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Meacham Tower.

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There's a ground stop nationwide.

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I advise you land your aircraft.

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People were standing still and that sometimes is not right.

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Microsoft products in 74 countries and territories have been affected.

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I just want to come out and say we did this on purpose.

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Biggest banks in the U.S.

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They're getting hit with simultaneous outages, right?

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Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank and Truist.

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Even Zelle started glitching out.

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Apple Care, iCloud, Apple Music, Apple Pay down today.

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Breaking news.

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Everything is broken.

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Is somebody attacking us?

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No, guys, every single one that I've looked at seems like a really boring, boring answer.

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We got to start somewhere, and I think we should start with...

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Good morning, hackers.

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Welcome back to the best podcast on the internet for hackers, The Lowdown, presented by Mays.

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Matt, I have a question.

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What month is it, just out of curiosity?

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Cybersecurity Awareness Month, part two, electric bungalow.

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So it's not October is what you're saying.

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Because it feels like October, because we're about to talk about not only a vulnerability in Java, Java, the language sort of a la PHP, and then also vulnerability in Nginx.

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Are we still in Cybersecurity Awareness Month, or is it now November?

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What happened?

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The cybersecurity awareness will continue until morale improves, okay?

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It will continue.

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Like...

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Oh, also a couple of outages, minor outages.

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Okay.

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FAA went down and did the first nationwide ground stop since 9-11.

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There was like one other in between there.

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And then apparently even the NSA is down.

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So there's a couple things happening.

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all the banks, and then like, yeah, Apple, Apple went down yesterday.

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Okay, again, I've said this on the podcast a few times.

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I measure how serious these things are going by like normal people in my life asking me questions.

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And I keep saying, I've had more normal people ask me about this than ever before.

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Nope, now.

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It's like every week, there's like a new record, the outages.

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I've had more people asking me about all of these outages because, and like, this is part of it, and I get it, but like, everyone is like, this must be a cyber attack.

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Right.

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Right.

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Or this must be the AI agent swarm.

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You know, let's do it.

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Where's my buttons?

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So this is mythos, right?

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This is this is why the outages are happening.

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Right.

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Right.

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And it's like, no, guys, every single one that I've like looked at seems like a really boring, boring answer.

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Right.

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And it's like, I don't know what to tell people.

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But then like, why are they all happening this week?

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We're going to talk about it later in the episode.

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Yeah.

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We got to start somewhere.

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And I think we should start with... What do you want?

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Java or Nginx?

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Let's do Java.

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Okay.

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I want to start with Java.

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That was totally my idea too.

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Yes.

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So, okay.

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I think you just went deep on this one.

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I went deep on Nginx this morning.

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We both made our own videos before we recorded this.

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Yeah.

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I think that...

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Okay.

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Like, I hear...

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Vulnerability in Java, and that terrifies me because it's one of the most widely used frameworks on the planet, languages on the planet, right?

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Like all sorts of stuff built around Java.

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Java runs on 6 billion devices, their tagline for the last 15 years.

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Billion with a B, right?

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That's a few.

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And so, but, but, but, but I have a feeling I haven't dove as deep as you did on this one in particular because I was at cyber marketing con all week running like Volnew events and all this kind of stuff.

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I have a theory that this is going to be a little bit like PHP to shell.

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Widely used, hard to exploit.

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Am I right?

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That is completely true.

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So to set the stage here, right, we're all kind of in language fear land after PHP to Shell dropped.

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So PHP to Shell, if you're not aware, vulnerability in the PHP runtime, right?

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And it was so pervasive that basically if you were on a version of PHP that was released after June of 2005, a malicious session initialization with a file upload could get RCE on a server.

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That sounds very bad and, like, is very bad.

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But as the months went on or the weeks went on after it came out, not a lot of in-the-wild exploitation was seen.

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The reason being, it's a networked application.

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It takes a lot of heap grooming, memory corruption, and really elite hacker shit to make it work.

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The Java bug is actually extremely similar to the PHP bug in terms of what is required to enable exploitation.

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But also, not every version of Java is actually vulnerable to this.

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So let's kind of dive into it, right?

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Java 4 Shell, and first of all, the name is Java 4 Shell and not Java 2 Shell because 4 is a hilarious meme number in cybersecurity right now because of Imudra, which like props to Imudra for making that hilarious for the years to come.

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I saw a tweet.

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We got to put it on the screen.

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It's like there's three cyber attacks right now.

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One, two, four, and three off by one.

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Yes.

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Perfect.

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There's two hacks and the list goes to three.

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I like it.

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It's so good, dude.

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Yeah, yeah, yeah.

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It's vulnerability in the OpenJDK, which is the Java development kit, which obviously is what you use to compile and build Java applications.

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The base 64 decoder.

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So in the year of our Lord, 2026, we have vulnerabilities in basic tour decoders.

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So the vulnerability is really interesting, right?

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If you're not aware...

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Java is what is called a just-in-time compiled language.

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Basically, when you compile Java, it is compiled down to this thing called JVM bytecode.

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The JVM is basically another process that interprets the bytecode, and it's called JIT compiling, just-in-time, where it's trying to compile that code down to even more efficient native code as often as possible to make the code very, very efficient, right?

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You have this effectively interpreted language, and if it's being run on 6 million devices, 6 million servers, ideally you want to have special little secret food that you do to make it very, very fast.

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And so the vulnerability for Java 4Shell comes down to the way that the JIT compiler optimizes the base64 operation.

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So when you're doing base64 decoding, you have the actual data, which is like, for example, a bunch of A's, which represent zeros in base64.

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And you have these equal signs, which is the padding character, which is basically going to make it aligned to the proper base64 block size.

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In the base64 intrinsic that runs on the CPU, so basically when the Java runtime is decoding base64, if it detects that you're doing base64 decoding operations multiple times, it'll replace your base64 operation from Java bytecode to native code, code that really runs on your CPU natively.

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Now, there is an off-by-one error in the code that runs the base64 intrinsic, where basically if the input is in the form of one padding character, two padding characters, one input, one padding, one input, two padding, or three padding, it will calculate that the actual output length is zero.

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Then when it's doing the operation to copy it out,

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It will subtract one from that output length and wrap that around to max int, which will actually tell the intrinsic that it's able to copy 64 bytes to a buffer that is smaller than 64 bytes.

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Classic out-of-bounds copy.

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What makes this even more insane is that the output character that is getting copied, you don't even control that.

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It's not a character that you control.

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You have control of one of the characters, a little control of the second character, and the third character is a constant value.

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It is a value that you do not control.

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And using that primitive, the Kalief team was able to turn this into RCE on... Hmm, what is this here?

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Let's see.

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Keycloak, Atlassian Jira, Atlassian Confluence, a J-Frog Artifactory, Jenkins, Ping Fetteri, among others.

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Okay?

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Now...

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To be very clear, how are you vulnerable to this?

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How do I know if I'm affected by this?

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Well, A, you have to have a system that processes external pre-auth base 64 data.

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And two, the real kicker, your CPU needs to have this special CPU extension enabled.

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It's called AVX-5.

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512-VBMI2.

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Basically, in the world of processors, right, they all have different hardware accelerations that allow you to do certain operations very, very fast, right?

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The intrinsic in the JIT compiler for Base64, if you have it enabled, uses this instruction set to do the Base64 decoding,

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And the specific mask that it uses to tell the CPU how much to copy is where the vulnerability is.

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If you give that mask the negative one from that underflow, that will cause the out-of-bounds write.

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So not only do you need to process Base64 data from the user, you need to have the CPU flag enabled.

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And on top of that, you need to groom the heap in a very particular way per application over the network.

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So is it a vulnerability that enables RCE?

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Yes.

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Is it a vulnerability that is just like command injection, get it for free, everyone can hack you?

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No, not at all.

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So, you know, bug is there, but it's not a huge deal, to be honest.

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So in the examples that they had, right, Jenkins, Artifactory, by the way, the same Artifactory that was the root cause of the hugging face incident, put a dollar in the hugging face jar.

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Can't make content without saying the word hugging face these days somewhere in the content.

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Yeah, so in those examples, all of those conditions that you just said had to be true, so were they specifically crafted servers running those things in the POC that had all those things?

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Or is there some sort of default Jira install that has a lot of those conditions that you just listed that would be exploitable?

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So you would need to be running these applications

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that has the CPU flag enabled, one.

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And then two, my assumption is that all of these applications process Base64 pre-auth.

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So basically the scenario is like you're a network admin, you run the JIRA Docker image on a server, that server just so happens to have that flag enabled, you're not really aware.

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JIRA will process Base64 for OAuth, for example.

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That is a vulnerable condition, right?

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Something like that.

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I didn't watch the POC.

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So that's how I imagine you have to set this up for it to be vulnerable.

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So it's not so much these applications, even though that's where the vulnerability is.

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It also has a lot to do with the kind of underlying infrastructure.

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Yeah, so it has nothing to do with the specific application.

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It is the fact that the application just happens to process Base64, and the vulnerability is in the way that Java processes Base64 with this flag enabled on the CPU.

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Okay, cool.

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All right.

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Super interesting.

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If you're a network admin, maybe you're a maintainer, maybe you're a CICD guy, Khalif will put the link in the description below.

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They have literally the command that you can run that will tell you if your CPU supports this instruction set, right?

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It's as simple as cat proc CPU info and grep for a variety of strings.

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Basically, AVX 512, if you look for that and you have that on with the BMI2 extension, you're vulnerable.

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Technically, like...

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Your CPU can be vulnerable.

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Maybe you're not processing Base64.

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Another way that you can actually disable this is you can use a flag within Java.

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Again, I'm not a huge Java guy, so I may be misspeaking a little bit.

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But basically, there's a flag that you can tell the Java runtime.

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to not use the base64 intrinsics.

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It's a dash xx colon dash use base64 intrinsics that will tell the JIT compiler to not hardware accelerate base64 encoding or decoding which will make you not vulnerable to this.

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Either you don't have it or if you do turn it off.

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It's a TLDR.

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Got it.

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Got it.

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Cool.

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Amen.

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So I think your last bit also goes to a bit of the advice that Khalif has on this write-up, which I really like.

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At the end of this blog post, they're calling it vibe uncoding.

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And so instead of vibe coding, vibe uncoding, using the same AI tools that they use to find a lot of these bugs to identify dead or unused or bloat

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code, which as we know through a lot of our vulnerability research is where a lot of these vulnerabilities wind up getting identified.

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So it's like, just rip this crap out.

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Yeah.

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Right.

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We had a Slack channel.

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I highly recommend this, do this and tell me if you do this right in the comments that if you do this at your day job, we had a Slack channel when I worked at Reddit called dead code society, like dead poet society.

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And we would just share screenshots of the pull request of like, you know, a few small green number and giant red number, right?

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Like, yeah,

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It was like, oh, you know, plus 31 minus a million, right?

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It was like, oh, we were just like killing lines of code and we would celebrate that.

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And we all use the knife emoji in there as like, yes, nice, kill the code, kill the unused code, right?

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So Dead Code Society, highly recommend you do this.

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You're incentivizing, you're gamifying, you're celebrating the fact that you're axing a bunch of this stuff.

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I think that's even more important now that we're like,

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Vibe coding everything, right?

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Because now we're like definitely losing sight of like what code is in use and not.

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And we didn't really have a good sight of it anyway to begin with when we were writing it all or at least including it all.

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But now that we're not writing damn near any of it, you know, using the tools to try to identify bloat is a very good recommendation as part of this research.

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Yeah.

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Before we leave the Caliph site, I do want to highlight.

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So the person that found this, my video I called him QL.

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I don't want to mispronounce his name.

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Quang Long.

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I'm sorry, bro, if this is me fucking your name up.

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He actually found the bug while trying to exploit a different bug that he found in Android and stumbled upon this bug with Codex on accident.

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codecs through like 20 minutes 30 minutes of like slop bugs that weren't real like the java runtime and then it's like oh also we may have found this bug in the b64 decoder and he's like no you didn't and he looked at it and he's like oh my god it's fucking real and it only cost him it looks like 200 of token spend to not only find the bug but then to develop the first working rce

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Yeah, it's wild, man.

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So literally, my talk title, Commoditization of Nation State Hacker Skills, right?

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$200, you could find an RCE that this literally would have been like an APT-type vulnerability, right?

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Broad RCE in a broad framework.

218
00:14:45.835 --> 00:14:46.576
Nuts, nuts.

219
00:14:46.716 --> 00:14:48.357
This team is on a tear right now.

220
00:14:48.377 --> 00:14:49.798
I don't know much about Khalif, right?

221
00:14:49.838 --> 00:14:51.719
Except for all the stuff coming out.

222
00:14:52.740 --> 00:14:54.521
They broke lockdown mode recently, too.

223
00:14:54.641 --> 00:14:55.582
Yeah, on the iPhone, yeah.

224
00:14:55.842 --> 00:14:57.223
Yeah, like exploit.

225
00:14:58.103 --> 00:15:04.446
God, it survived to restart broke lockdown mode jailbreak on modern iOS is insane.

226
00:15:04.466 --> 00:15:09.609
Of course, we have no details on all of that because if they did, that would be game over, right?

227
00:15:09.769 --> 00:15:14.491
Like we got to get new iOS versions out before we start to hear any details on that if we ever do.

228
00:15:14.732 --> 00:15:14.952
Right.

229
00:15:15.032 --> 00:15:17.113
But insane.

230
00:15:17.133 --> 00:15:21.355
You know, just kudos, Khalif, that you guys are just on a generational tear right now.

231
00:15:22.562 --> 00:15:33.335
Um, also kudos, uh, my homies over at, uh, Mallory, not a sponsor of the show, by the way, but, uh, they were one of the sites that I was passing around when people were trying to keep, uh, ahead of this Java thing.

232
00:15:33.355 --> 00:15:38.921
Cause they have like a really good timeline of a bunch of different, uh, write-ups and sources as people were starting to like do this.

233
00:15:38.941 --> 00:15:41.384
So just like shout on this awesome timeline.

234
00:15:41.404 --> 00:15:41.664
I don't know.

235
00:15:41.684 --> 00:15:42.144
Did you see this?

236
00:15:42.184 --> 00:15:43.226
I put this link in the show notes.

237
00:15:43.735 --> 00:15:45.597
We're talking about the Nginx vulnerability?

238
00:15:46.097 --> 00:15:47.239
No, no, no.

239
00:15:48.720 --> 00:15:49.060
Wait, what?

240
00:15:49.140 --> 00:15:49.441
Oh, my bad.

241
00:15:49.461 --> 00:15:50.422
My brain is in the wrong space.

242
00:15:50.642 --> 00:15:51.663
Yeah, Java Mallory thing.

243
00:15:51.683 --> 00:15:59.271
It's got this big timeline of all the different stuff and I just love seeing it unfold like that and how fast all of this goes and all the different sources, right?

244
00:15:59.291 --> 00:16:02.474
So we're not just reading it from Wiz's viewpoint on this or something like that.

245
00:16:02.494 --> 00:16:03.515
Yeah, sure, sure, sure.

246
00:16:04.015 --> 00:16:05.075
Uh, so this is super cool.

247
00:16:05.095 --> 00:16:05.696
So go check it out.

248
00:16:05.716 --> 00:16:06.596
We'll put that in the show notes.

249
00:16:06.856 --> 00:16:15.279
Oh, and one more shout again, not sponsored, but unless, unless, uh, cloud flare, you guys are effing killing it right now with this stuff.

250
00:16:15.439 --> 00:16:18.780
Also, I don't know, like the CTO of cloud flare, like, uh,

251
00:16:19.500 --> 00:16:20.600
talks to us on Twitter.

252
00:16:20.640 --> 00:16:23.001
I don't know if you've noticed him pop up on your Twitter.

253
00:16:23.021 --> 00:16:24.182
He definitely pops up on mine.

254
00:16:24.662 --> 00:16:35.145
So if for whatever reason you watch this and you would like to come on the podcast and talk to us about how you're responding to all of this stuff at the speed that you are, I would love to talk to you about this.

255
00:16:35.185 --> 00:16:36.326
I think his name is Dane, right?

256
00:16:37.666 --> 00:16:45.613
So shout out to them because just three hours ago before we were recording this, they put out WAF rules for all of this.

257
00:16:45.673 --> 00:17:00.164
So even if all that stuff that you were talking about is true, and even if the patching is hard, and even if you can't turn off that B64 thing, and you do host your stuff on Cloudflare, you can put this WAF stuff.

258
00:17:00.204 --> 00:17:03.487
And generally, when these big vulnerabilities come up, Cloudflare makes these things free.

259
00:17:03.867 --> 00:17:05.068
So that's also super cool.

260
00:17:05.228 --> 00:17:06.970
It's like, hey, just block this stuff at the WAF.

261
00:17:07.880 --> 00:17:08.881
All right.

262
00:17:08.941 --> 00:17:14.046
So that's one giant piece of the internet that's vulnerable about stuff.

263
00:17:14.386 --> 00:17:15.107
We have another.

264
00:17:15.407 --> 00:17:16.068
Are you done with Java?

265
00:17:16.208 --> 00:17:16.688
I'm good to go.

266
00:17:16.768 --> 00:17:17.049
Send it.

267
00:17:17.069 --> 00:17:17.249
Yep.

268
00:17:17.741 --> 00:17:18.441
Huh.

269
00:17:18.501 --> 00:17:18.942
Okay.

270
00:17:19.042 --> 00:17:21.663
So this one, we got the number two in the middle instead of the number four.

271
00:17:21.743 --> 00:17:23.304
So we're back to, but it's not too shell.

272
00:17:23.324 --> 00:17:24.124
It's too root.

273
00:17:24.605 --> 00:17:26.126
So it's engine X to root.

274
00:17:26.586 --> 00:17:27.426
I read this headline.

275
00:17:28.147 --> 00:17:28.967
You know, it's super funny.

276
00:17:29.547 --> 00:17:36.611
Um, I literally this week during all of the like dumpster fires that were going on this week, I saw multiple people on Twitter, make the joke.

277
00:17:36.931 --> 00:17:41.474
Hey, you all should be war gaming and engine X zero day right now.

278
00:17:41.634 --> 00:17:42.374
What would you do?

279
00:17:42.474 --> 00:17:43.375
Because it's coming.

280
00:17:43.435 --> 00:17:43.635
Right.

281
00:17:43.655 --> 00:17:43.835
Right.

282
00:17:44.355 --> 00:17:52.101
And literally, they didn't know that it was coming, but the advice was just like, hey guys, you all use this.

283
00:17:52.521 --> 00:17:53.962
It's going to be bad when it comes.

284
00:17:54.083 --> 00:17:56.084
You better know, have a playbook.

285
00:17:56.224 --> 00:17:57.265
And boy, were they right.

286
00:17:57.285 --> 00:17:59.787
Can I say something real quick?

287
00:18:00.007 --> 00:18:00.247
Yeah.

288
00:18:00.547 --> 00:18:10.535
I think when we were doing the breakdown of PHP to Shell, I said that and I even said, hey, it's probably going to be a use after free because of how good LLMs are at finding them.

289
00:18:11.095 --> 00:18:11.896
And guess what it is?

290
00:18:12.919 --> 00:18:15.303
Okay, I need crystal ball animations.

291
00:18:15.363 --> 00:18:16.826
I need throwbacks to the old episode.

292
00:18:16.846 --> 00:18:21.314
I need a black and white throwback to the episode when Ed said that and see if his prediction was correct.

293
00:18:21.334 --> 00:18:24.039
Or Ed, if I didn't say it, just say, LOL, no, he didn't, and then that's it.

294
00:18:25.882 --> 00:18:30.164
So similarly, this PHP to shell is a interesting bug pattern.

295
00:18:30.204 --> 00:18:37.506
It's a use after free caused by something non-fatally failing during a session establishment, but then it continues to do work with that metadata.

296
00:18:37.627 --> 00:18:47.530
It is likely that new bugs will be found not only in PHP that fit this model, but also NGINX, Apache, and name a network facing daemon that parses requests.

297
00:18:47.890 --> 00:18:51.472
There are going to be new bugs, which is not not super great.

298
00:18:54.194 --> 00:19:02.725
So, uh, so yeah, it is solstice friend of the show on Twitter actually tweeted this, like this exact prediction on October 22nd.

299
00:19:02.965 --> 00:19:04.247
Guess when this vulnerability was found?

300
00:19:05.667 --> 00:19:06.247
October 21st.

301
00:19:06.307 --> 00:19:06.608
Wow.

302
00:19:06.908 --> 00:19:18.975
So you better know that somebody saw that tweet that said, you guys got a war game engine X, uh, RCEs, uh, a day after a bunch of people behind the scenes knew that there was one.

303
00:19:19.355 --> 00:19:21.336
You better believe they were all sweating.

304
00:19:21.356 --> 00:19:22.577
That embargo broke.

305
00:19:22.597 --> 00:19:23.117
You know what I mean?

306
00:19:23.137 --> 00:19:24.218
That made me chuckle a little.

307
00:19:24.238 --> 00:19:29.361
I was like, Oh, someone saw that, that knew about this bug and was like, what does he know?

308
00:19:29.501 --> 00:19:30.121
Who leaked?

309
00:19:30.381 --> 00:19:31.002
Who leaked?

310
00:19:31.582 --> 00:19:33.664
Is the CEO of chain guard in the call?

311
00:19:33.684 --> 00:19:34.364
What are we doing?

312
00:19:34.485 --> 00:19:35.025
Oh, too soon.

313
00:19:35.045 --> 00:19:35.986
I'm sorry.

314
00:19:36.246 --> 00:19:36.867
I'm sorry.

315
00:19:37.167 --> 00:19:37.587
I'm sorry.

316
00:19:37.667 --> 00:19:37.967
I'm sorry.

317
00:19:37.987 --> 00:19:38.308
Chain guard.

318
00:19:38.328 --> 00:19:38.688
I love you.

319
00:19:39.008 --> 00:19:42.031
Uh, but yeah, yeah, we had to, we got to do the embargo memes here.

320
00:19:42.311 --> 00:19:42.571
Okay.

321
00:19:42.711 --> 00:19:46.835
So, uh, so NGINX to root, we've got five vulnerabilities.

322
00:19:46.995 --> 00:19:47.375
Okay.

323
00:19:47.655 --> 00:19:56.623
Um, the, the really funny part is if you go to the whiz write up about this, it was found by like this, uh, one of the main names on it is this group, uh,

324
00:19:57.183 --> 00:20:01.205
Zint, X-I-N-T, I don't know how they would like to pronounce their name.

325
00:20:01.525 --> 00:20:13.149
But if you go to the Wiz write-up, the executive summary found by, and it's like a list of one, two, three, four, five different companies independently uncovered critical remote code execution vulnerabilities in Nginx.

326
00:20:13.209 --> 00:20:20.792
Two of these five vulnerabilities were found by five different companies, which means it was found by the latest model that we all pointed at Nginx, right?

327
00:20:21.172 --> 00:20:32.858
It's like who had the right harness with the right budget to throw the latest model at all of these modern, you know, critical pieces of infrastructure of the Internet and Nginx and two of these RCEs fell out.

328
00:20:34.345 --> 00:20:35.806
That's literally all that means, right?

329
00:20:35.906 --> 00:20:36.726
I don't know which one it is.

330
00:20:36.766 --> 00:20:37.867
Probably Sol56.

331
00:20:38.507 --> 00:20:40.508
Does that timeline line up?

332
00:20:40.728 --> 00:20:40.928
Maybe.

333
00:20:40.988 --> 00:20:44.110
And then Zint found three other vulnerabilities.

334
00:20:44.310 --> 00:20:47.272
So that tells you harnesses still matter.

335
00:20:47.312 --> 00:20:59.238
The people running these frontier models still matter because some of these teams found additional vulnerabilities than others instead of just like YOLO, Sol56, please go find me, Nginx, RTE.

336
00:20:59.278 --> 00:20:59.618
Go now.

337
00:21:00.218 --> 00:21:00.938
Yeah, exactly.

338
00:21:01.279 --> 00:21:03.500
So it still matters.

339
00:21:03.540 --> 00:21:09.283
Talented researchers, good harnesses, this stuff still all matters.

340
00:21:09.784 --> 00:21:11.405
Also, the ability to sort through slop, right?

341
00:21:11.445 --> 00:21:17.288
The ability to know what is a real bug, what is exploitable, and that matters too.

342
00:21:17.528 --> 00:21:21.010
You can have a good harness, and it's still going to throw nonsense at you, right?

343
00:21:21.050 --> 00:21:21.270
Totally.

344
00:21:21.290 --> 00:21:22.271
You need to figure out what's legit.

345
00:21:22.771 --> 00:21:24.212
Yeah, you got to gaslight your model.

346
00:21:24.372 --> 00:21:26.534
It's going to gaslight you right back that it found something, right?

347
00:21:26.594 --> 00:21:29.316
And so it's like the gaslighting games, the Hunger Games.

348
00:21:29.336 --> 00:21:33.800
I need gaslighting games of the AI models to figure out what's actually vulnerable.

349
00:21:34.220 --> 00:21:34.420
All right.

350
00:21:34.440 --> 00:21:35.681
So this one's obviously crazy, right?

351
00:21:35.701 --> 00:21:37.643
If you're listening to this podcast, you probably know what Nginx is.

352
00:21:37.683 --> 00:21:41.286
But if you don't, it's like one of the most widely used web servers on the planet.

353
00:21:41.326 --> 00:21:42.787
It's like Nginx and Apache, right?

354
00:21:43.147 --> 00:21:43.968
It's like what's out there.

355
00:21:44.929 --> 00:21:49.773
Estimated stats, 225 million websites are powered by this.

356
00:21:50.493 --> 00:21:55.296
Nginx also very regularly is the thing that sits in front of your web application, right?

357
00:21:55.356 --> 00:22:03.500
So like I've used it mostly in that method, you know, like load balancing, reverse proxy type stuff where it sits in front of your application.

358
00:22:03.520 --> 00:22:15.027
So even if like, oh, no, I run on, you know, XYZ stack or like the Java stuff or like whatever, there's likely an Nginx box sitting in front of the web application no matter what stack you run.

359
00:22:15.147 --> 00:22:22.714
Yeah, literally every web app that I've made is like Django or something, but I always put Nginx in front because CertBot for TLS can interop with Nginx.

360
00:22:22.754 --> 00:22:26.318
You do CertBot deploy on Nginx and you do unencrypted back to your backend, right?

361
00:22:26.338 --> 00:22:27.299
So it's like it's everywhere.

362
00:22:27.799 --> 00:22:28.200
Exactly.

363
00:22:28.520 --> 00:22:34.946
The other word that you just said, super important, because part of the why this matters, right?

364
00:22:35.167 --> 00:22:37.249
Remote code execution on that Nginx box.

365
00:22:37.929 --> 00:22:41.852
is being able to intercept information that is being proxied to that.

366
00:22:41.933 --> 00:22:45.596
And you might say, well, Matt, in low level, I have TLS.

367
00:22:45.696 --> 00:22:47.557
I don't need to be worrying about interception.

368
00:22:47.797 --> 00:23:01.569
But like what Ed just said, a lot of times, a lot of times, what you're doing is terminating that TLS session at the Nginx box and then passing the unencrypted traffic back to your actual application to do whatever between your app and your database and all this kind of stuff, right?

369
00:23:01.609 --> 00:23:04.471
Not to say that's all the time, but that's very common, right?

370
00:23:04.511 --> 00:23:05.252
Super, super common.

371
00:23:05.872 --> 00:23:11.698
And then even if you didn't, it doesn't matter because you have remote code execution in the critical path to the application.

372
00:23:11.979 --> 00:23:16.383
So you can actually change the code of the website that's being served to the browser.

373
00:23:16.403 --> 00:23:17.925
Guess where the key material is.

374
00:23:18.585 --> 00:23:20.507
It's in that process.

375
00:23:20.587 --> 00:23:21.068
It's game over.

376
00:23:21.408 --> 00:23:25.590
You could do, like, the attack scenarios are, like, endless besides the man in the middle.

377
00:23:25.630 --> 00:23:30.972
I'm just saying TLS is not exactly like, oh, you're good now here because of this particular bug.

378
00:23:31.352 --> 00:23:35.454
So it's only rated a 9.2 CVSS instead of a 10.

379
00:23:35.854 --> 00:23:44.317
And that's because it, I think probably likely that the docking is because it requires HTTP 2 to be enabled on the Nginx server.

380
00:23:44.777 --> 00:23:47.178
So that's the one part of this story.

381
00:23:47.198 --> 00:23:48.859
This story broke two hours ago.

382
00:23:48.899 --> 00:23:49.059
Yeah.

383
00:23:50.880 --> 00:23:57.063
The one part of the stats that I do not have is that, the HTTP2 stats.

384
00:23:57.163 --> 00:24:01.424
It's harder to fingerprint on the Shodan type stuff.

385
00:24:01.545 --> 00:24:04.666
225 million websites was the estimate of just Nginx installs.

386
00:24:06.007 --> 00:24:17.872
On here, it also says 98% of Shodan identified Nginx servers, which I think was about in the 50 millions, was Shodan visible boxes.

387
00:24:19.818 --> 00:24:25.980
98% of those 50 something million were running vulnerable versions of this.

388
00:24:26.180 --> 00:24:31.721
So basically anything that Shodan can see is vulnerable to this for the most part in broad swaths.

389
00:24:32.181 --> 00:24:39.603
But based on version number, that does not tell us if HTTP 2 is enabled on all of those.

390
00:24:40.123 --> 00:24:42.544
I think it's not, you said it's not by default.

391
00:24:42.584 --> 00:24:46.005
Yeah, so H2 and H3 are not default behavior on Nginx.

392
00:24:46.665 --> 00:24:46.925
Sure.

393
00:24:47.146 --> 00:24:49.968
But, uh, but it's super calm.

394
00:24:50.028 --> 00:24:51.189
I know it's super common.

395
00:24:51.329 --> 00:24:54.672
I just don't have the stats to tell you right now on that particular thing.

396
00:24:55.013 --> 00:25:07.404
I, if you're listening to this, if we get this out, you know, if we turn this around, uh, fast enough this week and you're, and you hadn't responded to this yet, I would assume, I would just assume that, that you're running one of these versions and that it's, uh, vulnerable.

397
00:25:07.764 --> 00:25:08.545
Just act like that.

398
00:25:09.085 --> 00:25:22.234
The good news about that particular caveat, right, whether or not it's widely exploitable or not, is that if you can't patch for whatever reason, right, that's all you need to disable in order to do it.

399
00:25:22.434 --> 00:25:25.956
So the fix for this one, like, fits on one screen, right?

400
00:25:26.036 --> 00:25:31.360
On this Nginx to root page has, like, the what if I can't patch section.

401
00:25:31.580 --> 00:25:35.983
And, like, on one screen, it's got two commands that's just like, okay, HTTP2 off.

402
00:25:36.523 --> 00:25:45.245
And it's like, if you could turn that off, if for some reason that's easier for you than upgrading to the latest version, that would stop this from being exploitable too.

403
00:25:45.285 --> 00:25:48.106
It's also super easy to test if you're exploitable.

404
00:25:48.126 --> 00:25:52.647
So this is a little bit different than the Java and the PHP in its widespreadness.

405
00:25:52.727 --> 00:25:54.827
It seems easier to exploit from what I can tell.

406
00:25:55.187 --> 00:25:57.908
There's no active exploitation that we know about right now.

407
00:25:58.988 --> 00:26:04.650
But the researchers have not released a POC, but they've released videos of the POC.

408
00:26:06.630 --> 00:26:11.071
that this is easier to exploit than the PHP and Java situations.

409
00:26:11.611 --> 00:26:15.372
And it's easier for you to test yourself if you are impacted.

410
00:26:15.532 --> 00:26:20.033
It's also just one command that you can run to see if you're impacted by this.

411
00:26:20.333 --> 00:26:27.495
You run a second command to disable HTTP2 or to update, you run that same command, and you can test whether or not you're vulnerable to this.

412
00:26:27.515 --> 00:26:33.156
So this should be a relatively easy fix compared to all the other crap that we're doing right now.

413
00:26:33.945 --> 00:26:37.068
You want to talk about the bug?

414
00:26:37.428 --> 00:26:38.949
Like the use after free bit?

415
00:26:39.250 --> 00:26:46.135
Yes, we haven't seen a pop, we haven't seen the exact reasons why, but if you read the CBE itself, the CNA being F5,

416
00:26:47.990 --> 00:26:49.111
Let's see.

417
00:26:49.251 --> 00:27:02.404
When Nginx Plus or Nginx Open Source is configured to use H2 for client connections, a crafted request can result in a use after free in the worker process if this process is running low on worker connections.

418
00:27:02.444 --> 00:27:03.665
I want to highlight that piece.

419
00:27:04.466 --> 00:27:05.447
It's an interesting...

420
00:27:06.968 --> 00:27:12.090
I think illusion to a pattern we're going to start to see as LLMs get better at pattern matching and doing VR, right?

421
00:27:12.110 --> 00:27:15.532
This is a similar code pattern to the PHP to shell bug, right?

422
00:27:15.552 --> 00:27:24.415
The PHP to shell bug was if you can cause the allocator to fail during a session upload, the session pointer will reference freed memory, right?

423
00:27:24.776 --> 00:27:25.596
It's the same thing.

424
00:27:25.736 --> 00:27:27.877
If you can cause a failure state to occur...

425
00:27:28.477 --> 00:27:36.761
Because all the workers are being occupied and you're trying to maybe spawn another worker to handle another H2 chunk, that causes a failure that references freed memory, right?

426
00:27:37.241 --> 00:27:38.042
So that's pretty interesting.

427
00:27:38.122 --> 00:27:42.784
We don't know why, but it sounds like some kind of teardown that occurs when you need a new worker but you don't have one.

428
00:27:43.104 --> 00:27:47.286
You know, you tear down part of an object and another part of the memory references that dead object, right?

429
00:27:48.482 --> 00:27:53.665
One thing, I'm a huge asshole when it comes to verbiage or phraseology in CNAs.

430
00:27:54.005 --> 00:27:56.186
Literally the next line, or in CVEs rather.

431
00:27:57.166 --> 00:28:05.129
Additionally, attackers can execute code on systems with ASLR disabled or when the attacker can bypass ASLR.

432
00:28:05.590 --> 00:28:08.431
Oh, so A or not A, which means one?

433
00:28:08.611 --> 00:28:10.032
Like, what are you talking about, dude?

434
00:28:10.152 --> 00:28:10.652
I hate that.

435
00:28:10.992 --> 00:28:17.460
What I think they should probably say is, like, the researcher has shown that they can bypass ASLR with this, right?

436
00:28:17.480 --> 00:28:18.301
Similar to PHP to Shell.

437
00:28:18.321 --> 00:28:23.287
You have to do kind of like a leak via the UAF to get the ASLR info out and then use that to calculate the memory map.

438
00:28:23.867 --> 00:28:25.569
Interesting verbiage here for sure.

439
00:28:25.589 --> 00:28:25.810
Yeah.

440
00:28:26.190 --> 00:28:33.437
Either way, I think it's going to be as complicated, potentially if not more complicated, than PHP to shell to exploit.

441
00:28:33.878 --> 00:28:39.083
Therefore, we will see probably a similar amount of exploitation of this, which is like low to zero.

442
00:28:39.964 --> 00:28:46.771
And unlike PHP, to your point, you can turn this off with a simple flag in your sites-enabled config.

443
00:28:46.891 --> 00:28:49.814
So go turn off h2 and h3, and you're good to go.

444
00:28:51.348 --> 00:28:51.528
Yeah.

445
00:28:51.829 --> 00:28:58.736
So good write up, good work here by everyone who, like I said, had the budget and the latest model to point at things like Nginx.

446
00:28:59.156 --> 00:29:01.899
I'm glad that that's our new reality, right?

447
00:29:02.039 --> 00:29:07.165
Is these new models are going to come out, they're going to be better at finding specific types of vulnerabilities in specific types of code, right?

448
00:29:07.185 --> 00:29:09.828
There's all these nuances to each model that comes out, right?

449
00:29:10.488 --> 00:29:31.668
And right now at this point, we have enough security research teams that have gotten on board with this and the harnesses and the vulnerability research, you know, budget and divisions and teams focused to grabbing that new model and pointing it at stuff that's super important and critical load bearing things like Nginx or like Java, apparently, even though that one, like you said, was an accident.

450
00:29:32.609 --> 00:29:35.410
You know, we're pointing the right tools at the right things.

451
00:29:35.430 --> 00:29:45.935
This is why, since Mythos and its Project Glasswing velvet rope invite-only situation, I've been advocating to get these things into the hands of these types of people.

452
00:29:46.675 --> 00:29:49.317
Some of these researchers were not in Project Glasswing.

453
00:29:49.337 --> 00:29:53.699
They're not major Fortune 50 companies that are doing this.

454
00:29:53.719 --> 00:29:59.441
These are talented vulnerability researchers with the ability to create these harnesses and, like you said, understand the results.

455
00:29:59.982 --> 00:30:00.702
And they're finding...

456
00:30:01.402 --> 00:30:03.883
very critical things and helping get them fixed.

457
00:30:03.923 --> 00:30:05.924
And by the way, look at us.

458
00:30:05.964 --> 00:30:07.124
Congrats, cybersecurity.

459
00:30:07.384 --> 00:30:09.025
The embargo didn't break on this one.

460
00:30:09.185 --> 00:30:09.945
We have a patch.

461
00:30:10.285 --> 00:30:15.327
Like, this would have been a very different conversation if this leaked October 22nd and there was no patch.

462
00:30:15.827 --> 00:30:19.668
And we just had to go out there and be like, I don't know, everybody, go figure out your Nginx stuff.

463
00:30:19.688 --> 00:30:21.789
Well, in this case, you could just disable HTTP2.

464
00:30:21.909 --> 00:30:22.089
But...

465
00:30:22.829 --> 00:30:23.870
Maybe some people can't do that.

466
00:30:23.890 --> 00:30:25.491
Maybe you absolutely need a patch, right?

467
00:30:25.971 --> 00:30:28.072
So, yeah, this one was cool.

468
00:30:28.212 --> 00:30:40.819
And like I said, even not major companies that were invited to that velvet rope glasswing situation could play by these coordinated disclosure rules and, like, do for the better of the Internet type stuff that we just did here, right?

469
00:30:41.019 --> 00:30:44.301
Matt, do you know who else is good at finding vulnerabilities in code?

470
00:30:45.742 --> 00:30:47.623
The sponsor of today's video!

471
00:30:48.569 --> 00:30:52.113
Hey hackers, before we keep going, I wanna take a quick break and say a quick thank you to our sponsors.

472
00:30:52.393 --> 00:30:55.897
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473
00:30:56.377 --> 00:31:01.683
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474
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475
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476
00:31:09.951 --> 00:31:16.196
Software composition analysis tools and SaaS toolings are all historically really bad at just making more noise.

477
00:31:16.236 --> 00:31:23.081
They find issues that may not actually be real and just create a lot of problems for your engineers to deal with that don't solve real security vulnerabilities.

478
00:31:23.181 --> 00:31:24.202
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479
00:31:24.842 --> 00:31:47.360
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480
00:31:47.560 --> 00:31:52.123
Every vulnerability that Maze code reports comes with evidence that it's real and a way to fix it.

481
00:31:52.463 --> 00:31:56.826
Check out Maze at go.thelowdownpod.com slash Maze.

482
00:31:56.946 --> 00:32:00.628
That's go.thelowdownpod.com slash Maze.

483
00:32:00.809 --> 00:32:01.409
Thanks again, Maze.

484
00:32:01.529 --> 00:32:02.370
Let's keep going.

485
00:32:03.270 --> 00:32:03.690
And we're back.

486
00:32:03.710 --> 00:32:04.491
Hey, welcome back, everybody.

487
00:32:04.511 --> 00:32:05.732
How are we doing?

488
00:32:05.752 --> 00:32:07.093
We're professional podcasters, bro.

489
00:32:07.113 --> 00:32:08.734
Throwing it out to the sponsor, getting it back.

490
00:32:08.754 --> 00:32:09.494
We're so good.

491
00:32:09.514 --> 00:32:09.754
So good.

492
00:32:10.054 --> 00:32:12.736
What percentage of podcasts make it past 20 episodes straight?

493
00:32:12.816 --> 00:32:13.697
Like, we did good.

494
00:32:13.717 --> 00:32:14.257
We did good, dude.

495
00:32:14.317 --> 00:32:15.158
I think we're doing all right.

496
00:32:15.178 --> 00:32:15.378
All right.

497
00:32:16.298 --> 00:32:16.958
So it's 2027.

498
00:32:17.019 --> 00:32:17.959
It's going to be our year.

499
00:32:18.199 --> 00:32:20.900
It's going to be great.

500
00:32:20.940 --> 00:32:27.622
So I've been resisting saying this as part of the whole Nginx story because it would have transitioned us directly into the new story.

501
00:32:27.642 --> 00:32:33.145
And we needed to finish the Nginx story before we could transition into all these outages.

502
00:32:33.565 --> 00:32:33.785
But...

503
00:32:34.405 --> 00:32:41.458
Like one of the things I keep bringing up and we both just kept bringing up in these two stories was if it's difficult for you to patch for some reason.

504
00:32:41.678 --> 00:32:41.838
Right.

505
00:32:41.858 --> 00:32:43.721
That was like a sentence that I just kept saying.

506
00:32:43.902 --> 00:32:44.042
Right.

507
00:32:44.062 --> 00:32:44.583
With NGINX.

508
00:32:44.643 --> 00:32:44.904
Okay.

509
00:32:44.924 --> 00:32:45.565
We'll disable HTTP2.

510
00:32:47.015 --> 00:32:48.855
why would it be difficult to patch?

511
00:32:49.116 --> 00:32:56.617
Like if you're listening to this and you don't work for some like megacorp or anything like that, and you're just like, well, I have Nginx, so like upgrade, right?

512
00:32:56.637 --> 00:32:56.857
Done.

513
00:32:56.897 --> 00:32:57.257
Cool.

514
00:32:57.858 --> 00:32:58.598
Cool, right?

515
00:32:58.858 --> 00:32:59.938
That's not how life works.

516
00:33:00.018 --> 00:33:00.218
Yep.

517
00:33:00.378 --> 00:33:04.999
When you run in like a network the size of France that if it goes down, people's paychecks don't clear, right?

518
00:33:05.519 --> 00:33:10.461
You know, so like you can't just be like, cool, upgrade, you know, lol, no vuln anymore, right?

519
00:33:10.961 --> 00:33:15.162
So this is what I think is going on with all these outages, right?

520
00:33:15.242 --> 00:33:15.602
I like...

521
00:33:16.643 --> 00:33:17.804
Should we list the outages first?

522
00:33:17.824 --> 00:33:20.768
I was going to say, yeah, can you go into, like, you say these outages.

523
00:33:20.848 --> 00:33:23.351
There are several in the plural these, so give me a few.

524
00:33:23.792 --> 00:33:26.074
Sorry, I got ahead of myself, everybody.

525
00:33:26.835 --> 00:33:31.601
We have an article from the BBC headlined,

526
00:33:31.901 --> 00:33:35.063
Hacks, AI, or just overdue updates.

527
00:33:35.423 --> 00:33:36.924
Why have there been so many outages?

528
00:33:37.304 --> 00:33:41.027
We have escaped the echo chamber drastically right now, right?

529
00:33:41.047 --> 00:33:48.971
We've got major news, like websites, talking heads, constantly saying, you know, what's the deal with these outages?

530
00:33:49.091 --> 00:33:54.875
I saw press releases in the White House asking if this was cyber attack related or AI related.

531
00:33:55.075 --> 00:33:57.859
And they had to go, well, actually, around here we call it SI.

532
00:33:57.899 --> 00:33:59.020
It's like, that's not the point.

533
00:33:59.140 --> 00:34:02.344
Can we get – the planes aren't taking off.

534
00:34:02.404 --> 00:34:09.453
Why are we – The Kalief.io Java for Shell story made New York Times talk about heap grooming.

535
00:34:09.594 --> 00:34:11.496
Like, we are out of the bubble, dude.

536
00:34:11.516 --> 00:34:13.098
It is happening in real time right now.

537
00:34:13.118 --> 00:34:13.438
Wild.

538
00:34:13.458 --> 00:34:14.400
Machine speed.

539
00:34:15.060 --> 00:34:16.201
I got to see that.

540
00:34:16.301 --> 00:34:16.801
Okay, cool.

541
00:34:17.262 --> 00:34:18.142
So outages.

542
00:34:18.323 --> 00:34:23.366
It started with Microsoft, at least this little stint that we're talking about.

543
00:34:23.406 --> 00:34:25.708
Yeah, we're not in Black October anymore.

544
00:34:25.748 --> 00:34:28.009
That was a different stint and pile of issues.

545
00:34:29.250 --> 00:34:31.812
The Microsoft outage was kind of the kickoff of this, right?

546
00:34:32.192 --> 00:34:35.335
We made the joke on our last podcast, Microsoft 364, am I right?

547
00:34:35.595 --> 00:34:37.716
And they were down for the better part of a day.

548
00:34:38.837 --> 00:34:41.379
We still don't have a lot of information about what happened there.

549
00:34:41.679 --> 00:34:41.919
right?

550
00:34:42.179 --> 00:34:46.423
Like that's kind of wild that like some sort of transparency report hasn't come out about that one.

551
00:34:47.524 --> 00:34:56.551
But there was some like theories that maybe that caused a lot of other ripple effects because Microsoft is so load-bearing for so many organizations.

552
00:34:57.071 --> 00:34:58.792
Right after the Microsoft outage,

553
00:34:59.651 --> 00:35:02.934
like the next day, I don't know, time's fake.

554
00:35:02.954 --> 00:35:03.735
This is a few days ago.

555
00:35:05.036 --> 00:35:08.500
The FAA grounded all flights, like we mentioned at the top of the episode.

556
00:35:09.000 --> 00:35:11.923
People are like, was this AI?

557
00:35:11.983 --> 00:35:13.985
Are we under attack right now?

558
00:35:14.065 --> 00:35:17.909
I saw that it started in Chicago and started to spread out.

559
00:35:18.109 --> 00:35:21.112
Is this a worm hitting air traffic control systems?

560
00:35:21.613 --> 00:35:22.333
Whatever, right?

561
00:35:22.994 --> 00:35:23.314
Then...

562
00:35:24.815 --> 00:35:28.997
a bunch of the biggest banks in the U.S. went out, like yesterday or the day before, right?

563
00:35:29.557 --> 00:35:34.740
Then the NSA's confidential network, NSA net, went down.

564
00:35:35.100 --> 00:35:37.081
And the stuff started going about that.

565
00:35:37.461 --> 00:35:41.723
Then, like you said, the New York Times talking about Java bugs, right?

566
00:35:42.063 --> 00:35:46.485
So all of the media is like, what is going on, all of these outages?

567
00:35:46.625 --> 00:35:47.325
Apple had an outage.

568
00:35:47.365 --> 00:35:51.527
Like the App Store and Apple Wallet went down for a little bit this week.

569
00:35:51.767 --> 00:35:54.390
The meme was like the Bart Simpson say the line thing.

570
00:35:54.410 --> 00:35:57.653
And he's like, there's no indication of a cyber attack.

571
00:35:57.953 --> 00:35:59.375
Like, yay!

572
00:35:59.535 --> 00:35:59.795
Yeah.

573
00:35:59.995 --> 00:36:02.397
I did the breaking your mom is down.

574
00:36:03.058 --> 00:36:04.439
No suspected cyber attack.

575
00:36:04.500 --> 00:36:06.041
It's just like, it's just constant, right?

576
00:36:06.582 --> 00:36:07.963
And so, yeah.

577
00:36:08.203 --> 00:36:12.884
Right now, it seems like all of these are very, very boring IT issues.

578
00:36:13.044 --> 00:36:15.625
It just seems like they're all happening at the same time.

579
00:36:15.945 --> 00:36:20.046
So that begs the question, is this a coincidence?

580
00:36:20.226 --> 00:36:22.927
Or is this some sort of giant government conspiracy?

581
00:36:22.947 --> 00:36:27.528
And there is actually some sort of like AI thing going on or cyber attack going on.

582
00:36:27.568 --> 00:36:31.409
And we're all just getting fed, you know, some story about boring IT things.

583
00:36:32.850 --> 00:36:32.990
And...

584
00:36:33.630 --> 00:36:46.695
I come back to, and this is like my take on this, and I'm excited to hear yours, right, is I think the most plausible explanation of all of this happening is no, it's not a coincidence that this all happened at the same time.

585
00:36:47.375 --> 00:36:52.637
It's a ripple effect of us identifying more issues right now, right?

586
00:36:52.857 --> 00:36:58.800
So it's not like, oh, AI caused all this stuff, but we are finding more bugs, not just security bugs.

587
00:36:59.100 --> 00:37:00.640
We're finding more bugs in general.

588
00:37:01.341 --> 00:37:01.741
And so...

589
00:37:02.661 --> 00:37:05.522
Patching and upgrading are risky behaviors.

590
00:37:05.542 --> 00:37:19.849
This is why like enterprises do code freezes around Black Friday or around like big important days or when a bunch of their staff is going to go on vacation because you do a code freeze because upgrading is risky and like things break without you realizing it.

591
00:37:19.889 --> 00:37:24.151
It's hard to test every scenario that's like live in production, right?

592
00:37:24.171 --> 00:37:26.051
So once you do go live, there's risk of this.

593
00:37:26.532 --> 00:37:29.193
So I think that it's pretty plausible that...

594
00:37:29.793 --> 00:37:32.236
That we're at this point, the holidays are coming up.

595
00:37:32.296 --> 00:37:39.065
People are like scheduling all these upgrades from all of these things that we've been identifying at a faster rate than ever right now.

596
00:37:39.766 --> 00:37:44.532
And like we've squished and compressed a bunch of our issues to right now.

597
00:37:44.632 --> 00:37:45.293
What do you think is going on?

598
00:37:47.453 --> 00:37:49.817
Yeah, I think I agree with you, right?

599
00:37:49.877 --> 00:37:53.101
I mean, there are a lot of... No, come on.

600
00:37:53.201 --> 00:37:54.543
I need the tinfoil wizard hat.

601
00:37:54.583 --> 00:37:57.167
I need you to tell me that this is North Korea.

602
00:37:57.347 --> 00:37:58.729
I need you to tell me this is Iran.

603
00:37:58.970 --> 00:38:00.472
Well, so, okay, okay, okay.

604
00:38:00.872 --> 00:38:02.595
When this first started to happen...

605
00:38:02.775 --> 00:38:03.015
Right.

606
00:38:03.055 --> 00:38:12.325
When like Microsoft went down and then the FAA went down and then airlines went down, I was like, OK, maybe this is an Iran thing.

607
00:38:12.346 --> 00:38:14.928
And then we had like the news of like the dirty bomb threat going on.

608
00:38:14.948 --> 00:38:20.354
So I'm like, OK, maybe this is Iran, you know, trying to flex if they can act like a nation state, too.

609
00:38:21.075 --> 00:38:24.936
But then, like, the nothing ever happens meme kind of started to go off in my head.

610
00:38:24.956 --> 00:38:26.956
And I'm like, yeah, but, like, nothing happened.

611
00:38:26.996 --> 00:38:29.237
Like, no planes flew out of the sky.

612
00:38:29.497 --> 00:38:35.538
There was, like, a pool chlorination system that, like, over-chlorinated a pool in France because it depended on Microsoft Outlook.

613
00:38:35.578 --> 00:38:36.658
So, like, that's bad.

614
00:38:36.978 --> 00:38:39.839
But, like, other than that, nothing really, like, occurred.

615
00:38:40.299 --> 00:38:41.879
So I don't think it's a nation-state thing.

616
00:38:41.899 --> 00:38:42.760
I think I agree with you, man.

617
00:38:42.780 --> 00:38:43.740
I think it's literally just the...

618
00:38:45.060 --> 00:38:51.922
The technical debt or the security debt habits that we've kind of built up as an industry are starting to catch up with us.

619
00:38:52.182 --> 00:38:55.462
And now we have to come up with new ways to undo those habits.

620
00:38:55.983 --> 00:38:58.343
And, yeah, I think, like you said, patching is risky.

621
00:38:58.483 --> 00:38:59.443
Updating is risky.

622
00:38:59.743 --> 00:39:04.945
And so you have organizations like the FAA, you know, Citibank, maybe the NSA.

623
00:39:04.985 --> 00:39:08.105
They update that one router that's been sitting there for 20 years no one's ever touched.

624
00:39:08.505 --> 00:39:11.306
And then suddenly it takes out the national grid for the radar.

625
00:39:12.426 --> 00:39:19.068
I don't know what's going on, but I think I agree with you that it's just the patching of these bugs is causing ripple effects that we can expect.

626
00:39:19.588 --> 00:39:25.569
Yeah, and I do like the theory that a lot of this is happening right now because the holidays are literally next week.

627
00:39:25.769 --> 00:39:28.670
And they know everyone's going to go on vacation, on leave, whatever.

628
00:39:29.110 --> 00:39:33.711
Everywhere I've ever worked has code freeze starting next week through the end of the year.

629
00:39:34.031 --> 00:39:40.273
It's like, nope, we're not doing anything, by the way, like life support or major security issues, exceptions or whatever.

630
00:39:40.793 --> 00:39:44.234
The joke I made was that that load marrying it guys playing wow forever.

631
00:39:44.434 --> 00:39:46.795
And he's, he's just been out of office for too long.

632
00:39:46.815 --> 00:39:48.355
He's already a level 55 shaman.

633
00:39:48.395 --> 00:39:49.295
It's only been out a week.

634
00:39:50.055 --> 00:39:52.116
Uh, and, uh, that's why, but that was the joke I made.

635
00:39:52.156 --> 00:39:58.197
But, um, yeah, I, I really don't see, I don't see any evidence in any of this being like cyber attack related.

636
00:39:58.297 --> 00:40:01.738
And people were in my DMS all week, all week, man.

637
00:40:01.758 --> 00:40:02.699
Like, where's the video on this?

638
00:40:02.719 --> 00:40:03.339
Where's the video on this?

639
00:40:03.379 --> 00:40:04.539
I was like, where's the video on what?

640
00:40:04.599 --> 00:40:05.399
There's no cyber.

641
00:40:05.419 --> 00:40:06.720
There's nothing to talk about.

642
00:40:06.740 --> 00:40:07.140
It's like, yep.

643
00:40:07.220 --> 00:40:07.700
It went down.

644
00:40:07.800 --> 00:40:08.540
What else do you want to

645
00:40:08.620 --> 00:40:14.166
Tons of other creators that were making videos about it going down and like, oh, is it a hack?

646
00:40:14.186 --> 00:40:14.747
We don't know.

647
00:40:14.847 --> 00:40:16.289
And it's like, well, that's not useful.

648
00:40:16.309 --> 00:40:19.012
Like, you know, and I'm just trying to not add to the noise, everybody.

649
00:40:19.072 --> 00:40:19.433
Okay.

650
00:40:19.453 --> 00:40:20.934
Like, you know, is this AI?

651
00:40:20.974 --> 00:40:21.835
Is this like whatever?

652
00:40:21.855 --> 00:40:23.117
I'm like, there's just noise.

653
00:40:23.157 --> 00:40:23.677
It's just noise.

654
00:40:23.697 --> 00:40:24.118
I don't know.

655
00:40:24.198 --> 00:40:26.919
And I got misinformation and then contributed to it.

656
00:40:27.199 --> 00:40:32.921
Like, Polymarket said, FBI takes possession of the router in question from the FAA.

657
00:40:32.981 --> 00:40:33.742
And I retweeted that.

658
00:40:34.042 --> 00:40:40.524
And then the FAA tweeted, and they're like, hey... Or no, the FBI tweeted, and they're like, hey, we didn't take any routers from anybody.

659
00:40:40.544 --> 00:40:42.245
That was made up.

660
00:40:42.385 --> 00:40:43.626
Oh, wow, I missed that.

661
00:40:43.666 --> 00:40:44.646
Yeah, that's crazy.

662
00:40:45.226 --> 00:40:47.387
I mean, it's nuts.

663
00:40:48.167 --> 00:40:48.928
I'm a little, like...

664
00:40:49.737 --> 00:40:54.540
I will say, I'm not a big conspiracy guy, but, like, there's a little bit...

665
00:40:54.560 --> 00:40:58.161
I mean, I start to feel like the Charlie, you know, It's Always Sunny gif, right?

666
00:40:58.181 --> 00:41:00.102
Like, there's too many things going on, right?

667
00:41:00.383 --> 00:41:05.285
I mean, I'm in text messages with, like, much more important people than you and me, and, like, that's not a flag.

668
00:41:05.505 --> 00:41:08.607
I'm just, like, in some groups, and, like, these people are, like...

669
00:41:09.287 --> 00:41:12.689
also kind of scratching their head and like starting to ask questions.

670
00:41:12.729 --> 00:41:15.310
And it's like, okay, hold on, right?

671
00:41:15.750 --> 00:41:17.951
And like a lot of people don't believe in coincidences.

672
00:41:17.971 --> 00:41:20.892
And that's why I wanted to say, like, I don't think it's a coincidence.

673
00:41:21.112 --> 00:41:25.434
I think it's because of like, everything affects everything, right?

674
00:41:25.535 --> 00:41:29.056
And like, we've got these super bug finding tools.

675
00:41:29.316 --> 00:41:32.778
You and I talk a lot about security bugs, but that's not the only kind of bugs.

676
00:41:32.818 --> 00:41:32.998
Yeah.

677
00:41:33.438 --> 00:41:35.679
But AI is finding in a lot of this stuff, right?

678
00:41:35.799 --> 00:41:36.940
It could just be like,

679
00:41:37.620 --> 00:41:48.190
hey, we're trying to optimize this, or we're upgrading this, or we've got a lot of pressure from leadership to be running frontier models to do something, save money, fix bugs, modernize, whatever, right?

680
00:41:48.791 --> 00:41:52.695
And the pressure to move fast and break things, guess what?

681
00:41:52.875 --> 00:41:56.198
We move fast and broke things.

682
00:41:56.378 --> 00:42:02.083
I think the reason why the trigger pull is so light on at least internally our industry freaking out,

683
00:42:02.944 --> 00:42:11.126
At least for me, I think there's this general awareness of how fragile the system is, how fragile everything is.

684
00:42:11.666 --> 00:42:19.528
And if you apply LLM bug finding to that, you become aware of the system where like, hey, everything is kind of popsicle sticks and bubble gum.

685
00:42:20.008 --> 00:42:23.049
And also nation states probably have bugs in all of it.

686
00:42:23.709 --> 00:42:27.410
So then you're kind of like almost waiting for this scenario to occur.

687
00:42:27.470 --> 00:42:39.774
I think back to like the Volt Typhoon, Salt Typhoon, Telecom intrusions where it's like, oh, you know, Chinese threat actor hacked into Verizon and T-Mobile and AT&amp;T and Sprint and, and, and, and, and.

688
00:42:40.195 --> 00:42:43.516
And so you have these APTs that are probably like positioned in some of these networks.

689
00:42:43.876 --> 00:42:46.857
You're almost kind of waiting for this day to happen where you're like, oh, yeah.

690
00:42:47.337 --> 00:42:51.401
Microsoft went down and the FAA and the NSA and banks and Java.

691
00:42:51.421 --> 00:42:53.022
Like, it's kind of like, oh, duh.

692
00:42:53.302 --> 00:42:53.783
You know what I mean?

693
00:42:53.803 --> 00:42:56.445
So you almost want to believe it because it feels like it's possible.

694
00:42:56.765 --> 00:42:58.607
But that being said, still no indication of cyber attack.

695
00:42:58.627 --> 00:42:59.207
We have no idea.

696
00:42:59.248 --> 00:43:05.893
It's just I think that's why we're so ready to go that route of doomsday because it's the industry is like set up for it.

697
00:43:05.993 --> 00:43:09.837
You know, it's all it is also I'll give it to the conspiracy theorists.

698
00:43:10.077 --> 00:43:12.419
It's a little weird that they're literally all unrelated.

699
00:43:12.579 --> 00:43:13.339
Yeah, right.

700
00:43:13.539 --> 00:43:13.779
I agree.

701
00:43:13.819 --> 00:43:21.281
The fact that none of these things helped cause the other one of these things or that they don't share a root cause is strange, right?

702
00:43:21.321 --> 00:43:23.802
Like super, super strange, right?

703
00:43:23.882 --> 00:43:24.202
I get it.

704
00:43:24.902 --> 00:43:30.183
I think Sherrod over at Unit 42, previously Microsoft tweeted it really well.

705
00:43:30.223 --> 00:43:42.226
She said, it's interesting that people in threat intelligence with deep expertise in threat actor activity like Russia, China, Iran, North Korea specialists easily accept that the recent issues are human errors made on fragile systems.

706
00:43:42.947 --> 00:43:46.732
while people without threat intelligence backgrounds are shouting OMG cyber attack.

707
00:43:46.792 --> 00:43:48.635
I think that sums it up really nicely, right?

708
00:43:49.897 --> 00:43:56.867
It's just, yeah, it's just super weird that these things, like when I read, like you texted me the NSA thing, I was like at a conference and I was like, this could be good.

709
00:43:56.967 --> 00:43:57.388
Oh, shit.

710
00:43:57.408 --> 00:43:59.649
okay, I guess I'll make a video now.

711
00:44:00.049 --> 00:44:05.032
And fool me six times, shame on me, right?

712
00:44:05.072 --> 00:44:06.813
I guess I'll talk about something.

713
00:44:07.853 --> 00:44:12.336
But yeah, it's just duct tape and popsicle sticks all the way down, man, is really what's going on.

714
00:44:12.376 --> 00:44:16.018
And we just started blowing harder on this fragile tower.

715
00:44:17.018 --> 00:44:22.201
The quote that I like is that we've had decades of tech debt forever, and we all know this.

716
00:44:22.281 --> 00:44:24.202
If you work in technology, you all know this.

717
00:44:24.302 --> 00:44:26.183
Nowhere that anyone's ever worked is like,

718
00:44:26.823 --> 00:44:28.144
Modern, got it, done.

719
00:44:28.984 --> 00:44:29.905
My system is good.

720
00:44:30.165 --> 00:44:30.826
No one says that.

721
00:44:31.266 --> 00:44:32.547
Nope, nope, nope, right?

722
00:44:33.147 --> 00:44:34.928
But certain tech debt is worse than others.

723
00:44:35.028 --> 00:44:35.729
And guess what?

724
00:44:35.909 --> 00:44:40.912
In this age right now that we're in, interest rates just went through the roof on tech debt, right?

725
00:44:40.972 --> 00:44:42.233
And I think this is part of that.

726
00:44:42.593 --> 00:44:44.334
It's not the vulnpocalypse.

727
00:44:44.374 --> 00:44:45.294
Well, it's kind of vulnpocalypse.

728
00:44:45.334 --> 00:44:46.835
It's fucking Java and NGINX, right?

729
00:44:46.855 --> 00:44:49.417
But it's not the hacker-pocalypse, right?

730
00:44:49.517 --> 00:44:51.518
Or like- The cyberpunk-harmoner, if you will.

731
00:44:51.578 --> 00:44:52.119
Totally, right?

732
00:44:52.179 --> 00:44:53.099
It's not that.

733
00:44:53.500 --> 00:44:53.740
But-

734
00:44:54.340 --> 00:44:57.142
the interest rate's going up, meaning we're going to have some outages.

735
00:44:57.943 --> 00:45:02.967
Guarantee, by the way, Nginx upgrades or Java upgrades are going to take some stuff out.

736
00:45:03.247 --> 00:45:06.330
Whether or not it's big swaths of things like banks, right?

737
00:45:06.370 --> 00:45:08.172
Because they have redundancy testing.

738
00:45:08.412 --> 00:45:12.295
But someone's going to stub their toe trying to rush around and patch these massive...

739
00:45:12.315 --> 00:45:16.498
When Nginx is going to find out that the other end of that connection depends on HTTP2, and it's like, uh-oh.

740
00:45:16.538 --> 00:45:16.659
100%.

741
00:45:17.740 --> 00:45:18.280
100%.

742
00:45:18.340 --> 00:45:22.585
It might be like some homies blog and not like, you know, Bank of America, right?

743
00:45:22.646 --> 00:45:23.366
So like, who knows?

744
00:45:23.927 --> 00:45:24.928
So this one's wild.

745
00:45:25.489 --> 00:45:31.736
I just like, I kept like holding my tongue transitioning from the Nginx story to this because I kept saying patching is hard and risky.

746
00:45:32.537 --> 00:45:34.079
And I was like, wait, we got to finish Nginx.

747
00:45:34.099 --> 00:45:34.339
Yeah.

748
00:45:36.891 --> 00:45:37.131
All right.

749
00:45:37.291 --> 00:45:43.074
So what's the other, this other bit that absolutely took up a ton of air this week?

750
00:45:43.554 --> 00:45:52.938
Because it's like every big name company, SaaS company was listed as like hacked basically in the headlines for people on this one.

751
00:45:52.958 --> 00:45:53.638
Did you see this one?

752
00:45:53.818 --> 00:45:54.558
Optimizely?

753
00:45:54.958 --> 00:45:56.179
I saw floating around on Twitter.

754
00:45:56.239 --> 00:46:00.321
I couldn't give you a ton of details, but it sounds like it affected a ton of downstream companies.

755
00:46:00.341 --> 00:46:01.141
So please enlighten me.

756
00:46:01.461 --> 00:46:06.344
Yeah, so you and I both had to figure out what Optimizely was first, right?

757
00:46:06.644 --> 00:46:14.289
So it's basically a JavaScript front-end framework that you can include on your website that's code that you don't write.

758
00:46:14.309 --> 00:46:19.051
So this is technically, now, let's call it, everybody put a dollar in the jar, supply chain attack.

759
00:46:19.071 --> 00:46:19.792
Supply chain!

760
00:46:20.212 --> 00:46:24.178
So if you remember these from way back in like, I don't know, what, September?

761
00:46:25.500 --> 00:46:30.868
Pre-Black October and vulnerabilities and everything, what was the other topic du jour was supply chain attacks, right?

762
00:46:30.888 --> 00:46:32.230
With Team PCP and...

763
00:46:32.530 --> 00:46:33.452
Shy Allude.

764
00:46:33.572 --> 00:46:34.994
Shy Allude, NPS.

765
00:46:35.074 --> 00:46:39.516
NPM worms, PyPy worms, rust crates and all this kind of stuff.

766
00:46:39.556 --> 00:46:41.436
This is in that vein, right?

767
00:46:41.516 --> 00:46:50.940
But instead of hacking GitHub accounts and getting into different NPM packages, this Optimizely company just got hacked to themselves.

768
00:46:51.960 --> 00:47:00.342
And then the JavaScript that they were serving to their customers all of a sudden started serving malware, right?

769
00:47:00.522 --> 00:47:09.344
So this JavaScript that everyone had included on their site, if you've never done this, you don't actually include the whole JavaScript that does all of the functionality.

770
00:47:09.444 --> 00:47:11.985
You include a line on your website that...

771
00:47:12.585 --> 00:47:19.027
in real time calls out to the other company and brings in that JavaScript at the moment that someone's browser loads it.

772
00:47:19.567 --> 00:47:31.071
So this, if you want like a Matt J history lesson lore dump, you can go Google my Black Hat talk in 2013 about building a botnet on an ad network.

773
00:47:31.091 --> 00:47:32.511
And this is exactly how I did it.

774
00:47:32.751 --> 00:47:36.412
I got an ad approved on an ad network that included JavaScript.

775
00:47:36.432 --> 00:47:37.853
And then I changed the JavaScript

776
00:47:38.533 --> 00:48:01.565
on my server that it was pulling to be malicious and but the ad was already approved and out there and it didn't matter and that line of code never changed in the ad anymore i could just change the code that it was pulling into the browser at that time right uh not to date myself on my security research back to 2013 that was my first black act don't oh was it were you in my talk i may have been there actually no i don't know

777
00:48:02.005 --> 00:48:03.689
So it's a web app.

778
00:48:03.749 --> 00:48:05.152
You're cooler than web app security.

779
00:48:05.412 --> 00:48:10.021
I didn't know shit back then, but anyway.

780
00:48:10.142 --> 00:48:11.264
Web apps are not very...

781
00:48:12.081 --> 00:48:12.561
Low level.

782
00:48:12.602 --> 00:48:13.883
In the channel.

783
00:48:14.563 --> 00:48:15.264
So, yeah.

784
00:48:15.324 --> 00:48:20.308
So big names like Zoom and the BBC and HSBC and Equifax are on the headlines of this.

785
00:48:20.669 --> 00:48:25.133
So what this means and why this is scary is these massive websites that you use and trust.

786
00:48:25.173 --> 00:48:26.914
You go to Zoom all the time.

787
00:48:26.954 --> 00:48:28.676
You go read the news on BBC.

788
00:48:28.696 --> 00:48:31.899
You expect that website to not serve you malware.

789
00:48:32.019 --> 00:48:37.243
And for a period of time this week, they were serving malware on these very legitimate sites.

790
00:48:38.084 --> 00:48:40.486
because of this malicious Java includes.

791
00:48:40.647 --> 00:48:46.132
So there's 178 organizations that used Optimizely, which by the way is like an A-B tester.

792
00:48:46.552 --> 00:48:53.079
So it's like you can dynamically generate this JavaScript on the page that does like an A-B test of, I don't know, various things.

793
00:48:53.259 --> 00:48:55.701
Does this image or this image sell more t-shirts?

794
00:48:55.861 --> 00:48:56.442
Like which one?

795
00:48:56.462 --> 00:48:57.443
That's the whole thing.

796
00:48:57.823 --> 00:48:58.484
Literally, right?

797
00:48:58.984 --> 00:49:02.508
So pulled this in and what did the malware do?

798
00:49:03.950 --> 00:49:04.591
Steal crypto.

799
00:49:04.731 --> 00:49:05.071
Of course.

800
00:49:05.212 --> 00:49:05.532
Of course.

801
00:49:05.652 --> 00:49:06.533
Of course it's still crypto.

802
00:49:06.894 --> 00:49:08.876
So it was like card skimming.

803
00:49:08.936 --> 00:49:15.383
It was like crypto address swapping in page text forms, like from the clipboard and like outgoing requests.

804
00:49:15.744 --> 00:49:17.646
So that's like the only confirmed loss.

805
00:49:17.666 --> 00:49:18.387
That's how it happened.

806
00:49:18.547 --> 00:49:18.967
It was like...

807
00:49:19.668 --> 00:49:25.892
making a transfer to something and it like swapped their crypto wallet address for the actual one.

808
00:49:26.232 --> 00:49:29.274
So I think the only confirmed loss is about $7,000 from this.

809
00:49:29.294 --> 00:49:30.735
This could have been a lot worse, right?

810
00:49:30.795 --> 00:49:33.897
But it looks like it was also throwing like Karuna and Darksword exploit kits.

811
00:49:34.037 --> 00:49:34.518
Yeah.

812
00:49:34.558 --> 00:49:35.418
Which is insane.

813
00:49:35.698 --> 00:49:36.279
I was getting there.

814
00:49:36.299 --> 00:49:37.920
So like cards, no, it's all good.

815
00:49:37.940 --> 00:49:41.922
So card skimming crypto was like the main things that like that's the only confirmed loss.

816
00:49:42.363 --> 00:49:48.667
But then like, but as the research was like unfolding on this, it even says like added partway through the day.

817
00:49:49.467 --> 00:49:51.047
So this compromise happened.

818
00:49:51.067 --> 00:49:53.868
The attacker was testing what they could get away with.

819
00:49:54.188 --> 00:49:58.509
And then they were adding new malicious features to it as it was going.

820
00:49:58.849 --> 00:50:01.850
And one of the later features was throwing Karuna and Dark Sword.

821
00:50:01.870 --> 00:50:08.012
I have a video on my channel where I interviewed the researchers that identified Karuna and Dark Sword, if you're not familiar with those.

822
00:50:09.112 --> 00:50:12.693
But their iOS exploit kits that were found in the wild earlier this year.

823
00:50:13.353 --> 00:50:29.144
that previously would have been like 20 plus million dollar exploit kits that were now just like sitting on random watering hole websites, like just hacking anyone who came across that website, which is not how iOS exploits have ever been used in the past.

824
00:50:29.164 --> 00:50:32.807
They are very targeted because they are very hard and expensive to develop historically.

825
00:50:34.027 --> 00:50:34.867
And so then here you go.

826
00:50:34.907 --> 00:50:41.229
Karuna and Darksword kind of resurged and were part of this in a hidden frame.

827
00:50:42.309 --> 00:50:45.409
It was depending on certain iOS versions, right?

828
00:50:45.449 --> 00:50:46.550
Most of them were older.

829
00:50:47.070 --> 00:50:48.350
Some of them were slightly newer.

830
00:50:48.830 --> 00:50:58.232
But yeah, this is nuts to see the iOS exploit next to the crypto scamming and card skimming again, right?

831
00:50:58.252 --> 00:50:58.892
These are not...

832
00:50:59.832 --> 00:51:01.553
We're not used to this as an industry.

833
00:51:01.613 --> 00:51:05.934
That level of OS exploit being on crypto.

834
00:51:06.154 --> 00:51:08.875
The only money stolen from this whole campaign was $7,000.

835
00:51:09.235 --> 00:51:14.176
And they were using a previously what would have been a $20 million exploit as part of this attack.

836
00:51:14.196 --> 00:51:15.097
It was just insane.

837
00:51:16.497 --> 00:51:23.719
It is interesting that the world of go to a bad website and get hacked by a nation state is still alive and well.

838
00:51:23.879 --> 00:51:24.659
You know what I mean?

839
00:51:24.679 --> 00:51:26.360
You think like, oh, with all the...

840
00:51:26.940 --> 00:51:32.441
you know, looking at V8 we're doing and the fuzzing of this and the hardware mitigations we have on iPhones that would go away.

841
00:51:32.461 --> 00:51:36.282
But it's like, no, bro, you could still get popped by going to, I mean, fucking BBC.co.uk.

842
00:51:36.302 --> 00:51:37.642
You can get hacked, you know, insane.

843
00:51:38.442 --> 00:51:39.302
Yeah.

844
00:51:39.502 --> 00:51:45.523
So, you know, zooming out on this one to not just be like breach porn or vuln porn, like we say, right?

845
00:51:45.603 --> 00:51:54.445
I think the lesson learned that we want to walk away from this is like part, you know, that dead code society thing we talked about and like unused code, add this to the list.

846
00:51:54.605 --> 00:52:10.782
What are you including in your JavaScript front end that like this A-B test thing that like, what, someone from marketing or like marketing ops, like growth ops, like this is like in that world of like automation around optimization of your stuff, like through this on your website?

847
00:52:10.882 --> 00:52:11.783
Did you know it was there?

848
00:52:11.803 --> 00:52:12.183
Right.

849
00:52:12.363 --> 00:52:16.647
Like, did the security team at BBC know that this was there and evaluated it?

850
00:52:16.667 --> 00:52:31.960
Did they have any sort of way to monitor if optimizely was changing the code that was being pulled in dynamically at, you know, runtime in the browser like this, we, you got to have answers for this and you got to evaluate like your attack surface, like has always included this stuff.

851
00:52:32.540 --> 00:52:34.161
But it's time.

852
00:52:34.341 --> 00:52:36.103
Tech debt interest rates, right?

853
00:52:36.203 --> 00:52:38.344
It's time to evaluate what are you actually pulling in.

854
00:52:39.765 --> 00:52:47.090
The other follow-up from this is literally just this morning, we got an incident report out of Optimizely about this.

855
00:52:47.131 --> 00:52:50.233
I haven't actually got to read the full report, but the researcher who additionally...

856
00:52:50.833 --> 00:52:57.459
found it, said that they confirmed infections outside of their timeline.

857
00:52:57.479 --> 00:53:07.147
So they state that first infection was like, oh, 700 hours or whatever, but they have it going like maybe three or four hours even before that.

858
00:53:07.167 --> 00:53:09.609
So even the researchers like questioning this whole incident report.

859
00:53:10.069 --> 00:53:13.852
So we might actually learn some more about this as it goes, right?

860
00:53:13.872 --> 00:53:18.436
So it seems like maybe incident response isn't exactly going super well over there.

861
00:53:18.456 --> 00:53:18.937
I don't know if...

862
00:53:19.757 --> 00:53:20.558
I don't know what's going on.

863
00:53:20.698 --> 00:53:28.382
So maybe a moving target of a story, but definitely a broader thing to be concerned about when it comes to these JS includes.

864
00:53:28.462 --> 00:53:29.062
Interesting.

865
00:53:29.323 --> 00:53:29.643
Love it.

866
00:53:30.235 --> 00:53:31.396
All right, man.

867
00:53:31.516 --> 00:53:32.737
Black October behind us.

868
00:53:32.857 --> 00:53:34.498
Whatever the hell November is in front of us.

869
00:53:35.999 --> 00:53:40.562
I am not looking forward to the headlines during the holidays.

870
00:53:40.622 --> 00:53:42.623
The holidays are always when hacks happen.

871
00:53:42.643 --> 00:53:44.685
And the hacks have been happening off the holidays.

872
00:53:44.865 --> 00:53:47.006
I don't want to know what's going to happen on the holidays.

873
00:53:47.567 --> 00:53:51.109
This is when actual nation states kind of wake up and start to poke at us.

874
00:53:51.129 --> 00:53:52.110
And that's not what's going on.

875
00:53:52.170 --> 00:53:58.794
Everything that we talked about today was security researchers, you know, finding this stuff, not nation state hackers or cyber criminals, right?

876
00:53:59.194 --> 00:54:12.085
So crystal ball for future podcast episode edits for me is that Thanksgiving and Christmas are going to be pretty spicy over here in the U.S. Yeah, I think the winter is going to be cold.

877
00:54:12.105 --> 00:54:13.887
And I think other nations know that.

878
00:54:14.047 --> 00:54:17.250
So I think the power of greater others may see some fun as well.

879
00:54:17.310 --> 00:54:17.950
So we'll see.

880
00:54:17.970 --> 00:54:19.512
Very Game of Thrones of us, right?

881
00:54:19.692 --> 00:54:20.252
Yeah, I know.

882
00:54:20.292 --> 00:54:21.073
The winter is coming.

883
00:54:21.153 --> 00:54:22.774
Winter is coming.

884
00:54:22.914 --> 00:54:24.636
Hey, but real talk, guys.

885
00:54:24.776 --> 00:54:25.497
Thanksgiving is coming.

886
00:54:26.272 --> 00:54:28.973
We're going to be off next week due to the Thanksgiving holiday.

887
00:54:28.993 --> 00:54:35.694
I do want to say we are quite thankful for you all who listen here on YouTube and on Spotify and Apple Podcasts.

888
00:54:35.794 --> 00:54:42.455
We started this back May of this year, and we really could never have imagined it would have grown to what it is right now with only six months behind us.

889
00:54:42.475 --> 00:54:43.555
So seriously, thank you for listening.

890
00:54:43.896 --> 00:54:44.816
Thank you for hanging out with us.

891
00:54:45.676 --> 00:54:47.856
2027 is going to be a huge year for us.

892
00:54:47.876 --> 00:54:55.238
We just want to express our gratitude for your support, our sponsor's support, and everyone else who's here to hang out.

893
00:54:55.358 --> 00:54:56.118
It's been a good time so far.

894
00:54:56.758 --> 00:54:58.699
And thanks to Mays, our sponsor, for doing this.

895
00:54:58.719 --> 00:55:01.219
They believed in us from episode one, literally a launch partner.

896
00:55:01.299 --> 00:55:02.760
Couldn't have imagined that.

897
00:55:03.300 --> 00:55:08.121
Turns out, you know, our intros are polarizing, but I freaking love them.

898
00:55:08.261 --> 00:55:11.582
And it turns out editors cost money to do that kind of stuff.

899
00:55:11.602 --> 00:55:18.864
So thank you, Mays, for enabling the production values to this so that we're not just publishing two guys, you know, talking on Zoom.

900
00:55:19.104 --> 00:55:22.485
Like, you know, we're trying to put out a good podcast for you guys.

901
00:55:23.565 --> 00:55:25.066
I couldn't have said it better myself.

902
00:55:25.086 --> 00:55:25.466
Super thankful.

903
00:55:25.486 --> 00:55:27.989
Thankful for you, Mr. Low Level.

904
00:55:28.509 --> 00:55:30.552
And thankful for the audience.

905
00:55:30.672 --> 00:55:32.594
And this has been super awesome.

906
00:55:32.814 --> 00:55:34.456
Do you have any traditions?

907
00:55:34.536 --> 00:55:35.737
I know we're wrapping it up.

908
00:55:35.758 --> 00:55:37.540
Do you have any Thanksgiving traditions?

909
00:55:38.280 --> 00:55:42.305
I have one in particular that's like a special stuffing recipe.

910
00:55:42.585 --> 00:55:44.186
That's been in my family for quite a while.

911
00:55:45.086 --> 00:55:48.667
It's like a sausage stuffing, like mashed potato sausage, not like a bread stuffing.

912
00:55:49.847 --> 00:55:54.289
But it's kind of funny because then some of my family wants the bread stuffing and some of my family wants mashed potatoes.

913
00:55:54.309 --> 00:55:58.730
So we kind of have like mashed potatoes, mashed potatoes and like sausage and then bread stuffing.

914
00:55:58.790 --> 00:56:00.131
So there's like a lot of sides.

915
00:56:00.151 --> 00:56:00.991
The whole gradient, yeah.

916
00:56:01.111 --> 00:56:01.531
Yeah, yeah.

917
00:56:01.671 --> 00:56:05.854
And then also it's like, we kind of pride ourselves in being the open door.

918
00:56:06.254 --> 00:56:07.254
So we collect strays.

919
00:56:07.274 --> 00:56:09.836
So every Thanksgiving, it's like, who's out of town?

920
00:56:09.856 --> 00:56:10.576
Who just moved here?

921
00:56:10.616 --> 00:56:11.557
Doesn't have family, whatever.

922
00:56:11.577 --> 00:56:14.738
So I always have a gazillion people in my house and I love it that way.

923
00:56:14.758 --> 00:56:17.420
And it's awesome.

924
00:56:17.540 --> 00:56:23.063
I've had Thanksgivings where folding tables were snaking through the house because people couldn't fit at the dining table.

925
00:56:23.823 --> 00:56:24.483
It just feels good.

926
00:56:24.503 --> 00:56:29.646
It feels like the start of the holiday season and collecting family and all that kind of stuff.

927
00:56:29.786 --> 00:56:30.687
Yeah, we do kind of the same thing.

928
00:56:30.707 --> 00:56:34.029
So we alternate between we host and then my mother-in-law hosts.

929
00:56:34.049 --> 00:56:35.010
So this year we're hosting.

930
00:56:35.030 --> 00:56:37.411
We're hosting 20 people, which means we're doing that.

931
00:56:37.811 --> 00:56:43.735
We're doing that where we have like our main dining room and then like folding table, folding table out into our reading room.

932
00:56:45.076 --> 00:56:47.278
Meal, you know, food-wise is pretty traditional stuff.

933
00:56:47.318 --> 00:56:48.539
Turkey, mac and cheese.

934
00:56:48.559 --> 00:56:51.180
I make like a mac and cheese with a meat sauce kind of thing.

935
00:56:51.220 --> 00:56:55.623
It's kind of like almost like a hamburger helper sort of vibe, like real pasta and stuff.

936
00:56:56.164 --> 00:56:57.605
And just hang out and have good food, man.

937
00:56:57.625 --> 00:56:58.085
It's going to be great.

938
00:56:58.615 --> 00:57:08.264
I got really into, you know, I'm a millennial white male with a beard, so I got really into smoking barbecue for quite a while in my life, smoking meats, smoking meats.

939
00:57:09.224 --> 00:57:12.708
And so, yeah, of course, for a few years, I was smoking the turkey and people liked it.

940
00:57:12.888 --> 00:57:23.998
But the smoked turkey hit or miss, honestly, I kind of like the traditional oven one better, unless I will actually sometimes like cater some turkey from a local Austin barbecue restaurant.

941
00:57:24.398 --> 00:57:25.579
Even if we cook a whole bird,

942
00:57:25.619 --> 00:57:35.467
It's like kind of fun to bring in some local Austin barbecue, but I do make, and this is always a hit, uh, is a, uh, cranberry chipotle barbecue sauce to go with a smoked Turkey.

943
00:57:35.567 --> 00:57:38.710
So I use like whole cranberries and whole like chipotle peppers.

944
00:57:38.750 --> 00:57:41.212
And I make barbecue sauce and like immersion blend the whole thing.

945
00:57:41.232 --> 00:57:41.993
That sounds really good.

946
00:57:42.073 --> 00:57:42.373
Oh my God.

947
00:57:42.393 --> 00:57:43.994
It goes real well with smoked Turkey.

948
00:57:44.054 --> 00:57:44.835
It's like, I don't know.

949
00:57:44.855 --> 00:57:50.179
So especially if family comes in from out of state, it's kind of like, Hey, we're going to do a little Texas thing here for you, you know?

950
00:57:50.199 --> 00:57:50.640
There you go.

951
00:57:50.920 --> 00:57:52.201
So that's, uh, that's super fun.

952
00:57:52.521 --> 00:57:52.862
Cool, man.

953
00:57:53.523 --> 00:57:53.924
Alright y'all.

954
00:57:53.944 --> 00:57:54.165
Sweet.

955
00:57:54.506 --> 00:57:56.914
Well happy hacking, happy Thanksgiving, and we'll see y'all in two weeks.

956
00:57:58.238 --> 00:57:58.479
Peace.
