have been on stage talking about how dangerous the thing that they're building is every time.

881
00:52:18.961 --> 00:52:21.403
And I've been like, this just feels so weird to me.

882
00:52:21.423 --> 00:52:21.523
Yeah.

883
00:52:21.803 --> 00:52:22.003
Right.

884
00:52:23.124 --> 00:52:27.148
Like if you phrase their things that they're saying differently, you know,

885
00:52:27.886 --> 00:52:36.850
In my head, it goes, the thing I'm building that might make me like the world's third trillionaire, that thing that I'm actively building is super dangerous, by the way.

886
00:52:37.250 --> 00:52:39.531
Like, oh, yeah, yeah, I'm going to keep doing it.

887
00:52:39.751 --> 00:52:42.093
Like, I'm still obviously working very hard on it.

888
00:52:42.613 --> 00:52:47.475
I am obsessed with building this thing that is incredibly, incredibly dangerous.

889
00:52:47.915 --> 00:52:49.776
Like, FYI, super dangerous, right?

890
00:52:50.096 --> 00:52:50.716
It's like, what?

891
00:52:50.736 --> 00:52:51.217
Like, what?

892
00:52:53.038 --> 00:52:57.480
Yeah, I think I planted the tinfoil hat seed on you there, too, right?

893
00:52:57.941 --> 00:53:08.767
Like, there is a world where the only people that could survive government regulation are the biggest players that are already established and already have the data centers and the capital and all this, right?

894
00:53:08.787 --> 00:53:10.768
The Anthropics, the OpenAI's, the Googles, right?

895
00:53:10.808 --> 00:53:12.029
That, like, okay, cool.

896
00:53:12.049 --> 00:53:12.970
The government starts to...

897
00:53:13.910 --> 00:53:39.258
you know, get real spicy about this because it's so dangerous, as you said, that they probably could survive that, even though, I don't know, it can't be like all positive if they wind up, you know, with some serious regulation, because now you're starting to see some pretty serious big name politicians come out with like an all out AI ban, not like an open model ban, like, hey, hit the brakes on the whole damn thing.

898
00:53:40.384 --> 00:53:43.066
So how is that good for even the big players?

899
00:53:43.206 --> 00:53:43.927
I don't understand.

900
00:53:44.968 --> 00:53:51.493
Should we read this Jacob bit real quick so it's not just headlines that we're going off of?

901
00:53:51.553 --> 00:53:52.034
Yeah, send it.

902
00:53:52.134 --> 00:53:52.554
Let's do it.

903
00:53:53.415 --> 00:54:00.561
Because, okay, I think we honed in on the current Anthropic employee saying the 10% chance that we're going to eradicate humanity.

904
00:54:01.001 --> 00:54:02.623
The thing that started this all...

905
00:54:03.303 --> 00:54:05.804
Jeez, might be the most viral tweet I've ever seen.

906
00:54:06.104 --> 00:54:09.505
154 million views, 748,000 likes.

907
00:54:09.705 --> 00:54:11.266
Have you ever seen more than that?

908
00:54:11.286 --> 00:54:12.106
That's insane.

909
00:54:12.326 --> 00:54:12.686
Oh, yes.

910
00:54:12.747 --> 00:54:15.327
When the Apple CEO, the new one, tweeted hello.

911
00:54:15.888 --> 00:54:16.248
That one.

912
00:54:17.152 --> 00:54:17.352
Yeah.

913
00:54:17.632 --> 00:54:19.353
That got like 350 million views, I think.

914
00:54:19.373 --> 00:54:20.474
But other than that, number two.

915
00:54:20.614 --> 00:54:20.814
Yes.

916
00:54:21.134 --> 00:54:21.555
Hello.

917
00:54:23.376 --> 00:54:25.377
Or when like Obama wore a tan suit.

918
00:54:25.397 --> 00:54:25.757
I don't know.

919
00:54:26.037 --> 00:54:29.119
So I resigned from Anthropic today.

920
00:54:29.819 --> 00:54:35.743
I spent the last three years doing pre-training research at both OpenAI and Anthropic.

921
00:54:35.763 --> 00:54:37.284
So you've seen both sides of it, right?

922
00:54:37.404 --> 00:54:38.565
Kind of interesting perspective.

923
00:54:39.465 --> 00:55:04.164
neither company is acting responsibly they are racing straight to self-improving super intelligence and gambling with our lives more thoughts below i want to get to this thread and then i want your thoughts on that specific bit because i think that's like what we're honing in on do not underestimate the power of this technology these will soon be superhuman systems that can hack anything revolutionize any field overnight and acquire real power and resources

924
00:55:04.764 --> 00:55:09.770
We have all witnessed the progress in each of these domains, and progress is not slowing.

925
00:55:11.271 --> 00:55:17.017
I have a question, Mark, on if we've seen progress on acquiring real power and resources.

926
00:55:17.037 --> 00:55:17.438
I don't know.

927
00:55:17.598 --> 00:55:18.699
That's like, that seems...

928
00:55:19.780 --> 00:55:20.200
Questionable.

929
00:55:20.561 --> 00:55:26.265
The people building AI earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade.

930
00:55:26.485 --> 00:55:27.766
This is not a marketing stunt.

931
00:55:27.886 --> 00:55:34.131
If anything, many executives and senior researchers will couch their phrasing in the press to sound sensible.

932
00:55:34.651 --> 00:55:37.013
But I hear the same people express fear privately.

933
00:55:37.533 --> 00:55:40.095
No other human activity poses this level of danger.

934
00:55:41.036 --> 00:55:44.298
A common response is, if they truly believe this, why are they still building it?

935
00:55:44.418 --> 00:55:48.520
At OpenAI, many have not deeply internalized the civilizational stakes.

936
00:55:49.120 --> 00:55:54.323
At Anthropic, the stakes are well understood, but they are locked in a race to get there first.

937
00:55:54.623 --> 00:55:59.926
They believe no one else will act responsibly, so they must do it themselves despite the risk.

938
00:56:00.766 --> 00:56:09.449
Accepting this race and entering the endgame is a hubristic gamble and should not be launched from a private company's slack.

939
00:56:10.029 --> 00:56:16.471
Attempting to speedrun alignment should require extraordinary confidence that there are no better trajectories available.

940
00:56:16.931 --> 00:56:19.312
I'm optimistic about the potential for coordination.

941
00:56:19.512 --> 00:56:25.014
Warning shots like the Hugging Face attack have made pacing agreements between U.S. labs more viable.

942
00:56:25.694 --> 00:56:33.116
I don't feel like we're on track to prevent a global race, which may require costly actions such as a temporary ban on improving model capabilities.

943
00:56:33.916 --> 00:56:38.198
If you are a lab researcher, I urge you to consider what the next few years will actually feel like.

944
00:56:38.578 --> 00:56:45.060
Do you want to kick off a super intelligent RL run without a rigorous understanding of its mind?

945
00:56:45.500 --> 00:56:53.022
Should you put your head down because, quote, it's happening anyway, or take this moment to call for different conditions?

946
00:56:53.522 --> 00:56:54.824
I think it's really important to read all that.

947
00:56:55.545 --> 00:57:03.795
I know this is like not good podcasting 101 here, but that's kind of a lot of insane claims from an insider.

948
00:57:04.135 --> 00:57:06.058
And I understand why this is getting so much attention.

949
00:57:06.078 --> 00:57:09.262
Do you have any thoughts about the self-improving super intelligence part?

950
00:57:12.790 --> 00:57:19.836
And my only thoughts are, like, it's only as dangerous as, like, the MCP servers and external access you give it, right?

951
00:57:19.896 --> 00:57:26.421
Like, if the model is just a model that says words and you recursively improve that, I don't really care about that.

952
00:57:26.841 --> 00:57:31.025
But, like, just don't give it nuclear arsenal MCP servers.

953
00:57:31.085 --> 00:57:31.685
You know what I'm saying?

954
00:57:31.725 --> 00:57:34.548
Like, until someone hooks it in...

955
00:57:34.588 --> 00:57:35.168
This is the whole thing.

956
00:57:35.188 --> 00:57:35.428
It's like...

957
00:57:36.529 --> 00:57:40.813
There weren't any issues until we made this a cyber weapon.

958
00:57:41.133 --> 00:57:48.059
We started talking about how to use this on the internet to do cyber warfare, and then it kind of became the hot thing, and I think the cat's out of the bag at that point.

959
00:57:48.379 --> 00:57:53.623
But if it had just maintained, if it had just stayed as a model, there really is no inherent danger there.

960
00:57:53.824 --> 00:57:53.964
Yeah.

961
00:57:56.060 --> 00:57:56.361
I don't know.

962
00:57:56.381 --> 00:58:05.287
I just don't know what the solution here is because these ships are already moving away so fast that it's just like, okay, cat's out of the bag, Pandora's box is open, now what do we do?

963
00:58:05.907 --> 00:58:21.619
And then there's so many, you know, I'm not going to say capitalists because that sounds like, ooh, capitalism bad, but there's so many like profit-driven incentives to keep Pandora's box open that I'm not sure where it goes because like, you know, if we close this box, the SMP is going to take a fucking like 30% hit, right?

964
00:58:21.639 --> 00:58:22.840
And what does that do to the world?

965
00:58:22.880 --> 00:58:23.240
I'm not sure.

966
00:58:24.536 --> 00:58:31.740
Yeah, I kind of understand each point being made here, but I don't think I take a lot of these to the extreme as presented.

967
00:58:31.760 --> 00:58:34.642
I don't like I don't know if that's just like rose colored glasses.

968
00:58:35.762 --> 00:58:41.526
I think I do understand it beyond kind of what you're saying instead of just we'll just don't give it the nuclear arsenal MCP because like.

969
00:58:42.246 --> 00:58:46.389
they do make it clear that they are not talking about current state models.

970
00:58:46.449 --> 00:58:55.557
They are specifically referring to a future state where we are at some sort of self-improving recursive superintelligence.

971
00:58:55.997 --> 00:58:59.740
That is not current state models, which would require everything that you're talking about.

972
00:59:00.060 --> 00:59:01.481
So they are talking about some...

973
00:59:02.422 --> 00:59:17.393
hypothetical future state where the capabilities become so exponential here that you don't need to give it the access because it will have its own motives and its own act access like that it can create out of thin air basically.

974
00:59:17.433 --> 00:59:17.633
Right.

975
00:59:18.173 --> 00:59:19.714
Is what they're referring to.

976
00:59:19.975 --> 00:59:20.195
Right.

977
00:59:21.516 --> 00:59:23.937
I don't necessarily think that like if.

978
00:59:25.671 --> 00:59:33.173
I had a long debate with Daniel Meisler about this on my YouTube channel, and he talked a lot about this in terms of especially like open weight models.

979
00:59:34.033 --> 00:59:37.514
And I think you and I are both the same in like, how are you going to regulate that?

980
00:59:37.554 --> 00:59:39.095
Like whatever, you know, you just download this.

981
00:59:39.115 --> 00:59:40.875
How are you going to regulate these open weight models?

982
00:59:41.115 --> 00:59:46.757
He's of the camp that like those are truly dangerous because if they get good enough, you're giving like.

983
00:59:47.617 --> 00:59:53.964
sociopathic teenagers that we talk about in threat criminals, you're giving them this tool that could be a super hacker, right?

984
00:59:54.184 --> 00:59:55.306
For basically free.

985
00:59:56.127 --> 00:59:57.949
My argument to that, right?

986
00:59:57.989 --> 01:00:01.172
Cause we, we, we went around in circles on this, on this conversation is super interesting.

987
01:00:01.292 --> 01:00:01.472
Right.

988
01:00:01.953 --> 01:00:02.293
But like,

989
01:00:03.835 --> 01:00:13.306
The only way that that's like terabad forever for everybody is if you ignore the fact that then the defenders also have the same exact capabilities, right?

990
01:00:14.007 --> 01:00:20.774
If you have like an all-knowing, all like powerful, basically free model capability, like...

991
01:00:21.895 --> 01:00:24.617
we also have it to like shore up, right?

992
01:00:24.677 --> 01:00:28.699
A lot of the things that the offensive version of that could do, right?

993
01:00:28.919 --> 01:00:34.982
Like if, again, because we're talking super hypothetical, not current state models, not just like find RCE.

994
01:00:35.002 --> 01:00:40.085
We're talking about some sort of super intelligence can find its way into any system, whatever.

995
01:00:40.125 --> 01:00:43.767
It's like, well, then you also have that on the other side of the equation.

996
01:00:44.167 --> 01:00:45.648
Otherwise, none of this makes sense.

997
01:00:46.798 --> 01:00:50.261
So it's hard for me to take that one to the same extreme as some of these people.

998
01:00:50.361 --> 01:00:51.441
But, like, I don't know.

999
01:00:51.682 --> 01:00:58.747
I don't claim to be an expert on what self-improving superintelligence actually entails in some hypothetical future.

1000
01:00:59.167 --> 01:01:04.191
I just think that the problem is, at least in, like, the cyber case, we're talking about, like, cyber warfare or whatever.

1001
01:01:05.171 --> 01:01:07.793
Cyber warfare is, like, naturally asymmetric.

1002
01:01:08.094 --> 01:01:12.217
And that I think given the same capabilities, defense always loses.

1003
01:01:13.111 --> 01:01:16.833
Because it only takes one exploit and to move very quickly.

1004
01:01:17.153 --> 01:01:19.775
And then, like, I think defense is always behind.

1005
01:01:19.795 --> 01:01:22.556
I don't mean culturally or technologically.

1006
01:01:22.576 --> 01:01:29.320
I just mean, like, in a 1v1 me bro IRL, I think, like, the game always favors offense.

1007
01:01:30.041 --> 01:01:30.641
Yes and no.

1008
01:01:30.981 --> 01:01:36.825
I don't like that, like, the attacker only has to be right once, like, mantra that a lot of cyber has, like, lived off of for years.

1009
01:01:37.345 --> 01:01:41.307
Because if that was true, like, all of our bank accounts would be drained, right?

1010
01:01:41.367 --> 01:01:42.468
Well, it happens all the time.

1011
01:01:43.141 --> 01:01:44.945
Well, not bank accounts.

1012
01:01:44.965 --> 01:01:51.882
But what I'm saying is that we are still seeing zero days and companies getting popped every day, all day, and it's been 30 years.

1013
01:01:52.237 --> 01:01:56.118
Right, but our bank accounts are not being drained at all the time, right?

1014
01:01:56.158 --> 01:01:57.539
And so that's what I mean, right?

1015
01:01:57.559 --> 01:02:04.761
It's like, yes, the attackers do have a certain advantage on zero days and the amount of code that we put out with vulnerabilities.

1016
01:02:04.821 --> 01:02:07.062
And like you said, they only need to find one.

1017
01:02:07.882 --> 01:02:15.565
But the head of security at Slack a while back was a friend of mine, Ryan Huber, and he had this quote that I always attribute to him because it's so good.

1018
01:02:15.885 --> 01:02:17.886
A zero day is not an invisibility cloak, right?

1019
01:02:18.066 --> 01:02:21.107
And so it's like once they get in to actually achieve what they do.

1020
01:02:22.247 --> 01:02:26.809
I gave you partial credit because you did finish what you were saying with as long as they move really fast.

1021
01:02:26.829 --> 01:02:29.930
So they get in as long as they move really fast, and then you're right.

1022
01:02:31.031 --> 01:02:36.093
If they can move at super speed once they're in also, the defender advantage starts to go away.

1023
01:02:36.113 --> 01:02:47.858
I guess what I'm saying is that the technology that Cyber is propped up on is not by design, but architecturally flawed.

1024
01:02:48.158 --> 01:02:51.019
So defense is playing a losing game, I guess is my point.

1025
01:02:51.637 --> 01:03:02.066
Yeah, but again, in hypothetical future unicorn land, the defenders also have a self-improving super intelligence that can do things that we haven't even dreamt of yet.

1026
01:03:02.146 --> 01:03:10.133
Because if we're hypothetically thinking about things that attackers could do that we haven't dreamt of yet, we have to talk about the other side of the coin.

1027
01:03:10.153 --> 01:03:10.393
That's true.

1028
01:03:10.593 --> 01:03:10.833
Right?

1029
01:03:11.074 --> 01:03:11.614
Yeah, yeah.

1030
01:03:11.654 --> 01:03:14.136
And so wouldn't that be true across the board?

1031
01:03:14.216 --> 01:03:15.958
Biochemical, wouldn't that be true?

1032
01:03:16.218 --> 01:03:17.899
Like, all this other stuff.

1033
01:03:18.000 --> 01:03:18.800
I don't know, right?

1034
01:03:18.860 --> 01:03:19.241
Like, that's...

1035
01:03:19.821 --> 01:03:39.523
That's where I get, like, with a lot of the doomerism, if I'm going to play along with this hypothetical, right, which also, by the way, has great implications on the stock price, the value of these companies, if there is some future hypothetical state where these things could even achieve this, right, which I'm not convinced they could,

1036
01:03:40.473 --> 01:03:48.440
Like, I'm not convinced that there isn't a bend to the curve coming soon in terms of capability, right, of what the models could do.

1037
01:03:48.460 --> 01:03:52.363
I keep thinking it's coming and then it doesn't.

1038
01:03:52.543 --> 01:03:55.065
Each model that comes out is actually exponentially better.

1039
01:03:55.085 --> 01:03:58.148
And I'm like, oh shit, the curve hasn't flattened yet, right?

1040
01:03:58.168 --> 01:03:59.769
Yeah, we thought about this.

1041
01:04:00.109 --> 01:04:06.094
I was not an AI person until like around Sonnet 4, whenever that like kind of curve was, Sonnet 4.7 maybe.

1042
01:04:06.394 --> 01:04:08.276
And then I was like, oh, there's like, there's something here.

1043
01:04:08.576 --> 01:04:09.637
Yeah, yeah, yeah.

1044
01:04:09.817 --> 01:04:15.259
And I'm sure whenever fucking Sunnet 6 or 7 or whatever comes out, I'll have the same thought.

1045
01:04:15.359 --> 01:04:16.359
Yeah, it's weird.

1046
01:04:16.459 --> 01:04:25.163
We're still in exponential curve mode, but I'm not convinced it won't flatten off before humanity disappears, right?

1047
01:04:25.223 --> 01:04:25.864
Yeah.

1048
01:04:25.964 --> 01:04:29.405
Also, how many more data centers, how many more GPUs do we need to get here, right?

1049
01:04:29.525 --> 01:04:31.266
Because GPUs aren't free.

1050
01:04:31.586 --> 01:04:35.208
There is a finite number of companies that produce the silicon that make the GPUs.

1051
01:04:35.248 --> 01:04:36.188
You know what I mean?

1052
01:04:36.428 --> 01:04:38.149
How far does it have to go for this to be possible?

1053
01:04:39.577 --> 01:04:55.527
So one of the end state futures is the vulnpocalypse, which seems like we have a story this week of, again, another big vendor patching exponentially more vulnerabilities than they ever have in history in single patch cycles.

1054
01:04:55.627 --> 01:04:57.448
What do we got out of Microsoft here?

1055
01:04:58.755 --> 01:04:59.196
Oh, man.

1056
01:04:59.316 --> 01:05:01.959
It's been a crazy series of Patch Tuesdays for them.

1057
01:05:02.619 --> 01:05:08.706
Basically, since the whole mythos thing, Project Glass being popped off, they've been dropping a bunch of really big Patch Tuesdays.

1058
01:05:09.667 --> 01:05:17.095
This one, I think, is another record patch Tuesday with 974 flaws getting patched, including two actively exploded Windows Zero days.

1059
01:05:19.047 --> 01:05:20.608
There are a couple floating around.

1060
01:05:20.648 --> 01:05:31.595
If you actually read the bleeping computer, the Hacker News articles, a lot of them talk about, like, oh, there was, like, a priv-esque, an ALPC, Advanced Local Procedure Call, which gives a local attacker system privileges.

1061
01:05:31.675 --> 01:05:32.576
Okay, that's bad, obviously.

1062
01:05:32.956 --> 01:05:38.660
And another one where, like, the update stack has an improper link resolution vulnerability that gives you system vulnerabilities or system privileges.

1063
01:05:39.160 --> 01:05:57.498
But the ones that I've been seeing floating around on Twitter are like, dude, there's a 9.8 use after free in RDP, which I'm pretty sure is like when the big NSA leaks happened like 10 years ago, that those are the bugs we were concerned about, like North Korea getting and doing WannaCry type shit like like these are the ones that are so scary.

1064
01:05:58.199 --> 01:06:12.342
And so it just kind of goes to show that, you know, in a world of does Rust fix this, in a world of memory safety and software security is kind of like top of mind for people in like the offsec world, both in and out of these companies, memory corruption bugs are well and good.

1065
01:06:12.382 --> 01:06:19.744
Another 9.8, a use after free vulnerability in Windows DHCP server that allows unauthorized code execution over the network.

1066
01:06:19.784 --> 01:06:27.966
I think I also saw one that's in the DNS server, the DNS server being a huge problem, because typically if you have a Windows hosted DNS server, that box tends to also be the domain controller.

1067
01:06:28.346 --> 01:06:32.790
So popping that vulnerability gives you not only system on that box, but also full domain access.

1068
01:06:32.810 --> 01:06:49.906
I want to be very clear here that with a windows based modern windows 11 kernel, um, having a memory corruption primitive in the kernel, like getting that to become RCE is like not a simple project that in and of itself, like chaining that together is difficult.

1069
01:06:49.926 --> 01:06:50.347
There's a lot of,

1070
01:06:51.227 --> 01:07:00.829
virtualization-based security, and there's SMAP and SMAP, all these hardware protections that prevent a lot of the sexy primitives from turning into actual code execution.

1071
01:07:00.849 --> 01:07:16.253
Also, if you want to actually get a kernel mode implant to work on Windows, Windows uses VBS to do hypervisor-based code, and integrity basically is checking for a signature on every page of memory running in Ring Zero, which is very hard to defeat.

1072
01:07:16.513 --> 01:07:18.934
It's not as simple as just, oh, pop a shell via these exploits.

1073
01:07:18.974 --> 01:07:19.734
It's very difficult stuff to

1074
01:07:20.414 --> 01:07:22.975
exploit, but yeah, man, 974 bugs patched.

1075
01:07:23.456 --> 01:07:26.897
If you're a defender or you're an assist admin, get your patches in.

1076
01:07:27.077 --> 01:07:37.222
We talk a lot about sometimes maybe we wait a few weeks on patches because, oh, supply chain, oh, like NPM style stuff, but no, here, please update yesterday on these.

1077
01:07:37.943 --> 01:07:39.043
You're making a face.

1078
01:07:39.063 --> 01:07:39.484
What's up, Matt?

1079
01:07:39.704 --> 01:07:40.684
I'm looking at the list.

1080
01:07:40.964 --> 01:07:43.786
There's more than just that one use after free, too.

1081
01:07:44.046 --> 01:07:44.806
I mean, there's a one to...

1082
01:07:48.690 --> 01:07:54.456
Three, four, just on the article I'm reading, four 9.8 use after free volumes.

1083
01:07:54.576 --> 01:07:55.437
Yeah.

1084
01:07:55.597 --> 01:07:59.961
And then a heap-based buffer overflow with the same score.

1085
01:07:59.981 --> 01:08:00.602
Yeah.

1086
01:08:00.662 --> 01:08:04.105
And then an injection vulnerability in SQL Server with a 9.6.

1087
01:08:04.165 --> 01:08:06.347
Yep.

1088
01:08:07.629 --> 01:08:09.450
Missing authorization vulnerability 8.8 in SharePoint.

1089
01:08:12.012 --> 01:08:14.795
that allows authorized attackers to execute code over the network.

1090
01:08:14.815 --> 01:08:24.206
So that's, it's like says an off bug, but then it's code execution also tied to it to SharePoint, uh, an 8.6 in Microsoft authenticator.

1091
01:08:24.467 --> 01:08:26.469
So that's even like consumer level stuff.

1092
01:08:27.510 --> 01:08:27.750
Um, um,

1093
01:08:29.065 --> 01:08:32.207
God, I mean, this looks like a gnarly list, first of all.

1094
01:08:33.087 --> 01:08:35.948
But like you said, it's not trivial to exploit.

1095
01:08:37.889 --> 01:08:42.671
I even see a quote from one of the people in here talk about that.

1096
01:08:44.652 --> 01:08:51.055
Even with the massive batch of patches, the number of vulnerabilities that are expected to impact most organization remains quite low.

1097
01:08:51.775 --> 01:08:56.137
Not to mention the absence of correlating spike in active exploits so far.

1098
01:08:56.517 --> 01:08:57.257
It's a really good point.

1099
01:08:58.078 --> 01:08:58.858
I bring that up a lot.

1100
01:08:59.238 --> 01:09:07.882
The only way we're going to see that is if we see an exponential increase in threat actors, actual people that are trying to go and exploit these things, which we have not seen yet.

1101
01:09:08.283 --> 01:09:11.885
Yeah, a lot of these vulnerabilities require you to already be in the network, right?

1102
01:09:11.905 --> 01:09:20.311
So you're either talking insider threat or you're talking like poor network architecture where like you really are exposing the RDP port to the Internet, right?

1103
01:09:20.351 --> 01:09:22.573
Which, again, please, God, stop doing that.

1104
01:09:23.633 --> 01:09:30.318
Use a VPN concentrator, use some kind of SD-WAN, something that keeps the greater Internet out of your network.

1105
01:09:30.657 --> 01:09:38.302
The concern here is some of the newest level frontier models are very good at exploitation chaining.

1106
01:09:38.583 --> 01:09:41.725
And these are the types of bugs that they need for those chains.

1107
01:09:42.005 --> 01:09:42.225
Right.

1108
01:09:42.645 --> 01:09:42.886
Yeah.

1109
01:09:42.986 --> 01:09:48.850
As we get closer and closer to GA on that, I am a little bit worried, even though these are spicy to exploit.

1110
01:09:49.900 --> 01:09:53.923
Yeah, even with the frontier models, I think there are just some things that are just not possible.

1111
01:09:54.223 --> 01:09:57.085
I'm not saying that exploitation of the memory of the kernel isn't possible.

1112
01:09:57.105 --> 01:10:04.029
I'm just saying it is extremely difficult to pull off, and sometimes you need to be chaining multiple bugs together.

1113
01:10:04.169 --> 01:10:08.732
Typically, you can turn a use-after-free into an arbitrary write.

1114
01:10:08.752 --> 01:10:15.096
You can turn a use-after-free into an arbitrary read, but the types that you have to free into are

1115
01:10:16.377 --> 01:10:22.543
Like that is a whole other knowledge subset that like the model probably has probably won't won't do for you back to our open weight model conversation, though.

1116
01:10:22.583 --> 01:10:27.228
Like you probably could convince GLM five, three or whatever to like, yeah, I have a use after free in this structure.

1117
01:10:27.628 --> 01:10:32.934
How do I get what other structure do I have to allocate in place of that to turn that into an arb read, arb right?

1118
01:10:32.954 --> 01:10:36.998
And then then you have the two real primitives you need to do arbitrary whatever in the kernel.

1119
01:10:37.299 --> 01:10:48.744
but there's like basically these Frontier-esque open weight models, you know, like the Kimmys, the DeepSeeks, the GLMs, right?

1120
01:10:50.225 --> 01:10:56.247
That are comparable in performance to some of the actual Frontier models.

1121
01:10:56.807 --> 01:11:04.831
Then people take those and they get rid of all guardrails off of even those and they put them up on Hugging Face or whatever.

1122
01:11:06.452 --> 01:11:16.961
I saw an obliterated, or if I'm using that correctly, version of the latest Kimi float around yesterday, and they said that it's incredibly good at security research.

1123
01:11:18.923 --> 01:11:27.730
It is not a cyber-trained model, but because it doesn't have the guardrails and stuff, and it is a very good engineering model, it tends to be good at this.

1124
01:11:27.910 --> 01:11:28.090
Yeah.

1125
01:11:28.831 --> 01:11:31.953
Yeah, I want to issue with this article from Bleeping Computer.

1126
01:11:31.973 --> 01:11:35.294
It has to do more with the CBSS scoring system.

1127
01:11:35.715 --> 01:11:42.098
So one of the rubrics of the CBSS score is exploit complexity.

1128
01:11:42.698 --> 01:11:48.982
And note that all of these are 9.8, which means that technically, most likely, I haven't read them all, but it most likely got an exploit complexity low.

1129
01:11:49.722 --> 01:11:54.845
It might be low complexity to trigger the use after free, to trigger the overflow.

1130
01:11:55.186 --> 01:12:03.551
But then, like, when you say exploit complexity, to me that implies, like, okay, to go from vuln to shell to RCE, what is the complexity?

1131
01:12:03.571 --> 01:12:05.492
And it is much higher than low.

1132
01:12:05.512 --> 01:12:07.093
So are these true 9.8s?

1133
01:12:07.714 --> 01:12:08.514
I don't think so.

1134
01:12:08.795 --> 01:12:12.357
But, I mean, at the same time, they are definitely vulns that exist, so please go patch.

1135
01:12:12.477 --> 01:12:23.023
Yeah, CVSS, I gave a presentation years ago called CVSS Sucks, and it was all about what could actually be used in an exploit and as the defender choosing what to fix with limited resources.

1136
01:12:23.663 --> 01:12:28.726
I think the exact data showed, and this was a while ago, but I don't think it's much better.

1137
01:12:29.247 --> 01:12:40.293
If you fixed from CVSS 10 down in that order, like for your vuln pile, you were actually better off throwing a dart at your vuln pile in fixing a vulnerability that would have been used in a data breach.

1138
01:12:42.006 --> 01:12:59.161
The data showed if you took the data from the Verizon DBIR and all the public data breach data and vulnerabilities that were actually used in those and then correlated that against any given organization's vulnerability pile and then did CVSS scores, you were actually better...

1139
01:13:00.289 --> 01:13:06.181
randomly picking vulnerabilities to fix in priority order, you were better off than doing it in CVSS order.

1140
01:13:06.201 --> 01:13:10.309
And there was a lot of reasons why, but kind of what we're talking about is part of it, right?

1141
01:13:10.690 --> 01:13:11.251
That's insane.

1142
01:13:11.712 --> 01:13:11.932
Yeah.

1143
01:13:12.922 --> 01:13:17.044
We're going way long, but because I talked way too much about the LG thing that I'm pissed off about.

1144
01:13:17.084 --> 01:13:25.026
But we do have one more that I thought was tied to our main story last week, which was the 153 million driver's licenses that were stolen.

1145
01:13:25.727 --> 01:13:32.169
So we have shiny hunters, which was the is the same hacker group that was behind the McKesson breach that we talked about last week.

1146
01:13:32.209 --> 01:13:34.390
They're really prolific hacking group.

1147
01:13:34.670 --> 01:13:39.191
They came out and they have a website where they put their ransoms up and they put the

1148
01:13:41.960 --> 01:13:45.301
DMV database as their ransom.

1149
01:13:45.581 --> 01:13:54.202
And so what I thought when I saw that was, oh, they probably bought the driver's license leak from the, what was it, IDNet or whatever?

1150
01:13:55.042 --> 01:13:56.403
IDScan.net.

1151
01:13:57.363 --> 01:14:00.683
They probably bought that off the dark web because it was for sale.

1152
01:14:01.343 --> 01:14:09.125
And now they're probably subsectioning it out and ransoming different DMVs or different organizations or whatever is what I thought when I read this.

1153
01:14:09.545 --> 01:14:10.085
Turns out,

1154
01:14:11.646 --> 01:14:18.290
If they're to be believed, they've reported to the journalist that no, they separately hacked the Florida.

1155
01:14:18.410 --> 01:14:24.813
It's called the David system, which is their driver's license system via a password reset flaw.

1156
01:14:25.454 --> 01:14:27.135
They haven't talked about what the flaw is.

1157
01:14:27.415 --> 01:14:35.500
So I don't know if it's like the good old days of hacking where it's like they just guessed someone's mother's maiden name and like they got in and like that's embarrassing or what.

1158
01:14:35.900 --> 01:14:42.885
But they haven't given too much more details because they said that they've already breached other states DMVs and they're going to get announcements out in the coming weeks.

1159
01:14:43.505 --> 01:14:44.646
But that floor is the first one.

1160
01:14:44.766 --> 01:14:52.231
And kind of funnily, they they used Jeffrey Epstein's driver's license as the proof that they got the data out.

1161
01:14:52.351 --> 01:14:54.292
And it marked him as a sexual predator.

1162
01:14:54.352 --> 01:14:56.594
But safe driver was was secret.

1163
01:14:58.910 --> 01:14:59.550
There you go.

1164
01:14:59.750 --> 01:15:00.370
Screenshot.

1165
01:15:00.390 --> 01:15:01.251
I was like, oh, God.

1166
01:15:02.091 --> 01:15:04.371
I'm hoping we'll get some more details out of it.

1167
01:15:04.651 --> 01:15:07.492
This seems like this isn't their MO, by the way.

1168
01:15:07.552 --> 01:15:12.473
Shiny Andrews is a social engineering threat actor group for sure through and through.

1169
01:15:12.673 --> 01:15:16.754
So the password reset flaw must have been something they stumbled across that was just super easy to exploit.

1170
01:15:16.834 --> 01:15:18.554
So they were like, why even call them and trick them?

1171
01:15:18.994 --> 01:15:19.774
Because we don't have to.

1172
01:15:20.954 --> 01:15:23.335
But, yeah, this one seems...

1173
01:15:23.995 --> 01:15:32.878
Terabat as well for all the reasons we talked about ad nauseum last week about why driver's licenses specifically are super specifically bad in the current world of age verification.

1174
01:15:32.898 --> 01:15:41.902
I wonder if it was like the the meta password reset bug from like three months ago back in May maybe where it was like if you VPN to the same state.

1175
01:15:42.542 --> 01:15:48.747
as the owner of the account and just asked Meta AI to add your email to the password reset functionality, it was like, oh, sure.

1176
01:15:48.767 --> 01:15:52.210
And then it would just send you a password reset link with no questions.

1177
01:15:52.250 --> 01:15:53.230
Maybe it was that.

1178
01:15:53.431 --> 01:15:55.112
Maybe the Meta guys work at Florida David now.

1179
01:15:55.252 --> 01:15:55.692
That'd be cool.

1180
01:15:56.293 --> 01:15:57.374
Anyway, guys, we'll wrap it up here.

1181
01:15:57.574 --> 01:15:58.334
Thanks for watching.

1182
01:15:58.374 --> 01:15:59.395
I appreciate it.

1183
01:15:59.435 --> 01:16:00.456
We have a good time doing this.

1184
01:16:00.516 --> 01:16:03.418
Best way to help us out is A, check out Maze, partner of the show.

1185
01:16:03.478 --> 01:16:09.403
They are truly doing good things in the world of infrastructure and code security, making our software more secure.

1186
01:16:09.863 --> 01:16:12.806
Also, best way to help us out is give us a five-star rating on Spotify.

1187
01:16:12.826 --> 01:16:15.108
If you listen on Spotify, if you don't, maybe you should get over there.

1188
01:16:15.588 --> 01:16:17.590
And then tell our friends about the show.

1189
01:16:17.610 --> 01:16:20.333
I think we have a good time talking here about vulnerabilities, having a little bit of a banter.

1190
01:16:21.053 --> 01:16:22.054
Let your friends know what we're doing.

1191
01:16:22.234 --> 01:16:22.715
Appreciate it.

1192
01:16:22.735 --> 01:16:23.135
Matt?

1193
01:16:23.215 --> 01:16:24.076
Tell your mom, man.

1194
01:16:24.116 --> 01:16:24.917
Moms love us.

1195
01:16:26.358 --> 01:16:28.440
Funny part is, I already told her.

1196
01:16:28.880 --> 01:16:29.201
Thanks.

1197
01:16:29.221 --> 01:16:30.001
Appreciate it.

1198
01:16:30.442 --> 01:16:30.662
Bye.

1199
01:16:31.443 --> 01:16:31.683
See you.
